Effort levels in a Cournot Nash contest with asymmetric information

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 69, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 195-210

  Hurley, Terrance M ^a   Shogren, Jason F ^b  

^a IOWA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b Department of Economics and Finance   (United States)

Author keywords

Asymmetric information; Contests; D72; D74; Rent seeking; Risk

Indexed keywords

EID: 0008257178     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(98)00026-7     Document Type: Article

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