Bargaining in a network of buyers and sellers

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 115, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 35-77

  Corominas Bosch, Margarida ^a  

^a DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS   (Spain)

Author keywords

Bargaining; Graph theory; Network market

Indexed keywords

EID: 1442306662     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00110-8     Document Type: Article

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