Bank runs: Liquidity costs and investment distortions

Journal of Monetary Economics

Volumn 41, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 27-38

  Cooper, Russell ^a   Ross, Thomas W ^b  

^a Boston University   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA   (Canada)

Author keywords

Bank runs; Liquidity costs

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031994543     PISSN: 03043932     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0304-3932(97)00070-6     Document Type: Article

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