Introduction: Science, technology and international affairs

Osiris

Volumn 21, Issue , 2006, Pages 1-21

  Krige, John ^a   Barth, Kai Henrik ^b  

^a GEORGIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^b GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33748620954     PISSN: 03697827     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/507133     Document Type: Editorial

References (137)

1. Even the traditionally science-skeptical State Department is rethinking how science and technology has, can, and possibly should interact with foreign policy and diplomacy. For a summary of the kinds of areas in which American diplomacy requires "good science,"
2. see Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's speech to the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Feb. 21, 2000, Washington, D.C., available online at http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/2000/ 000221.html (accessed Nov. 21, 2005).
3. See also National Research Council (U.S.) Committee on Science Technology and Health Aspects of the Foreign Policy Agenda of the United States, The Pervasive Role of Science, Technology, and Health in Foreign Policy: Imperatives for the Department of State (Washington, D.C., 1999). For a critical review of the State Department's perspective on science and technology in foreign policy,
4. see Daniel S. Greenberg, Science, Money, and Politics: Political Triumph and Ethical Erosion (Chicago, 2001), 305-29.
5. Spencer R. Weart, The Discovery of Global Warming (Cambridge, Mass., 2003);
6. Clark A. Miller and Paul N. Edwards, Changing the Atmosphere: Expert Knowledge and Environmental Governance (Cambridge, Mass., 2001).
7. Joseph Cirincione, Jon B. Wolfsthal, and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats, 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C., 2005).
8. Laurie Garrett, The Coming Plague: Newly Emerging Diseases in a World Out of Balance (New York, 1994);
9. idem, Betrayal of Trust: The Collapse of Global Public Health (New York, 2000);
10. idem, "The Next Pandemic?" Foreign Affairs 84 (July/Aug. 2005): 3-23.
11. Eugene B. Skolnikoff, The Elusive Transformation: Science, Technology, and the Evolution of International Politics (Princeton, 1993).
12. For a recent survey of the literature, see Roy MacLeod, ed., Nature and Empire: Science and the Colonial Enterprise, Osiris, 2nd ser., 15 (2000).
13. Daniel J. Kevles, The Physicists: The History of a Scientific Community in Modern America (New York, 1978), describes some of these key developments.
14. See, notably, Michael Fortun and Sylvan S. Schweber, "Scientists and the Legacy of World War II: The Case of Operations Research (OR)," Social Studies o Science 23 (Nov. 1993): 595-642.
15. Vannevar Bush was, of course, an enthusiastic proponent of this idea: Bush, Science, the Endless Frontier: A Report to the President (Washington, D.C., 1945). On scientists as a reserve labor force,
16. see Chandra Mukerji, A Fragile Power: Scientists and the State (Princeton, 1989).
17. Jean-Jacques Salomon, "Science Policy Studies and the Development of Science Policy," in Science, Technology, and Society: A Cross-Disciplinary Perspective, ed. Ina Spiegel-Rösing and Derek de Solla Price (London, 1977),43-70;
18. Bruce L. R. Smith, American Science Policy since World War II (Washington, D.C., 1990).
19. Daniel J. Kevles, "Foundations, Universities, and Trends in Support for the Physical and Biological Sciences, 1900-1992," Dædalus 121 (Fall 1992): 195-235.
20. Paul Forman, "Behind Quantum Electronics: National Security as Basis for Physical Research in the United States, 1940-1960," Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences 18 (1987): 149-229;
21. Daniel J. Kevles, "Principles and Politics in Federal R&D Policy, 1945-1990: An Appreciation of the Bush Report," in Science, the Endless Frontier: A Report to the President, by Vannevar Bush, National Science Foundation [NSF] report 90-8 (Washington, D.C., 1990), ix-xxxiii (an introduction to the version of the report reprinted by the NSF on its fortieth anniversary).
22. Nicolas Rasmussen, "The Mid-Century Biophysics Bubble: Hiroshima and the Biological Revolution in America, Revisited," History of Science 35 (1997): 245-93.
23. Aant Elzinga and Catharina Landström, Internationalism and Science (London, 1996).
24. For a short introduction to the issue as phrased in these terms, see Robert E. Kohler, Landscapes and Labscapes: Exploring the Lab-Field Border in Biology (Chicago, 2002), chap. 1.
25. Clark A. Miller, "'An Effective Instrument of Peace': Scientific Cooperation as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy, 1938-1950" (this volume).
26. Joseph Manzione, "'Amusing and Amazing and Practical and Military': The Legacy of Scientific Internationalism in American Foreign Policy, 1945-1963," Diplomatic History 24 (Winter 2000): 21-55;
27. Allison L. C. de Cerreno and Alex Keynan, Scientific Cooperation, State Conflict: The Roles of Scientists in Mitigating International Discord, Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, vol. 866 (New York, 1998).
28. For an early overview, see Brigitte Schroeder-Gudehus, "Science, Technology, and Foreign Policy;" in Spiegel-Rösing and Price, Science, Technology, and Society (cit. n. 10), 473-506;
29. Ronald E. Doel and Zuoyue Wang, "Science and Technology," in Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy, ed. Alexander DeConde, Richard Dean Burns, and Fredrik Logevall, rev. ed. (New York, 2001), 443-59.
30. Gregg Herken, Cardinal Choices: Presidential Science Advising from the Atomic Bomb to SDI, rev. and exp., Stanford Nuclear Age series (Stanford, 2000);
31. Harold Karan Jacobson and Eric Stein, Diplomats, Scientists, and Politicians: The United States and the Nuclear Test Ban Negotiations (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1966);
32. Robert Gilpin, American Scientists and Nuclear Weapons Policy (Princeton, 1962);
33. Robert Gilpin and Christopher Wright, eds., Scientists and National Policy-Making (New York, 1964);
34. Matthew Evangelista, Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to End the Cold War (Ithaca, N.Y., 1999);
35. Sheila Jasanoff, The Fifth Branch: Science Advisers as Policymakers (Cambridge, Mass., 1990).
36. United States Congress, House Committee on International Relations, and Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy: An Extended Study of the Interactions of Science and Technology with United States Foreign Policy, 3 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1977).
37. From the vast literature dealing with Europe, see John Krige, "The Politics of European Scientific Collaboration," in Companion to Science in the Twentieth Century, ed. John Krige and Dominique Pestre (London, 1997);
38. Johan Schot, Thomas Misa, and Ruth Oldenziel, eds., Tensions of Europe: The Role of Technology in the Making of Europe, special issue, History and Technology 21 (March 2005);
39. Margaret Sharpe and Claire Shearman, European Technological Collaboration (London, 1987).
40. For a survey, see Ronald E. Doel, "Scientists as Policyrnakers, Advisors, and Intelligence Agents: Linking Contemporary Diplomatic History with the History of Contemporary Science," in The Historiography of Contemporary Science and Technology, ed. Thomas Söderqvist (Amsterdam, 1997), 215-44.
41. David C. Arnold, Spying from Space: Constructing America's Satellite Command Systems (College Station, Texas, 2005);
42. Dwayne A. Day, John M. Logsdon, and Brian Latel, eds., Eye in the Sky: The Story of the Corona Spy Satellites (Washington, D.C., 1998).
43. Walter A. McDougall, The Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age (Baltimore, 1997).
44. John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War (Oxford, 1987).
45. But see Gerard James Fitzgerald, From Prevention to Infection: Intramural Aerobiology, Biomedical Technology, and the Origins of Biological Warfare Research in the United States, 1910-1955 (Ph.D. diss., Carnegie Mellon Univ., 2003).
46. Diplomatic and military historians have discussed commonalities and differences with political scientists in Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, eds., Bridges and Boundaries: Historians, Political Scientists, and the Study of International Relations (Cambridge, Mass., 2001).
47. Pierre Mesmer, Journal Officiel, Jan. 24, 1963, 1613. For the significance of the nuclear in France,
48. see Gabrielle Hecht, The Radiance of France: Nuclear Power and National Identity after World War II (Cambridge, Mass., 1998).
49. Starting points include Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb (1986, repr. New York, 1995);
50. David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb (New Haven, 1994);
51. Margaret Gowing and Lorna Arnold, Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy, 1945-1952, 2 vols. (New York, 1974);
52. André Bendjebbar, Histoire secrète de la bombe atomique française (Paris, 2000); George (Paris, 2000);
53. George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb (Berkeley, 2001);
54. John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb (Stanford, 1988);
55. Avner Cohen, Israel and the Bomb (New York, 1998).
56. For an overview, see McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New York, 1988).
57. Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon (Ithaca, NY, 1989);
58. Michael Mandelbaum, The Nuclear Revolution: International Politics before and after Hiroshima (New York, 1981).
59. Since the end of the cold war, the nuclear threat has shifted to some extent from states to nonstate actors. Charles D. Ferguson, William C. Potter, with Amy Sands et al., The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism (Monterey, Calif., 2004);
60. Graham Allison, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe (New York, 2004).
61. Ambassador Robert L. Gallucci, dean of the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, interview with Kai-Henrik Barth, Georgetown Univ., Washington, D.C., Sept. 23, 2005. A copy of the interview is available on request from Barth.
62. See also Joel S. Wit, Daniel Poneman, and Robert L. Gallucci, Going Critical: The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis (Washington, D.C., 2004).
63. Thus Lawrence Scheinman, "Was Atoms for Peace a Mistake?" in Atoms for Peace: An Analysis after Thirty Years, ed. Joseph F Pilat, Robert E. Pendley, and Charles K. Ebinger (Boulder, Colo., 1985), 197-203, remarks that the distinction between peaceful and military uses cannot be made technically except in terms of end-product; they can only be separated by political means (202).
64. Angela N. H. Creager, "Tracing the Politics of Changing Postwar Research Practices: The Export of 'American' Radioisotopes to European Biologists," Studies in the History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Science 33 (2002): 367-88;
65. Martin J. Medhurst, "Atoms for Peace and Nuclear Hegemony: The Rhetorical Structure of a Cold War Campaign," Armed Forces and Society 23 (1997): 571-93.
66. It continues to have this signiticance today. For example, Gallucci has explained how the United States offered the North Koreans light-water reactors built in South Korea, which "were knock-offs of American, Westinghouse reactors," to stop them from building gas-graphite reactors, which could be used for a weapons program. Gallucci interview (cit. n. 32).
67. On the South African program, see Peter Liberman, "The Rise and Fall of the South African Bomb," International Security 26 (Fall 2001): 45-86;
68. David Albright, "South Africa and the Affordable Bomb," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 50 (July/Aug. 1994): 37-47;
69. Mitchell Reiss, Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities, Woodrow Wilson Center Special Studies (Baltimore, 1995), 7-43;
70. Helen E. Purkitt and Stephen F. Burgess, South Africa's Weapons of Mass Destruction (Bloomington, Ind., 2005), chap. 3. For a perspective from those involved in building the bomb,
71. see Hannes Steyn, Richardt van der Wait, and Jan van Loggerenberg, Armament and Disarmament: South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Experience (Pretoria, 2003). For an official history of South Africa's early nuclear program (which, of course, doesn't mention nuclear weapons),
72. see A. R. Newby-Fraser, Chain Reaction: Twenty Years of Nuclear Research and Development in South Africa (Pretoria, 1979).
73. Clare Wells, The UN, UNESCO, and the Politics of Knowledge (London, 1987).
74. Theoretical physicists Leon Van Hove in Europe and Victor Weisskopf in the United States were particularly emphatic about this point. Both were directors general of CERN, the European Organization for Nuclear Research in Geneva, and knew very well that an American-sponsored resolution in UNESCO in June 1950 had been crucial to the establishment of the regional laboratory. For the U.S. foreign policy concerns that inspired this intervention,
75. see John Krige, "Isidor I. Rabi and CERN," Physics in Perspective 7 (2005): 150-64.
76. See also idem, American Hegemony and the Postwar Reconstruction of Science in Europe (Cambridge, Mass., 2006), chap. 3.
77. Political scientists have long debated why states seek nuclear weapons. For an overview of the debate, see Tanya Ogilvie-Wbite, "Is There a Theory of Nuclear Proliferation? An Analysis of the Contemporary Debate," Nonproliferation Review (Fall 1996): 43-60. For one of the most influential models of proliferation,
78. see Scott D. Sagan, "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb," International Security 21 (Winter 1996/97): 54-86.
79. See also Itty Abraham, The Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb: Science, Secrecy, and the Post-colonial State (London, 1998)
80. Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb (cit. n. 29).
81. Gallucci interview. See also Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci, Going Critical. (Both cil. n. 32.)
82. On the MIT that Brown deemed exemplary, see Stuart W. Leslie, The Cold War and American Science: The Military-Industrial-Academic Complex at MIT and Stanford (New York, 1993); idem, "Profit and Loss: The Military and MIT in the Postwar Era," Hist. Stud. Phys. Biol. Sci. 21 (1990): 59-85.
83. idem, "Profit and Loss: The Military and MIT in the Postwar Era," Hist. Stud. Phys. Biol. Sci. 21 (1990): 59-85.
84. Walt W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto, 3rd ed. (Cambridge, 1990).
85. Joseph S. Nye Jr., "Soft Power," Foreign Policy 80 (Autumn 1990): 153-71. Nye writes: "Soft cooptive power is just as important as hard command power. If a state can make its power seem legitimate in the eyes of others, it will encounter less resistance to its wishes. If its culture and ideology are attractive, others will more willingly follow. If it can establish international norms consistent with its society, it is less likely to have to change. If it can support institutions that make other states wish to channel their activities in ways the dominant state prefers, it may be spared the costly exercise of coercive or hard power" (167).
86. See also idem, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York, 2004).
87. Gallucci provides an insight into the internal disputes over the interpretation of intelligence. He tells how, on one occasion, he was called over by the CIA to study pictures of a "hole in the Kalahari Desert" detected by Soviet intelligence, which suggested that South Africa was about to test a nuclear weapon. He was told by a senior official in the State Department that this intelligence "was inconvenient politically,"and that Galluci had to "find another explanation." This did not mean that the CIA was expected "to twist the intelligence or anything," but the senior official wanted Gallucci "to go back and tell [the CIA] I know they think this is a test site, but I want them to use a little imagination here, because South Africans tell me it's not a test site. So I want you to go back and say, 'If it's not a test site, what else could it be?'" Gallucci and the CIA, very reluctantly, did as they were asked. "So we, in fact, produced a paper on what else could it be. Nobody believed any of it, but we did it." Galluci interview (cit. n. 32).
88. Gallucci interview (cit. n. 32). On Pakistan's nuclear program see Samina Ahmed, "Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Program: Turning Points and Nuclear Choices," International Security 23 (Spring 1999): 178-204. Urenco is a uranium enrichment consortium established in 1970 by Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. The three countries sought advanced enrichment capabilities to guarantee a steady fuel supply for their nuclear power plants. On A. Q. Khan, see William J. Broad, David E. Sanger, and Raymond Bonner, "A Tale of Nuclear Proliferation: How Pakistani Built His Network;'New York Times, Feb. 12, 2004, A1; David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, "Unraveling the A. Q. Khan and Future Proliferation Networks," Washington Quarterly 28 (Spring 2005): 111-28.
89. see Samina Ahmed, "Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Program: Turning Points and Nuclear Choices," International Security 23 (Spring 1999): 178-204. Urenco is a uranium enrichment consortium established in 1970 by Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. The three countries sought advanced enrichment capabilities to guarantee a steady fuel supply for their nuclear power plants. On A. Q. Khan, see William J. Broad, David E. Sanger, and Raymond Bonner, "A Tale of Nuclear Proliferation: How Pakistani Built His Network;'New York Times, Feb. 12, 2004, A1; David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, "Unraveling the A. Q. Khan and Future Proliferation Networks," Washington Quarterly 28 (Spring 2005): 111-28.
90. see William J. Broad, David E. Sanger, and Raymond Bonner, "A Tale of Nuclear Proliferation: How Pakistani Built His Network;'New York Times, Feb. 12, 2004, A1;
91. David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, "Unraveling the A. Q. Khan and Future Proliferation Networks," Washington Quarterly 28 (Spring 2005): 111-28.
92. Galluci interview (cit. n. 32)
93. On refashioning identities see Mario Biagioli, Galileo Courtier: The Practice of Science in the Culture of Absolutism (Chicago, 1993); David Kaiser, "The Postwar Suburbanization of American Physics," American Quarterly 56 (2004): 851-88. On disciplinary transformations, see the references in note 49. On one major think tank, see Martin J. Collins, Cold War Laboratory: RAND, the Air Force, and the American State, 1945-1950 (Washington, D.C., 2002); David Hounshell, "The Cold War, RAND and the Generation of Knowledge," Hist. Stud. Phys. Biol. Sci. 27 (1997): 237-67.
94. David Kaiser, "The Postwar Suburbanization of American Physics," American Quarterly 56 (2004): 851-88. On disciplinary transformations, see the references in note 49. On one major think tank,
95. see Martin J. Collins, Cold War Laboratory: RAND, the Air Force, and the American State, 1945-1950 (Washington, D.C., 2002);
96. David Hounshell, "The Cold War, RAND and the Generation of Knowledge," Hist. Stud. Phys. Biol. Sci. 27 (1997): 237-67.
97. See Michael Aaron Dennis, "'Our First Line of Defense': Two University Laboratories in the Postwar American State," Isis 85 (1994): 427-55;
98. Forman, "Behind Quantum Electronics" (cit. n. 12);
99. Daniel J. Kevles, "Cold War and Hot Physics: Science, Security, and the American State, 1945-56," Hist. Stud. Phys. Biol. Sci. 20 (1990): 239-64;
100. Leslie, The Cold War and American Science (cit. n. 42);
101. Rebecca S. Lowen, "'Exploiting a Wonderful Opportunity': The Patronage of Scientific Research at Stanford University, 1937-1965," Minerva 30 (1992): 391-421;
102. idem, Creating the Cold War University: The Transformation of Stanford (Berkeley, 1997); Kai-Henrik Barth, "The Politics of Seismology: Nuclear Testing, Arms Control, and the Transformation of a Discipline," Soc. Stud. Sci. 33 (Oct. 2003): 743-81.
103. Kai-Henrik Barth, "The Politics of Seismology: Nuclear Testing, Arms Control, and the Transformation of a Discipline," Soc. Stud. Sci. 33 (Oct. 2003): 743-81.
104. See, e.g.,Allan Needell, "'Truth is Our Weapon': Project TROY, Political Warfare, and Government-Academic Relations in the National Security State," Diplomatic History 17 (1993): 399-420.
105. See also Mark Solovey, "Project Camelot and the 1960s Epistemological Revolution: Rethinking the Politics-Patronage-Social Science Nexus," Soc. Stud. Sci. 31 (April 2001): 171-206.
106. Kelman is quoted in Solovey, "Project Camelot and the 1960s Epistemological Revolution" (cit. n. 50),
107. 189. See also Gilpin, American Scientists (cit. n. 19).
108. Jean-Jacques Salomon, "The Internationale of Science," Science Studies, 1 (1971): 23-42, on 26.
109. Dennis, "'Our First Line of Defense"' (cit. n. 49).
110. In some European countries, the budget for European scientific and technological collaboration often comes from the foreign office, not the science ministry.
111. On the report, see Anonymous, "Science and Foreign Relations: Berkner Report to the U.S. Department of State," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 6 (June 1950): 293-8. See also Allan A. Needell, Science, Cold War, and the American State: Lloyd V. Berkner and the Balance of Professional Ideals (Amsterdam, 2000).
112. See also Allan A. Needell, Science, Cold War, and the American State: Lloyd V. Berkner and the Balance of Professional Ideals (Amsterdam, 2000).
113. These words are from Clark A. Miller, "Scientific Internationalism in American Foreign Policy: The Case of Meteorology, 1947-1958," in Miller and Edwards, Changing the Atmosphere (cit. n. 2), 167-217, on 173.
114. The State Department and the CIA grappled with this issue. A scientist had "to be known internationally in order to have the entrée he needs for collecting information in a foreign country." At the same time, scientists were very wary of being associated with "spying" since they feared it would jeopardize their scientific careers. Hence the importance of informal intelligence gathering. See Wilton Lexow, "The Science Attaché Program," Studies in Intelligence, CIA Document CSI-2001-00018, published April 1, 1966, released July 30, 2001, available at http://www.cia.gov/csi/kent_csi/author-combine.htm (accessed on February 2, 2006).
115. See Albright, AAAS speech (cit. n. 1).
116. A task force reporting to the State Department on the dangers of the proliferation of dual-use rocket technology in the mid- 1960s made the point quite explicitly. Multilateral programs should be encouraged, it asserted, since "[i]n such a framework rocket programs tend to be more open, serve peaceful uses and are subject to international control and absorb manpower and financial resources that might otherwise be diverted to purely national programs. National rocket programs tend to concentrate on militarily significant solid and storable liquid fueled systems, are less open, and less responsive to international controls." Cited in John Krige, "Technology, Foreign Policy, and International Cooperation in Space," in Critical Issues in the History of Spaceflight, ed. Steven J. Dick and Roger D. Launius (Washington, D.C, 2006).
117. This term is so defined by Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Bringing Transnational Relations Back in: Introduction," in Bringing Transnational Relations Back in: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures, and International Institutions, ed. Thomas Risse-Kappen (Cambridge, 1995), 3-33, on 3.
118. Europeans have been traumatized by the outbreak of "mad cow disease" and are now far more sensitive than many others about what they eat, although it must be said that the enthusiasm for "organic food" in the United States is rising sharply as well. On public perceptions of the nuclear, see Spencer R. Weart, Nuclear Fear: A History of Images (Cambridge, Mass., 1988). More generally, Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky, Risk and Danger: An Essay on the Selection of Technological and Environmental Dangers (Berkeley, 1983).
119. More generally, Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky, Risk and Danger: An Essay on the Selection of Technological and Environmental Dangers (Berkeley, 1983).
120. See Stephen Hilgartner, Science on Stage: Expert Advice as Public Drama (Stanford, 2000).
121. Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, "Science and Diplomacy: Strengthening State for the 21st Century," Policy Statement on Science & Technology and Diplomacy, attachment to memorandum signed May 12, 2000, http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/2000/000512b.html (accessed Nov. 21, 2005).
122. Thus, speaking to the American Association for the Advancement of Science in February 2000, Albright claimed that "science does not support the 'Frankenfood' fears of some, particularly outside the United States, that biotech or other products will harm human health." Cited by Jasanoff, "Biotechnology and Empire: The Global Power of Seeds and Science" (this volume). The dismissal of the critics of GMOs (including some British and French scientists) as being irrational and impervious to the supposedly unambiguous dictates of "science" suggests that the secretary of state was here more interested in harnessing science to legitimate U.S. business interests than in framing policies that reflected the scientific uncertainties and public anxieties about the effects of genetic modification. See also Sheila Jasanoff, Designs on Nature: Science and Democracy in Europe and the United States (Princeton, 2005).
123. See also Sheila Jasanoff, Designs on Nature: Science and Democracy in Europe and the United States (Princeton, 2005).
124. Ann M. Florini, ed., The Third Force: The Rise of Transnational Civil Society (Tokyo, 2000);
125. Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Ithaca, 1998).
126. Eugene B. Skolnikoff, Science, Technology, and American Foreign Policy (Cambridge, Mass., 1967); idem, The Elusive Transformation (cit. n. 5).
127. idem, The Elusive Transformation (cit. n. 5).
128. Jessica T. Mathews, "Power Shift," Foreign Affairs 76 (Jan./Feb. 1997): 50-66. Jessica Mathews has been the president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace since 1997. This is one of the most influential think tanks in Washington, D.C.
129. John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford, 1997);
130. Geir Lundestad, Empire by Integration: The United States and European Integration, 1945-1997 (Oxford University Press, 1998);
131. Charles S. Maier, "An American Empire? The Problems of Frontiers and Peace in Twenty-First Century World Politics," Harvard Magazine 105 (Nov./Dec. 2002).
132. Mathews, "Power Shift" (cit. n. 67), 53.
133. See also Shelia Jasanoff, ed., States of Knowledge: The Co-production of Science and Social Order (London,2004).
134. James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (New Haven, 1998).
135. For a recent private initiative to build "one (satellite-linked) world" in the telecommunications sector, see Martin J. Collins, "One World ... One Telephone: Iridium, One Look at the Making of a Global Age," History Technol. 21 (Sept. 2005): 301-24.
136. The allusions to Hughes are deliberate: Thomas P. Hughes, Networks of Power: Electrification in Western Society, 1880-1930 (Baltimore, 1988); idem, "The Evolution of Large Technological Systems," in The Social Construction of Technological Systems: New Directions in the Sociology and History of Technology, ed. Wiebe E. Bijker, Thomas P. Hughes, and Trevor Pinch (Cambridge, Mass., 1987),51-82.
137. idem, "The Evolution of Large Technological Systems," in The Social Construction of Technological Systems: New Directions in the Sociology and History of Technology, ed. Wiebe E. Bijker, Thomas P. Hughes, and Trevor Pinch (Cambridge, Mass., 1987),51-82.