Equilibria in rent-seeking contests with homogeneous success functions

Economic Theory

Volumn 27, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 719-727

  Malueg, David A ^a   Yates, Andrew J ^b  

^a TULANE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b Department of Economics   (United States)

Author keywords

Existence of equilibrium; Homogeneous contest success functions; Rent seeking

Indexed keywords

EID: 18244395561     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-004-0554-9     Document Type: Article

References (8)

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3. Dixit, A.: Strategic behavior in contests. American Economic Review 77, 891-898 (1987)
4. Nitzan, S.: Modelling rent-seeking contests. European Journal of Political Economy 10, 41-60 (1994)
5. Simon, C., Blume, L.: Mathematics for economists. New York: Norton 1994
6. Skaperdas, S.: Contest success functions. Economic Theory 7, 283-290 (1996)
7. Tollison, R.: Rent-seeking. In: Mueller, D. (ed.) Perspectives on public choice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1997
8. Tullock, G.: Efficient rent-seeking. In: Buchanan, J., Tollison, R., Tullock, G. (eds.) Toward a theory of the rent-seeking society. College Station: Texas A&M University Press 1980