Electoral competition with privately-informed candidates

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 58, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 1-29

  Bernhardt, Dan ^a   Duggan, John ^b   Squintani, Francesco ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

^b Department of Political Science   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33751079918     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2006.03.004     Document Type: Article

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