Junta distributions and the average-case complexity of manipulating elections

Proceedings of the International Conference on Autonomous Agents

Volumn 2006, Issue , 2006, Pages 497-504

  Procaccia, Ariel D ^a   Rosenschein, Jeffrey S ^a  

^a HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

Author keywords

Computational complexity; Voting

Indexed keywords

DISTRIBUTED COMPUTER SYSTEMS; HEURISTIC METHODS; NETWORK PROTOCOLS; POLYNOMIAL APPROXIMATION;

HEURISTIC POLYNOMIAL TIME; JUNTA DISTRIBUTIONS; MANIPULATING ELECTIONS; VOTING PROTOCOLS;

COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY;

EID: 34247257901     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1160633.1160726     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (11)

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