Bargaining and network structure: An experiment

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 136, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 28-65

  Charness, Gary ^a   Corominas Bosch, Margarida ^b   Fréchette, Guillaume R ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITAT POMPEU FABRA   (Spain)

^c NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Bargaining; Experiment; Graph theory; Network; Social learning

Indexed keywords

EID: 34548045744     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: 10957235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2005.06.009     Document Type: Article

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