Noncooperative foundations of the nucleolus in majority games

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 54, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 380-397

  Montero, Maria ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Balancedness; Bargaining; Coalition formation; Majority games; Nucleolus; Power indices

Indexed keywords

EID: 31844433579     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2005.01.001     Document Type: Article

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