Coordination risk and the price of debt

European Economic Review

Volumn 48, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 133-153

  Morris, Stephen ^a   Shin, Hyun Song ^b  

^a YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Creditor coordination; Global games

Indexed keywords

CREDIT PROVISION; DEBT; PRICE DYNAMICS; RISK FACTOR;

EID: 0942291286     PISSN: 00142921     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0014-2921(02)00239-8     Document Type: Article

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