Social rewards, externalities and stable preferences

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 70, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 53-73

  Fershtman, Chaim ^a,b   Weiss, Yoram ^b  

^a TILBURG UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

^b TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

Author keywords

Externalities; Incentive mechanism; Social rewards; Stable preferences

Indexed keywords

EID: 0002576501     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(98)00060-7     Document Type: Article

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