Policy reversals and electoral competition with privately informed parties

Journal of Public Economic Theory

Volumn 4, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 39-61

  Martinelli, César ^a   Matsui, Akihiko ^b  

^a INSTITUTO TECNOLÓGICO AUTÓNOMO DE MÉXICO   (Mexico)

^b UNIVERSITY OF TOKYO   (Japan)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33745201845     PISSN: 10973923     EISSN: 14679779     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9779.00087     Document Type: Article

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