Private Sector Involvement and International Financial Crises: An Analytical Perspective

Private Sector Involvement and International Financial Crises: An Analytical Perspective

Volumn , Issue , 2005, Pages 1-224

  Chui, Michael ^a   Gai, Prasanna ^b,c  

^a HONG KONG MONETARY AUTHORITY   (Hong Kong)

^b AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY   (Australia)

^c BANK OF ENGLAND   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Coordination problems; Currency crises; Financial crises; Global games; IMF; International financial architecture; Private sector involvement; Sovereign bankruptcy procedures; Sovereign debt

Indexed keywords

EID: 33847648913     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/0199267758.001.0001     Document Type: Book

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