Learning and equilibrium as useful approximations: Accuracy of prediction on randomly selected constant sum games

Economic Theory

Volumn 33, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 29-51

  Erev, Ido ^a   Roth, Alvin E ^b   Slonim, Robert L ^c   Barron, Greg ^d  

^a TECHNION ISRAEL INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (Israel)

^b HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c CASE WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^d HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34547167532     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: 14320479     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-007-0214-y     Document Type: Conference Paper

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