Shareholders should welcome knowledge workers as directors

Journal of Management and Governance

Volumn 10, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 325-345

  Osterloh, Margit ^a   Frey, Bruno S ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ZURICH   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

Board directors; Corporate governance; Firm specific knowledge; Insiders; Shareholders

Indexed keywords

EID: 33749244768     PISSN: 13853457     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10997-006-9003-4     Document Type: Article

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