Responder behavior in ultimatum offer games with incomplete information

Journal of Economic Psychology

Volumn 20, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 183-206

  Huck, Steffen ^a  

^a HUMBOLDT UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

Author keywords

Bargaining; Experiments; Motivation

Indexed keywords

EID: 0038605549     PISSN: 01674870     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0167-4870(99)00004-5     Document Type: Article

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