Trade interdependence, the international financial institutions, and the recent evolution of sovereign-debt renegotiations

Journal of International Economics

Volumn 58, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 177-209

  Klimenko, Mikhail M ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Bargaining games; Debt rescheduling; Negotiations

Indexed keywords

BARGAINING; CREDIT PROVISION; DEBT; ECONOMIC RELATIONS; NEGOTIATION PROCESS;

EID: 0036066599     PISSN: 00221996     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0022-1996(01)00165-9     Document Type: Article

References (44)

1. Trade dependency, bargaining, and external debt
2. Bargaining in legislatures
3. The role of multilateral institutions in the market for sovereign debt
4. Multilateral negotiations for rescheduling developing country debt
5. A constant recontracting model of sovereign debt
6. Sovereign debt: Is to forgive to forget?
7. Sovereign debt repurchases: No cure for overhang
8. Official creditor seniority and burden-sharing in the former Soviet bloc
9. The unique perfect equilibrium of an N-person bargaining game
10. Private investment and sovereign debt negotiations
11. A noncooperative theory of coalitional bargaining
12. Investment incentives: New money, debt relief, and the critical role of conditionality in the debt crisis
13. Recent experience with commercial bank debt reduction
14. Secondary market prices and Mexico's Brady deal
15. Interest rates, growth and external debt: The macroeconomic impact of Mexico's Drady Deal
16. Growth and external debt under risk of debt repudiation
17. Models of sovereign debt: Partial versus general reputations
18. Interest rates, official lending, and the debt crises: A reassessment
19. Burden-sharing among official and private creditors
20. Official credits to developing countries: Implicit transfer to the banks
21. Linking trade and external debt strategies
22. A retrospective on the debt crisis
23. Sanctions: Some simple analytics
24. Debt with potential repudiation: Theoretical and empirical analysis
25. Debt concentration and bargaining power: Large banks, small banks, and secondary market prices
26. Strategic models of sovereign-debt renegotiations
27. Measuring the intensity of competition in export markets
28. A note on the optimal tariff, retaliation and the welfare loss from tariff wars in a framework with intra-industry trade
29. Foreign investment with endogenous protection
30. Sovereign debt as intertemporal barter
31. Multilateral bargaining
32. Is bilateralism bad
33. On the relation between reschedulings and bank value
34. Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model
35. The transfer problem and transport costs II: Analysis of effects of trade impediments
36. Burden sharing in sovereign debt reduction
37. Tolerance of arrearages: How IMF loan policy can effect debt reduction