"Amusing and Amazing and Practical and Military": The Legacy of Scientific Internationalism in American Foreign Policy, 1945-1963

Diplomatic History

Volumn 24, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 21-55

  Manzione, Joseph ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0007281439     PISSN: 01452096     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-7709.00197     Document Type: Article

References (260)

1. Norbert Wiener, letter to the editor, The Atlantic Monthly, December 1946.
2. Don K. Price, The Scientific Estate (Cambridge, MA, 1965), 3.
3. Ibid., 9, 10.
4. Ibid., 20, 274, 275. Price's monograph was part of what historian David A. Hollinger has called a "little renaissance of science studies" between 1962 and 1965 concerning the place of science in postwar American government. Included in this "renaissance" were Warren Hagstrom's The Scientific Community (New York, 1965); Karl Hill's The Management of Scientists (Boston, 1964); Clark Kerr's The Uses of the University (Cambridge, MA, 1963); Fritz Machlup's The Production and Distribution of Knowledge in the United States (Princeton, 1962); Michael Polanyi's Science, Faith, and Society (Chicago, 1964); and Derek J. Price's Little Science, Big Science (New York, 1963). See Hollinger, "Free Enterprise and Free Inquiry: The Emergence of Laissez Faire Communitarianism in the Ideology of Science in the United States," New Literary History 21 (1990): 899, 915.
5. Ibid., 20, 274, 275. Price's monograph was part of what historian David A. Hollinger has called a "little renaissance of science studies" between 1962 and 1965 concerning the place of science in postwar American government. Included in this "renaissance" were Warren Hagstrom's The Scientific Community (New York, 1965); Karl Hill's The Management of Scientists (Boston, 1964); Clark Kerr's The Uses of the University (Cambridge, MA, 1963); Fritz Machlup's The Production and Distribution of Knowledge in the United States (Princeton, 1962); Michael Polanyi's Science, Faith, and Society (Chicago, 1964); and Derek J. Price's Little Science, Big Science (New York, 1963). See Hollinger, "Free Enterprise and Free Inquiry: The Emergence of Laissez Faire Communitarianism in the Ideology of Science in the United States," New Literary History 21 (1990): 899, 915.
6. Ibid., 20, 274, 275. Price's monograph was part of what historian David A. Hollinger has called a "little renaissance of science studies" between 1962 and 1965 concerning the place of science in postwar American government. Included in this "renaissance" were Warren Hagstrom's The Scientific Community (New York, 1965); Karl Hill's The Management of Scientists (Boston, 1964); Clark Kerr's The Uses of the University (Cambridge, MA, 1963); Fritz Machlup's The Production and Distribution of Knowledge in the United States (Princeton, 1962); Michael Polanyi's Science, Faith, and Society (Chicago, 1964); and Derek J. Price's Little Science, Big Science (New York, 1963). See Hollinger, "Free Enterprise and Free Inquiry: The Emergence of Laissez Faire Communitarianism in the Ideology of Science in the United States," New Literary History 21 (1990): 899, 915.
7. Ibid., 20, 274, 275. Price's monograph was part of what historian David A. Hollinger has called a "little renaissance of science studies" between 1962 and 1965 concerning the place of science in postwar American government. Included in this "renaissance" were Warren Hagstrom's The Scientific Community (New York, 1965); Karl Hill's The Management of Scientists (Boston, 1964); Clark Kerr's The Uses of the University (Cambridge, MA, 1963); Fritz Machlup's The Production and Distribution of Knowledge in the United States (Princeton, 1962); Michael Polanyi's Science, Faith, and Society (Chicago, 1964); and Derek J. Price's Little Science, Big Science (New York, 1963). See Hollinger, "Free Enterprise and Free Inquiry: The Emergence of Laissez Faire Communitarianism in the Ideology of Science in the United States," New Literary History 21 (1990): 899, 915.
8. Ibid., 20, 274, 275. Price's monograph was part of what historian David A. Hollinger has called a "little renaissance of science studies" between 1962 and 1965 concerning the place of science in postwar American government. Included in this "renaissance" were Warren Hagstrom's The Scientific Community (New York, 1965); Karl Hill's The Management of Scientists (Boston, 1964); Clark Kerr's The Uses of the University (Cambridge, MA, 1963); Fritz Machlup's The Production and Distribution of Knowledge in the United States (Princeton, 1962); Michael Polanyi's Science, Faith, and Society (Chicago, 1964); and Derek J. Price's Little Science, Big Science (New York, 1963). See Hollinger, "Free Enterprise and Free Inquiry: The Emergence of Laissez Faire Communitarianism in the Ideology of Science in the United States," New Literary History 21 (1990): 899, 915.
9. Ibid., 20, 274, 275. Price's monograph was part of what historian David A. Hollinger has called a "little renaissance of science studies" between 1962 and 1965 concerning the place of science in postwar American government. Included in this "renaissance" were Warren Hagstrom's The Scientific Community (New York, 1965); Karl Hill's The Management of Scientists (Boston, 1964); Clark Kerr's The Uses of the University (Cambridge, MA, 1963); Fritz Machlup's The Production and Distribution of Knowledge in the United States (Princeton, 1962); Michael Polanyi's Science, Faith, and Society (Chicago, 1964); and Derek J. Price's Little Science, Big Science (New York, 1963). See Hollinger, "Free Enterprise and Free Inquiry: The Emergence of Laissez Faire Communitarianism in the Ideology of Science in the United States," New Literary History 21 (1990): 899, 915.
10. Ibid., 20, 274, 275. Price's monograph was part of what historian David A. Hollinger has called a "little renaissance of science studies" between 1962 and 1965 concerning the place of science in postwar American government. Included in this "renaissance" were Warren Hagstrom's The Scientific Community (New York, 1965); Karl Hill's The Management of Scientists (Boston, 1964); Clark Kerr's The Uses of the University (Cambridge, MA, 1963); Fritz Machlup's The Production and Distribution of Knowledge in the United States (Princeton, 1962); Michael Polanyi's Science, Faith, and Society (Chicago, 1964); and Derek J. Price's Little Science, Big Science (New York, 1963). See Hollinger, "Free Enterprise and Free Inquiry: The Emergence of Laissez Faire Communitarianism in the Ideology of Science in the United States," New Literary History 21 (1990): 899, 915.
11. Ibid., 20, 274, 275. Price's monograph was part of what historian David A. Hollinger has called a "little renaissance of science studies" between 1962 and 1965 concerning the place of science in postwar American government. Included in this "renaissance" were Warren Hagstrom's The Scientific Community (New York, 1965); Karl Hill's The Management of Scientists (Boston, 1964); Clark Kerr's The Uses of the University (Cambridge, MA, 1963); Fritz Machlup's The Production and Distribution of Knowledge in the United States (Princeton, 1962); Michael Polanyi's Science, Faith, and Society (Chicago, 1964); and Derek J. Price's Little Science, Big Science (New York, 1963). See Hollinger, "Free Enterprise and Free Inquiry: The Emergence of Laissez Faire Communitarianism in the Ideology of Science in the United States," New Literary History 21 (1990): 899, 915.
12. Paul Forman, "Behind Quantum Electronics: National Security as a Basis for Physical Research in the United States," Historical Studies of the Physical and Biological Sciences (HSPBS) 18, no. 1 (1987): 149-229. For another perspective on this conclusion see Leonard A. Cole, Politics and the Restraint of Science (Totowa, NJ, 1983).
13. Paul Forman, "Behind Quantum Electronics: National Security as a Basis for Physical Research in the United States," Historical Studies of the Physical and Biological Sciences (HSPBS) 18, no. 1 (1987): 149-229. For another perspective on this conclusion see Leonard A. Cole, Politics and the Restraint of Science (Totowa, NJ, 1983).
14. Daniel J. Kevles, "Cold War and Hot Physics: Science, Security, and the American State, 1945-56," HSPBS 20, no. 2 (1990): 239-64.
15. Aaron L. Friedberg, "Science, the Cold War, and the American State," Diplomatic History 20 (Winter 1996): 117.
16. Much has been done to characterize the relationship between government and science since the above-mentioned "little renaissance." On the "flexible" and contractual nature of military or intelligence support for research and development see, for example, Harvey Sapolsky, Science and the Navy: The History of the Office of Naval Research (Princeton, 1990); Jacob Neufeld, Ballistic Missiles in the United States Air Force, 1945-1060 (Washington, 1990); Michael H. Gorn, Harnessing the Genie: Science and Technology Forecasting for the Air Force, 1944-1986 (Washington, 1988); Walter A. McDougall, The Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age (New York, 1985); and Robert A. Divine, The Sputnik Challenge: Eisenhower's Response to the Soviet Satellite (New York, 1993). On professional relationships between scientific institutions, associations, or personnel and the U.S. government see, for example, Roger L. Geiger, Research and Relevant Knowledge: American Research Universities since World War II (New York, 1993); Zuoyue Wang, "The Politics of Big Science in the Cold War: PSAC and the Funding of SLAC," HSPBS 25, no. 2 (1995): 329-56; Finn Aaserud, "Sputnik and the 'Princeton Three': The National Security Laboratory That Was Not to Be," HSPBS 25, no. 2 (1995): 185-259; Hollinger, "Free Enterprise and Free Inquiry," 897-918; and Robert W. Seidel, "A Home for Big Science: The Atomic Energy Commission's Laboratory System," HSPBS 16, no. 1 (1986): 135-76. For a perspective that more closely matches Paul Forman's "coercive" model see Stuart W. Leslie, The Cold War and American Science: The Military-Industrial-Academic Complex at MIT and Stanford (New York, 1993).
17. Much has been done to characterize the relationship between government and science since the above-mentioned "little renaissance." On the "flexible" and contractual nature of military or intelligence support for research and development see, for example, Harvey Sapolsky, Science and the Navy: The History of the Office of Naval Research (Princeton, 1990); Jacob Neufeld, Ballistic Missiles in the United States Air Force, 1945-1060 (Washington, 1990); Michael H. Gorn, Harnessing the Genie: Science and Technology Forecasting for the Air Force, 1944-1986 (Washington, 1988); Walter A. McDougall, The Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age (New York, 1985); and Robert A. Divine, The Sputnik Challenge: Eisenhower's Response to the Soviet Satellite (New York, 1993). On professional relationships between scientific institutions, associations, or personnel and the U.S. government see, for example, Roger L. Geiger, Research and Relevant Knowledge: American Research Universities since World War II (New York, 1993); Zuoyue Wang, "The Politics of Big Science in the Cold War: PSAC and the Funding of SLAC," HSPBS 25, no. 2 (1995): 329-56; Finn Aaserud, "Sputnik and the 'Princeton Three': The National Security Laboratory That Was Not to Be," HSPBS 25, no. 2 (1995): 185-259; Hollinger, "Free Enterprise and Free Inquiry," 897-918; and Robert W. Seidel, "A Home for Big Science: The Atomic Energy Commission's Laboratory System," HSPBS 16, no. 1 (1986): 135-76. For a perspective that more closely matches Paul Forman's "coercive" model see Stuart W. Leslie, The Cold War and American Science: The Military-Industrial-Academic Complex at MIT and Stanford (New York, 1993).
18. Much has been done to characterize the relationship between government and science since the above-mentioned "little renaissance." On the "flexible" and contractual nature of military or intelligence support for research and development see, for example, Harvey Sapolsky, Science and the Navy: The History of the Office of Naval Research (Princeton, 1990); Jacob Neufeld, Ballistic Missiles in the United States Air Force, 1945-1060 (Washington, 1990); Michael H. Gorn, Harnessing the Genie: Science and Technology Forecasting for the Air Force, 1944-1986 (Washington, 1988); Walter A. McDougall, The Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age (New York, 1985); and Robert A. Divine, The Sputnik Challenge: Eisenhower's Response to the Soviet Satellite (New York, 1993). On professional relationships between scientific institutions, associations, or personnel and the U.S. government see, for example, Roger L. Geiger, Research and Relevant Knowledge: American Research Universities since World War II (New York, 1993); Zuoyue Wang, "The Politics of Big Science in the Cold War: PSAC and the Funding of SLAC," HSPBS 25, no. 2 (1995): 329-56; Finn Aaserud, "Sputnik and the 'Princeton Three': The National Security Laboratory That Was Not to Be," HSPBS 25, no. 2 (1995): 185-259; Hollinger, "Free Enterprise and Free Inquiry," 897-918; and Robert W. Seidel, "A Home for Big Science: The Atomic Energy Commission's Laboratory System," HSPBS 16, no. 1 (1986): 135-76. For a perspective that more closely matches Paul Forman's "coercive" model see Stuart W. Leslie, The Cold War and American Science: The Military-Industrial-Academic Complex at MIT and Stanford (New York, 1993).
19. Much has been done to characterize the relationship between government and science since the above-mentioned "little renaissance." On the "flexible" and contractual nature of military or intelligence support for research and development see, for example, Harvey Sapolsky, Science and the Navy: The History of the Office of Naval Research (Princeton, 1990); Jacob Neufeld, Ballistic Missiles in the United States Air Force, 1945-1060 (Washington, 1990); Michael H. Gorn, Harnessing the Genie: Science and Technology Forecasting for the Air Force, 1944-1986 (Washington, 1988); Walter A. McDougall, The Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age (New York, 1985); and Robert A. Divine, The Sputnik Challenge: Eisenhower's Response to the Soviet Satellite (New York, 1993). On professional relationships between scientific institutions, associations, or personnel and the U.S. government see, for example, Roger L. Geiger, Research and Relevant Knowledge: American Research Universities since World War II (New York, 1993); Zuoyue Wang, "The Politics of Big Science in the Cold War: PSAC and the Funding of SLAC," HSPBS 25, no. 2 (1995): 329-56; Finn Aaserud, "Sputnik and the 'Princeton Three': The National Security Laboratory That Was Not to Be," HSPBS 25, no. 2 (1995): 185-259; Hollinger, "Free Enterprise and Free Inquiry," 897-918; and Robert W. Seidel, "A Home for Big Science: The Atomic Energy Commission's Laboratory System," HSPBS 16, no. 1 (1986): 135-76. For a perspective that more closely matches Paul Forman's "coercive" model see Stuart W. Leslie, The Cold War and American Science: The Military-Industrial-Academic Complex at MIT and Stanford (New York, 1993).
20. Much has been done to characterize the relationship between government and science since the above-mentioned "little renaissance." On the "flexible" and contractual nature of military or intelligence support for research and development see, for example, Harvey Sapolsky, Science and the Navy: The History of the Office of Naval Research (Princeton, 1990); Jacob Neufeld, Ballistic Missiles in the United States Air Force, 1945-1060 (Washington, 1990); Michael H. Gorn, Harnessing the Genie: Science and Technology Forecasting for the Air Force, 1944-1986 (Washington, 1988); Walter A. McDougall, The Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age (New York, 1985); and Robert A. Divine, The Sputnik Challenge: Eisenhower's Response to the Soviet Satellite (New York, 1993). On professional relationships between scientific institutions, associations, or personnel and the U.S. government see, for example, Roger L. Geiger, Research and Relevant Knowledge: American Research Universities since World War II (New York, 1993); Zuoyue Wang, "The Politics of Big Science in the Cold War: PSAC and the Funding of SLAC," HSPBS 25, no. 2 (1995): 329-56; Finn Aaserud, "Sputnik and the 'Princeton Three': The National Security Laboratory That Was Not to Be," HSPBS 25, no. 2 (1995): 185-259; Hollinger, "Free Enterprise and Free Inquiry," 897-918; and Robert W. Seidel, "A Home for Big Science: The Atomic Energy Commission's Laboratory System," HSPBS 16, no. 1 (1986): 135-76. For a perspective that more closely matches Paul Forman's "coercive" model see Stuart W. Leslie, The Cold War and American Science: The Military-Industrial-Academic Complex at MIT and Stanford (New York, 1993).
21. Much has been done to characterize the relationship between government and science since the above-mentioned "little renaissance." On the "flexible" and contractual nature of military or intelligence support for research and development see, for example, Harvey Sapolsky, Science and the Navy: The History of the Office of Naval Research (Princeton, 1990); Jacob Neufeld, Ballistic Missiles in the United States Air Force, 1945-1060 (Washington, 1990); Michael H. Gorn, Harnessing the Genie: Science and Technology Forecasting for the Air Force, 1944-1986 (Washington, 1988); Walter A. McDougall, The Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age (New York, 1985); and Robert A. Divine, The Sputnik Challenge: Eisenhower's Response to the Soviet Satellite (New York, 1993). On professional relationships between scientific institutions, associations, or personnel and the U.S. government see, for example, Roger L. Geiger, Research and Relevant Knowledge: American Research Universities since World War II (New York, 1993); Zuoyue Wang, "The Politics of Big Science in the Cold War: PSAC and the Funding of SLAC," HSPBS 25, no. 2 (1995): 329-56; Finn Aaserud, "Sputnik and the 'Princeton Three': The National Security Laboratory That Was Not to Be," HSPBS 25, no. 2 (1995): 185-259; Hollinger, "Free Enterprise and Free Inquiry," 897-918; and Robert W. Seidel, "A Home for Big Science: The Atomic Energy Commission's Laboratory System," HSPBS 16, no. 1 (1986): 135-76. For a perspective that more closely matches Paul Forman's "coercive" model see Stuart W. Leslie, The Cold War and American Science: The Military-Industrial-Academic Complex at MIT and Stanford (New York, 1993).
22. Much has been done to characterize the relationship between government and science since the above-mentioned "little renaissance." On the "flexible" and contractual nature of military or intelligence support for research and development see, for example, Harvey Sapolsky, Science and the Navy: The History of the Office of Naval Research (Princeton, 1990); Jacob Neufeld, Ballistic Missiles in the United States Air Force, 1945-1060 (Washington, 1990); Michael H. Gorn, Harnessing the Genie: Science and Technology Forecasting for the Air Force, 1944-1986 (Washington, 1988); Walter A. McDougall, The Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age (New York, 1985); and Robert A. Divine, The Sputnik Challenge: Eisenhower's Response to the Soviet Satellite (New York, 1993). On professional relationships between scientific institutions, associations, or personnel and the U.S. government see, for example, Roger L. Geiger, Research and Relevant Knowledge: American Research Universities since World War II (New York, 1993); Zuoyue Wang, "The Politics of Big Science in the Cold War: PSAC and the Funding of SLAC," HSPBS 25, no. 2 (1995): 329-56; Finn Aaserud, "Sputnik and the 'Princeton Three': The National Security Laboratory That Was Not to Be," HSPBS 25, no. 2 (1995): 185-259; Hollinger, "Free Enterprise and Free Inquiry," 897-918; and Robert W. Seidel, "A Home for Big Science: The Atomic Energy Commission's Laboratory System," HSPBS 16, no. 1 (1986): 135-76. For a perspective that more closely matches Paul Forman's "coercive" model see Stuart W. Leslie, The Cold War and American Science: The Military-Industrial-Academic Complex at MIT and Stanford (New York, 1993).
23. Much has been done to characterize the relationship between government and science since the above-mentioned "little renaissance." On the "flexible" and contractual nature of military or intelligence support for research and development see, for example, Harvey Sapolsky, Science and the Navy: The History of the Office of Naval Research (Princeton, 1990); Jacob Neufeld, Ballistic Missiles in the United States Air Force, 1945-1060 (Washington, 1990); Michael H. Gorn, Harnessing the Genie: Science and Technology Forecasting for the Air Force, 1944-1986 (Washington, 1988); Walter A. McDougall, The Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age (New York, 1985); and Robert A. Divine, The Sputnik Challenge: Eisenhower's Response to the Soviet Satellite (New York, 1993). On professional relationships between scientific institutions, associations, or personnel and the U.S. government see, for example, Roger L. Geiger, Research and Relevant Knowledge: American Research Universities since World War II (New York, 1993); Zuoyue Wang, "The Politics of Big Science in the Cold War: PSAC and the Funding of SLAC," HSPBS 25, no. 2 (1995): 329-56; Finn Aaserud, "Sputnik and the 'Princeton Three': The National Security Laboratory That Was Not to Be," HSPBS 25, no. 2 (1995): 185-259; Hollinger, "Free Enterprise and Free Inquiry," 897-918; and Robert W. Seidel, "A Home for Big Science: The Atomic Energy Commission's Laboratory System," HSPBS 16, no. 1 (1986): 135-76. For a perspective that more closely matches Paul Forman's "coercive" model see Stuart W. Leslie, The Cold War and American Science: The Military-Industrial-Academic Complex at MIT and Stanford (New York, 1993).
24. Much has been done to characterize the relationship between government and science since the above-mentioned "little renaissance." On the "flexible" and contractual nature of military or intelligence support for research and development see, for example, Harvey Sapolsky, Science and the Navy: The History of the Office of Naval Research (Princeton, 1990); Jacob Neufeld, Ballistic Missiles in the United States Air Force, 1945-1060 (Washington, 1990); Michael H. Gorn, Harnessing the Genie: Science and Technology Forecasting for the Air Force, 1944-1986 (Washington, 1988); Walter A. McDougall, The Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age (New York, 1985); and Robert A. Divine, The Sputnik Challenge: Eisenhower's Response to the Soviet Satellite (New York, 1993). On professional relationships between scientific institutions, associations, or personnel and the U.S. government see, for example, Roger L. Geiger, Research and Relevant Knowledge: American Research Universities since World War II (New York, 1993); Zuoyue Wang, "The Politics of Big Science in the Cold War: PSAC and the Funding of SLAC," HSPBS 25, no. 2 (1995): 329-56; Finn Aaserud, "Sputnik and the 'Princeton Three': The National Security Laboratory That Was Not to Be," HSPBS 25, no. 2 (1995): 185-259; Hollinger, "Free Enterprise and Free Inquiry," 897-918; and Robert W. Seidel, "A Home for Big Science: The Atomic Energy Commission's Laboratory System," HSPBS 16, no. 1 (1986): 135-76. For a perspective that more closely matches Paul Forman's "coercive" model see Stuart W. Leslie, The Cold War and American Science: The Military-Industrial-Academic Complex at MIT and Stanford (New York, 1993).
25. Much has been done to characterize the relationship between government and science since the above-mentioned "little renaissance." On the "flexible" and contractual nature of military or intelligence support for research and development see, for example, Harvey Sapolsky, Science and the Navy: The History of the Office of Naval Research (Princeton, 1990); Jacob Neufeld, Ballistic Missiles in the United States Air Force, 1945-1060 (Washington, 1990); Michael H. Gorn, Harnessing the Genie: Science and Technology Forecasting for the Air Force, 1944-1986 (Washington, 1988); Walter A. McDougall, The Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age (New York, 1985); and Robert A. Divine, The Sputnik Challenge: Eisenhower's Response to the Soviet Satellite (New York, 1993). On professional relationships between scientific institutions, associations, or personnel and the U.S. government see, for example, Roger L. Geiger, Research and Relevant Knowledge: American Research Universities since World War II (New York, 1993); Zuoyue Wang, "The Politics of Big Science in the Cold War: PSAC and the Funding of SLAC," HSPBS 25, no. 2 (1995): 329-56; Finn Aaserud, "Sputnik and the 'Princeton Three': The National Security Laboratory That Was Not to Be," HSPBS 25, no. 2 (1995): 185-259; Hollinger, "Free Enterprise and Free Inquiry," 897-918; and Robert W. Seidel, "A Home for Big Science: The Atomic Energy Commission's Laboratory System," HSPBS 16, no. 1 (1986): 135-76. For a perspective that more closely matches Paul Forman's "coercive" model see Stuart W. Leslie, The Cold War and American Science: The Military-Industrial-Academic Complex at MIT and Stanford (New York, 1993).
26. Much has been done to characterize the relationship between government and science since the above-mentioned "little renaissance." On the "flexible" and contractual nature of military or intelligence support for research and development see, for example, Harvey Sapolsky, Science and the Navy: The History of the Office of Naval Research (Princeton, 1990); Jacob Neufeld, Ballistic Missiles in the United States Air Force, 1945-1060 (Washington, 1990); Michael H. Gorn, Harnessing the Genie: Science and Technology Forecasting for the Air Force, 1944-1986 (Washington, 1988); Walter A. McDougall, The Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age (New York, 1985); and Robert A. Divine, The Sputnik Challenge: Eisenhower's Response to the Soviet Satellite (New York, 1993). On professional relationships between scientific institutions, associations, or personnel and the U.S. government see, for example, Roger L. Geiger, Research and Relevant Knowledge: American Research Universities since World War II (New York, 1993); Zuoyue Wang, "The Politics of Big Science in the Cold War: PSAC and the Funding of SLAC," HSPBS 25, no. 2 (1995): 329-56; Finn Aaserud, "Sputnik and the 'Princeton Three': The National Security Laboratory That Was Not to Be," HSPBS 25, no. 2 (1995): 185-259; Hollinger, "Free Enterprise and Free Inquiry," 897-918; and Robert W. Seidel, "A Home for Big Science: The Atomic Energy Commission's Laboratory System," HSPBS 16, no. 1 (1986): 135-76. For a perspective that more closely matches Paul Forman's "coercive" model see Stuart W. Leslie, The Cold War and American Science: The Military-Industrial-Academic Complex at MIT and Stanford (New York, 1993).
27. On the "space race" see Divine, The Sputnik Challenge; McDougall, The Heavens and the Earth; and William Burroughs, Deep Black: Space Espionage and National Security (New York, 1986). On nuclear weapons and nuclear energy, the volume of studies is very large and includes influential monographs such as Martin Sherwin, A World Destroyed: The Atomic Bomb and the Grand Alliance (New York, 1975); Gregg Herken, The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War, 1945-50 (New York, 1980); Harold Jacobson and Eric Stein, Diplomats, Scientists, and Politicians: The united States and the Test Ban Negotiations (Ann Arbor, 1966); and studies such as Herken, Cardinal Choices: Presidential Science Advising from the Atomic Bomb to SDI (New York, 1992); McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New York, 1988); Barton J. Bernstein, "Four Physicists and the Bomb: The Early Years, 1945-1950," HSPBS 18, no. 2 (1988): 231-63; Jonathan E. Helmreich, Gathering Rare Earths: The Diplomacy of Uranium Acquisition (Princeton, 1986); Richard Sylves, The Nuclear Oracles: A Political History of the General Advisory Committee of the Atomic Energy Commission, 1947-1977 (Ames, IA, 1987); and Spencer Weart, Nuclear Fear: A History of Images (Cambridge, MA, 1988).
28. On the "space race" see Divine, The Sputnik Challenge; McDougall, The Heavens and the Earth; and William Burroughs, Deep Black: Space Espionage and National Security (New York, 1986). On nuclear weapons and nuclear energy, the volume of studies is very large and includes influential monographs such as Martin Sherwin, A World Destroyed: The Atomic Bomb and the Grand Alliance (New York, 1975); Gregg Herken, The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War, 1945-50 (New York, 1980); Harold Jacobson and Eric Stein, Diplomats, Scientists, and Politicians: The united States and the Test Ban Negotiations (Ann Arbor, 1966); and studies such as Herken, Cardinal Choices: Presidential Science Advising from the Atomic Bomb to SDI (New York, 1992); McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New York, 1988); Barton J. Bernstein, "Four Physicists and the Bomb: The Early Years, 1945-1950," HSPBS 18, no. 2 (1988): 231-63; Jonathan E. Helmreich, Gathering Rare Earths: The Diplomacy of Uranium Acquisition (Princeton, 1986); Richard Sylves, The Nuclear Oracles: A Political History of the General Advisory Committee of the Atomic Energy Commission, 1947-1977 (Ames, IA, 1987); and Spencer Weart, Nuclear Fear: A History of Images (Cambridge, MA, 1988).
29. On the "space race" see Divine, The Sputnik Challenge; McDougall, The Heavens and the Earth; and William Burroughs, Deep Black: Space Espionage and National Security (New York, 1986). On nuclear weapons and nuclear energy, the volume of studies is very large and includes influential monographs such as Martin Sherwin, A World Destroyed: The Atomic Bomb and the Grand Alliance (New York, 1975); Gregg Herken, The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War, 1945-50 (New York, 1980); Harold Jacobson and Eric Stein, Diplomats, Scientists, and Politicians: The united States and the Test Ban Negotiations (Ann Arbor, 1966); and studies such as Herken, Cardinal Choices: Presidential Science Advising from the Atomic Bomb to SDI (New York, 1992); McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New York, 1988); Barton J. Bernstein, "Four Physicists and the Bomb: The Early Years, 1945-1950," HSPBS 18, no. 2 (1988): 231-63; Jonathan E. Helmreich, Gathering Rare Earths: The Diplomacy of Uranium Acquisition (Princeton, 1986); Richard Sylves, The Nuclear Oracles: A Political History of the General Advisory Committee of the Atomic Energy Commission, 1947-1977 (Ames, IA, 1987); and Spencer Weart, Nuclear Fear: A History of Images (Cambridge, MA, 1988).
30. On the "space race" see Divine, The Sputnik Challenge; McDougall, The Heavens and the Earth; and William Burroughs, Deep Black: Space Espionage and National Security (New York, 1986). On nuclear weapons and nuclear energy, the volume of studies is very large and includes influential monographs such as Martin Sherwin, A World Destroyed: The Atomic Bomb and the Grand Alliance (New York, 1975); Gregg Herken, The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War, 1945-50 (New York, 1980); Harold Jacobson and Eric Stein, Diplomats, Scientists, and Politicians: The united States and the Test Ban Negotiations (Ann Arbor, 1966); and studies such as Herken, Cardinal Choices: Presidential Science Advising from the Atomic Bomb to SDI (New York, 1992); McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New York, 1988); Barton J. Bernstein, "Four Physicists and the Bomb: The Early Years, 1945-1950," HSPBS 18, no. 2 (1988): 231-63; Jonathan E. Helmreich, Gathering Rare Earths: The Diplomacy of Uranium Acquisition (Princeton, 1986); Richard Sylves, The Nuclear Oracles: A Political History of the General Advisory Committee of the Atomic Energy Commission, 1947-1977 (Ames, IA, 1987); and Spencer Weart, Nuclear Fear: A History of Images (Cambridge, MA, 1988).
31. On the "space race" see Divine, The Sputnik Challenge; McDougall, The Heavens and the Earth; and William Burroughs, Deep Black: Space Espionage and National Security (New York, 1986). On nuclear weapons and nuclear energy, the volume of studies is very large and includes influential monographs such as Martin Sherwin, A World Destroyed: The Atomic Bomb and the Grand Alliance (New York, 1975); Gregg Herken, The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War, 1945-50 (New York, 1980); Harold Jacobson and Eric Stein, Diplomats, Scientists, and Politicians: The united States and the Test Ban Negotiations (Ann Arbor, 1966); and studies such as Herken, Cardinal Choices: Presidential Science Advising from the Atomic Bomb to SDI (New York, 1992); McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New York, 1988); Barton J. Bernstein, "Four Physicists and the Bomb: The Early Years, 1945-1950," HSPBS 18, no. 2 (1988): 231-63; Jonathan E. Helmreich, Gathering Rare Earths: The Diplomacy of Uranium Acquisition (Princeton, 1986); Richard Sylves, The Nuclear Oracles: A Political History of the General Advisory Committee of the Atomic Energy Commission, 1947-1977 (Ames, IA, 1987); and Spencer Weart, Nuclear Fear: A History of Images (Cambridge, MA, 1988).
32. On the "space race" see Divine, The Sputnik Challenge; McDougall, The Heavens and the Earth; and William Burroughs, Deep Black: Space Espionage and National Security (New York, 1986). On nuclear weapons and nuclear energy, the volume of studies is very large and includes influential monographs such as Martin Sherwin, A World Destroyed: The Atomic Bomb and the Grand Alliance (New York, 1975); Gregg Herken, The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War, 1945-50 (New York, 1980); Harold Jacobson and Eric Stein, Diplomats, Scientists, and Politicians: The united States and the Test Ban Negotiations (Ann Arbor, 1966); and studies such as Herken, Cardinal Choices: Presidential Science Advising from the Atomic Bomb to SDI (New York, 1992); McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New York, 1988); Barton J. Bernstein, "Four Physicists and the Bomb: The Early Years, 1945-1950," HSPBS 18, no. 2 (1988): 231-63; Jonathan E. Helmreich, Gathering Rare Earths: The Diplomacy of Uranium Acquisition (Princeton, 1986); Richard Sylves, The Nuclear Oracles: A Political History of the General Advisory Committee of the Atomic Energy Commission, 1947-1977 (Ames, IA, 1987); and Spencer Weart, Nuclear Fear: A History of Images (Cambridge, MA, 1988).
33. On the "space race" see Divine, The Sputnik Challenge; McDougall, The Heavens and the Earth; and William Burroughs, Deep Black: Space Espionage and National Security (New York, 1986). On nuclear weapons and nuclear energy, the volume of studies is very large and includes influential monographs such as Martin Sherwin, A World Destroyed: The Atomic Bomb and the Grand Alliance (New York, 1975); Gregg Herken, The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War, 1945-50 (New York, 1980); Harold Jacobson and Eric Stein, Diplomats, Scientists, and Politicians: The united States and the Test Ban Negotiations (Ann Arbor, 1966); and studies such as Herken, Cardinal Choices: Presidential Science Advising from the Atomic Bomb to SDI (New York, 1992); McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New York, 1988); Barton J. Bernstein, "Four Physicists and the Bomb: The Early Years, 1945-1950," HSPBS 18, no. 2 (1988): 231-63; Jonathan E. Helmreich, Gathering Rare Earths: The Diplomacy of Uranium Acquisition (Princeton, 1986); Richard Sylves, The Nuclear Oracles: A Political History of the General Advisory Committee of the Atomic Energy Commission, 1947-1977 (Ames, IA, 1987); and Spencer Weart, Nuclear Fear: A History of Images (Cambridge, MA, 1988).
34. On the "space race" see Divine, The Sputnik Challenge; McDougall, The Heavens and the Earth; and William Burroughs, Deep Black: Space Espionage and National Security (New York, 1986). On nuclear weapons and nuclear energy, the volume of studies is very large and includes influential monographs such as Martin Sherwin, A World Destroyed: The Atomic Bomb and the Grand Alliance (New York, 1975); Gregg Herken, The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War, 1945-50 (New York, 1980); Harold Jacobson and Eric Stein, Diplomats, Scientists, and Politicians: The united States and the Test Ban Negotiations (Ann Arbor, 1966); and studies such as Herken, Cardinal Choices: Presidential Science Advising from the Atomic Bomb to SDI (New York, 1992); McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New York, 1988); Barton J. Bernstein, "Four Physicists and the Bomb: The Early Years, 1945-1950," HSPBS 18, no. 2 (1988): 231-63; Jonathan E. Helmreich, Gathering Rare Earths: The Diplomacy of Uranium Acquisition (Princeton, 1986); Richard Sylves, The Nuclear Oracles: A Political History of the General Advisory Committee of the Atomic Energy Commission, 1947-1977 (Ames, IA, 1987); and Spencer Weart, Nuclear Fear: A History of Images (Cambridge, MA, 1988).
35. On the "space race" see Divine, The Sputnik Challenge; McDougall, The Heavens and the Earth; and William Burroughs, Deep Black: Space Espionage and National Security (New York, 1986). On nuclear weapons and nuclear energy, the volume of studies is very large and includes influential monographs such as Martin Sherwin, A World Destroyed: The Atomic Bomb and the Grand Alliance (New York, 1975); Gregg Herken, The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War, 1945-50 (New York, 1980); Harold Jacobson and Eric Stein, Diplomats, Scientists, and Politicians: The united States and the Test Ban Negotiations (Ann Arbor, 1966); and studies such as Herken, Cardinal Choices: Presidential Science Advising from the Atomic Bomb to SDI (New York, 1992); McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New York, 1988); Barton J. Bernstein, "Four Physicists and the Bomb: The Early Years, 1945-1950," HSPBS 18, no. 2 (1988): 231-63; Jonathan E. Helmreich, Gathering Rare Earths: The Diplomacy of Uranium Acquisition (Princeton, 1986); Richard Sylves, The Nuclear Oracles: A Political History of the General Advisory Committee of the Atomic Energy Commission, 1947-1977 (Ames, IA, 1987); and Spencer Weart, Nuclear Fear: A History of Images (Cambridge, MA, 1988).
36. On the "space race" see Divine, The Sputnik Challenge; McDougall, The Heavens and the Earth; and William Burroughs, Deep Black: Space Espionage and National Security (New York, 1986). On nuclear weapons and nuclear energy, the volume of studies is very large and includes influential monographs such as Martin Sherwin, A World Destroyed: The Atomic Bomb and the Grand Alliance (New York, 1975); Gregg Herken, The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War, 1945-50 (New York, 1980); Harold Jacobson and Eric Stein, Diplomats, Scientists, and Politicians: The united States and the Test Ban Negotiations (Ann Arbor, 1966); and studies such as Herken, Cardinal Choices: Presidential Science Advising from the Atomic Bomb to SDI (New York, 1992); McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New York, 1988); Barton J. Bernstein, "Four Physicists and the Bomb: The Early Years, 1945-1950," HSPBS 18, no. 2 (1988): 231-63; Jonathan E. Helmreich, Gathering Rare Earths: The Diplomacy of Uranium Acquisition (Princeton, 1986); Richard Sylves, The Nuclear Oracles: A Political History of the General Advisory Committee of the Atomic Energy Commission, 1947-1977 (Ames, IA, 1987); and Spencer Weart, Nuclear Fear: A History of Images (Cambridge, MA, 1988).
37. On the "space race" see Divine, The Sputnik Challenge; McDougall, The Heavens and the Earth; and William Burroughs, Deep Black: Space Espionage and National Security (New York, 1986). On nuclear weapons and nuclear energy, the volume of studies is very large and includes influential monographs such as Martin Sherwin, A World Destroyed: The Atomic Bomb and the Grand Alliance (New York, 1975); Gregg Herken, The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War, 1945-50 (New York, 1980); Harold Jacobson and Eric Stein, Diplomats, Scientists, and Politicians: The united States and the Test Ban Negotiations (Ann Arbor, 1966); and studies such as Herken, Cardinal Choices: Presidential Science Advising from the Atomic Bomb to SDI (New York, 1992); McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New York, 1988); Barton J. Bernstein, "Four Physicists and the Bomb: The Early Years, 1945-1950," HSPBS 18, no. 2 (1988): 231-63; Jonathan E. Helmreich, Gathering Rare Earths: The Diplomacy of Uranium Acquisition (Princeton, 1986); Richard Sylves, The Nuclear Oracles: A Political History of the General Advisory Committee of the Atomic Energy Commission, 1947-1977 (Ames, IA, 1987); and Spencer Weart, Nuclear Fear: A History of Images (Cambridge, MA, 1988).
38. On the "space race" see Divine, The Sputnik Challenge; McDougall, The Heavens and the Earth; and William Burroughs, Deep Black: Space Espionage and National Security (New York, 1986). On nuclear weapons and nuclear energy, the volume of studies is very large and includes influential monographs such as Martin Sherwin, A World Destroyed: The Atomic Bomb and the Grand Alliance (New York, 1975); Gregg Herken, The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War, 1945-50 (New York, 1980); Harold Jacobson and Eric Stein, Diplomats, Scientists, and Politicians: The united States and the Test Ban Negotiations (Ann Arbor, 1966); and studies such as Herken, Cardinal Choices: Presidential Science Advising from the Atomic Bomb to SDI (New York, 1992); McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New York, 1988); Barton J. Bernstein, "Four Physicists and the Bomb: The Early Years, 1945-1950," HSPBS 18, no. 2 (1988): 231-63; Jonathan E. Helmreich, Gathering Rare Earths: The Diplomacy of Uranium Acquisition (Princeton, 1986); Richard Sylves, The Nuclear Oracles: A Political History of the General Advisory Committee of the Atomic Energy Commission, 1947-1977 (Ames, IA, 1987); and Spencer Weart, Nuclear Fear: A History of Images (Cambridge, MA, 1988).
39. James G. Hershberg's biography, James B. Conant: From Harvard to Hiroshima and the Making of the Nuclear Age (New York, 1995), is a recent example of studies that have sought to explore the role of the scientist as scientific leader, adviser, and policymaker.
40. On the growth of international scientific cooperation and exchange see Charles V. Kidd, "The Growth of Science and the Distribution of Scientists among Nations," in The Politics of Science, ed. William R. Nelson (New York, 1968), 87-103.
41. Eugene Rabinowitch, "International Cooperation of Scientists," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (BAS) 2 (September 1946), 1.
42. On the ideal of scientific exchange and cooperation see Warren O. Hagstrom, "Gift Giving as an Organizing Principle in Science," in Science in Context, ed. Barry Barnes and David Edge (Cambridge, MA, 1982), 21-34. On the importance that American scientists attributed to international science, and for further development of the ideology of scientific internationalism, see Edward U. Condon, "Science and International Cooperation," BAS 1 (May 1946), 1; and Michael Polanyi, "The Foundations of Freedom in Science," BAS 2 (November 1947), 6, 7. David Hull, Science as Process: An Evolutionary Account of the Social and Conceptual Development of Science (Chicago, 1989), and Jean-Jacques Salomon, Science and Politics (Cambridge, MA, 1973), 209-33, set this internationalist tradition in the context of community and society. A highly idealized expression of this theme can be found in Michael Polanyi, "The Republic of Science: Its Political and Economic Theory," in Criteria for Scientific Development: Public Policy and National Goals, ed. Edward Shils (Cambridge, MA, 1968).
43. On the ideal of scientific exchange and cooperation see Warren O. Hagstrom, "Gift Giving as an Organizing Principle in Science," in Science in Context, ed. Barry Barnes and David Edge (Cambridge, MA, 1982), 21-34. On the importance that American scientists attributed to international science, and for further development of the ideology of scientific internationalism, see Edward U. Condon, "Science and International Cooperation," BAS 1 (May 1946), 1; and Michael Polanyi, "The Foundations of Freedom in Science," BAS 2 (November 1947), 6, 7. David Hull, Science as Process: An Evolutionary Account of the Social and Conceptual Development of Science (Chicago, 1989), and Jean-Jacques Salomon, Science and Politics (Cambridge, MA, 1973), 209-33, set this internationalist tradition in the context of community and society. A highly idealized expression of this theme can be found in Michael Polanyi, "The Republic of Science: Its Political and Economic Theory," in Criteria for Scientific Development: Public Policy and National Goals, ed. Edward Shils (Cambridge, MA, 1968).
44. On the ideal of scientific exchange and cooperation see Warren O. Hagstrom, "Gift Giving as an Organizing Principle in Science," in Science in Context, ed. Barry Barnes and David Edge (Cambridge, MA, 1982), 21-34. On the importance that American scientists attributed to international science, and for further development of the ideology of scientific internationalism, see Edward U. Condon, "Science and International Cooperation," BAS 1 (May 1946), 1; and Michael Polanyi, "The Foundations of Freedom in Science," BAS 2 (November 1947), 6, 7. David Hull, Science as Process: An Evolutionary Account of the Social and Conceptual Development of Science (Chicago, 1989), and Jean-Jacques Salomon, Science and Politics (Cambridge, MA, 1973), 209-33, set this internationalist tradition in the context of community and society. A highly idealized expression of this theme can be found in Michael Polanyi, "The Republic of Science: Its Political and Economic Theory," in Criteria for Scientific Development: Public Policy and National Goals, ed. Edward Shils (Cambridge, MA, 1968).
45. On the ideal of scientific exchange and cooperation see Warren O. Hagstrom, "Gift Giving as an Organizing Principle in Science," in Science in Context, ed. Barry Barnes and David Edge (Cambridge, MA, 1982), 21-34. On the importance that American scientists attributed to international science, and for further development of the ideology of scientific internationalism, see Edward U. Condon, "Science and International Cooperation," BAS 1 (May 1946), 1; and Michael Polanyi, "The Foundations of Freedom in Science," BAS 2 (November 1947), 6, 7. David Hull, Science as Process: An Evolutionary Account of the Social and Conceptual Development of Science (Chicago, 1989), and Jean-Jacques Salomon, Science and Politics (Cambridge, MA, 1973), 209-33, set this internationalist tradition in the context of community and society. A highly idealized expression of this theme can be found in Michael Polanyi, "The Republic of Science: Its Political and Economic Theory," in Criteria for Scientific Development: Public Policy and National Goals, ed. Edward Shils (Cambridge, MA, 1968).
46. On the ideal of scientific exchange and cooperation see Warren O. Hagstrom, "Gift Giving as an Organizing Principle in Science," in Science in Context, ed. Barry Barnes and David Edge (Cambridge, MA, 1982), 21-34. On the importance that American scientists attributed to international science, and for further development of the ideology of scientific internationalism, see Edward U. Condon, "Science and International Cooperation," BAS 1 (May 1946), 1; and Michael Polanyi, "The Foundations of Freedom in Science," BAS 2 (November 1947), 6, 7. David Hull, Science as Process: An Evolutionary Account of the Social and Conceptual Development of Science (Chicago, 1989), and Jean-Jacques Salomon, Science and Politics (Cambridge, MA, 1973), 209-33, set this internationalist tradition in the context of community and society. A highly idealized expression of this theme can be found in Michael Polanyi, "The Republic of Science: Its Political and Economic Theory," in Criteria for Scientific Development: Public Policy and National Goals, ed. Edward Shils (Cambridge, MA, 1968).
47. On the ideal of scientific exchange and cooperation see Warren O. Hagstrom, "Gift Giving as an Organizing Principle in Science," in Science in Context, ed. Barry Barnes and David Edge (Cambridge, MA, 1982), 21-34. On the importance that American scientists attributed to international science, and for further development of the ideology of scientific internationalism, see Edward U. Condon, "Science and International Cooperation," BAS 1 (May 1946), 1; and Michael Polanyi, "The Foundations of Freedom in Science," BAS 2 (November 1947), 6, 7. David Hull, Science as Process: An Evolutionary Account of the Social and Conceptual Development of Science (Chicago, 1989), and Jean-Jacques Salomon, Science and Politics (Cambridge, MA, 1973), 209-33, set this internationalist tradition in the context of community and society. A highly idealized expression of this theme can be found in Michael Polanyi, "The Republic of Science: Its Political and Economic Theory," in Criteria for Scientific Development: Public Policy and National Goals, ed. Edward Shils (Cambridge, MA, 1968).
48. George B. Kistiakowski, "Science and Foreign Affairs," BAS 16 (April 1960): 115.
49. For essays on these "enlightened states of mind" and their possible effect on society see R. K. Merton, "The Institutional Imperatives of Science," in The Sociology of Science, ed. Barry Barnes (London, 1972), 65-79;
50. Anatol Rapoport, "A Scientific Approach to Ethics," Science 125 (1957): 796-99;
51. Peter B. Medewar, Advice to Young Scientists (Cambridge, UK, 1979);
52. Joseph Haberer, Politics and the Community of Science (New York, 1969);
53. John R. Baker, Science and the Planned State (New York, 1945), 24-38;
54. and Salomon, Science and Politics, 3-70. Similar themes relating the benefits of the scientific mind to governance and society can be found as far back as the essays of Francis Bacon in The New Atlantis and other works in the seventeenth century. Among more recent philosophers, writers, scientists, popular commentators, and political visionaries who extolled the social and political effects of a "scientific" perspective were Henri Bergson, John Dewey, Bertrand Russell, L. T. Hobhouse, Phillip Gibbs, Waldemar Kaempffert, H. G. Wells, Jack London, Bernard Shaw, Aldous Huxley, Olaf Stapledon, Camille Flammarion, Frederick Soddy, Marcellin Berthelot, Herbert Croly, Walter Lippmann, Karl Kautsky, Jean Jaures, V. I. Lenin, and Leon Trotsky. H. G. Wells wrote a political tract titled The Open Conspiracy in which he tried to work out the details of a world governed by scientists and other experts. Physicist Leo Szilard was deeply influenced by this essay.
55. H. G. Wells, The Food of the Gods (New York, 1924), 12.
56. For perspectives on public and professional expectations of the role of science in society in the future see I. F. Clarke, The Pattern of Expectation, 1644-2001 (New York, 1979); and Robert Nisbet, History of the Idea of Progress (New York, 1980). Critics attacked society's increasing reliance on science in the twenties and thirties, characterizing science as amoral and dehumanizing; the effect in the scientific community was to enlarge the dialogue among scientists on the directions that science was taking society in the future. See Daniel J. Kevles, The Physicists: The History of a Scientific Community in Modern America (Cambridge, MA, 1987), 178-84, 236-40.
57. For perspectives on public and professional expectations of the role of science in society in the future see I. F. Clarke, The Pattern of Expectation, 1644-2001 (New York, 1979); and Robert Nisbet, History of the Idea of Progress (New York, 1980). Critics attacked society's increasing reliance on science in the twenties and thirties, characterizing science as amoral and dehumanizing; the effect in the scientific community was to enlarge the dialogue among scientists on the directions that science was taking society in the future. See Daniel J. Kevles, The Physicists: The History of a Scientific Community in Modern America (Cambridge, MA, 1987), 178-84, 236-40.
58. For perspectives on public and professional expectations of the role of science in society in the future see I. F. Clarke, The Pattern of Expectation, 1644-2001 (New York, 1979); and Robert Nisbet, History of the Idea of Progress (New York, 1980). Critics attacked society's increasing reliance on science in the twenties and thirties, characterizing science as amoral and dehumanizing; the effect in the scientific community was to enlarge the dialogue among scientists on the directions that science was taking society in the future. See Daniel J. Kevles, The Physicists: The History of a Scientific Community in Modern America (Cambridge, MA, 1987), 178-84, 236-40.
59. Weart, Nuclear Images, chaps. 1-4.
60. Quoted in Sherwin, A World Destroyed, 20.
61. Hollinger, "Free Enterprise and Free Inquiry," 897-902; G. H. Roberts, "The Pure-Ideal and Democratic Culture," Science 156 (1967): 1699-1705; Ronald C. Tobey, The American Ideology of Science, 1919-1930 (Pittsburgh, 1971); Robert Kargon and Elizabeth Hodes, "Karl Compton, Isaiah Bowman, and the Politics of Science in the Great Depression," Isis 76, no. 283 (1985): 311; Peter J. Kuznik, Beyond the Laboratory: Scientists as Political Activists in 1930s America (Chicago, 1987), 172-74, 193-94, 235-38; Kevles, The Physicists, 243-66.
62. Hollinger, "Free Enterprise and Free Inquiry," 897-902; G. H. Roberts, "The Pure-Ideal and Democratic Culture," Science 156 (1967): 1699-1705; Ronald C. Tobey, The American Ideology of Science, 1919-1930 (Pittsburgh, 1971); Robert Kargon and Elizabeth Hodes, "Karl Compton, Isaiah Bowman, and the Politics of Science in the Great Depression," Isis 76, no. 283 (1985): 311; Peter J. Kuznik, Beyond the Laboratory: Scientists as Political Activists in 1930s America (Chicago, 1987), 172-74, 193-94, 235-38; Kevles, The Physicists, 243-66.
63. Hollinger, "Free Enterprise and Free Inquiry," 897-902; G. H. Roberts, "The Pure-Ideal and Democratic Culture," Science 156 (1967): 1699-1705; Ronald C. Tobey, The American Ideology of Science, 1919-1930 (Pittsburgh, 1971); Robert Kargon and Elizabeth Hodes, "Karl Compton, Isaiah Bowman, and the Politics of Science in the Great Depression," Isis 76, no. 283 (1985): 311; Peter J. Kuznik, Beyond the Laboratory: Scientists as Political Activists in 1930s America (Chicago, 1987), 172-74, 193-94, 235-38; Kevles, The Physicists, 243-66.
64. Hollinger, "Free Enterprise and Free Inquiry," 897-902; G. H. Roberts, "The Pure-Ideal and Democratic Culture," Science 156 (1967): 1699-1705; Ronald C. Tobey, The American Ideology of Science, 1919-1930 (Pittsburgh, 1971); Robert Kargon and Elizabeth Hodes, "Karl Compton, Isaiah Bowman, and the Politics of Science in the Great Depression," Isis 76, no. 283 (1985): 311; Peter J. Kuznik, Beyond the Laboratory: Scientists as Political Activists in 1930s America (Chicago, 1987), 172-74, 193-94, 235-38; Kevles, The Physicists, 243-66.
65. Hollinger, "Free Enterprise and Free Inquiry," 897-902; G. H. Roberts, "The Pure-Ideal and Democratic Culture," Science 156 (1967): 1699-1705; Ronald C. Tobey, The American Ideology of Science, 1919-1930 (Pittsburgh, 1971); Robert Kargon and Elizabeth Hodes, "Karl Compton, Isaiah Bowman, and the Politics of Science in the Great Depression," Isis 76, no. 283 (1985): 311; Peter J. Kuznik, Beyond the Laboratory: Scientists as Political Activists in 1930s America (Chicago, 1987), 172-74, 193-94, 235-38; Kevles, The Physicists, 243-66.
66. Hollinger, "Free Enterprise and Free Inquiry," 897-902; G. H. Roberts, "The Pure-Ideal and Democratic Culture," Science 156 (1967): 1699-1705; Ronald C. Tobey, The American Ideology of Science, 1919-1930 (Pittsburgh, 1971); Robert Kargon and Elizabeth Hodes, "Karl Compton, Isaiah Bowman, and the Politics of Science in the Great Depression," Isis 76, no. 283 (1985): 311; Peter J. Kuznik, Beyond the Laboratory: Scientists as Political Activists in 1930s America (Chicago, 1987), 172-74, 193-94, 235-38; Kevles, The Physicists, 243-66.
67. For example, Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley published The Last Man in 1826. The book contained lengthy descriptions about how war, plague, and other misuses of technology had annihilated most of humanity. Camille Flammarion wrote La Fin du monde in 1894, in which the last survivor huddled in a greenhouse as the earth's atmosphere leaked away. Matthew Shiel posited humanity destroyed by poison gas released by a scientist in The Purple Cloud (1901). Jack London wrote The Iron Heel and The Scarlet Plague, the former about a brutal, technocratic oligarchy reducing civilization to savagery, and the latter about an advanced industrial civilization being brought down by an epidemic. In Anatole France's Penguin Island' (1908), terrorist-physicists destroy entire cities with miniature atomic explosives. In H. G. Wells's The World Set Free (1913), entire cities are again destroyed by atomic bombs, this time dropped from airplanes during a world war. Wells described cities reduced to pillars of flame and "luminous, radio-active vapor . . . killing and scorching all they overtook," images that would deeply affect Leo Szilard, Samuel K. Allison, Harold Urey, and other physicists who read the book years later. The enormity of destruction during the First World War escalated the literature and helped to establish the genre of science fiction in the United States and Western Europe. Interwar discussions and speculations about air power and the speculative images of fleets of bombers raining destruction on helpless cities reinforced the idea of the destructive power of science and technology (see, for example, Uri
68. For example, Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley published The Last Man in 1826. The book contained lengthy descriptions about how war, plague, and other misuses of technology had annihilated most of humanity. Camille Flammarion wrote La Fin du monde in 1894, in which the last survivor huddled in a greenhouse as the earth's atmosphere leaked away. Matthew Shiel posited humanity destroyed by poison gas released by a scientist in The Purple Cloud (1901). Jack London wrote The Iron Heel and The Scarlet Plague, the former about a brutal, technocratic oligarchy reducing civilization to savagery, and the latter about an advanced industrial civilization being brought down by an epidemic. In Anatole France's Penguin Island' (1908), terrorist-physicists destroy entire cities with miniature atomic explosives. In H. G. Wells's The World Set Free (1913), entire cities are again destroyed by atomic bombs, this time dropped from airplanes during a world war. Wells described cities reduced to pillars of flame and "luminous, radio-active vapor . . . killing and scorching all they overtook," images that would deeply affect Leo Szilard, Samuel K. Allison, Harold Urey, and other physicists who read the book years later. The enormity of destruction during the First World War escalated the literature and helped to establish the genre of science fiction in the United States and Western Europe. Interwar discussions and speculations about air power and the speculative images of fleets of bombers raining destruction on helpless cities reinforced the idea of the destructive power of science and technology (see, for example, Uri Bailor, The Shadow of the Bomber: The Fear of Air Attack and British Politics, 1932-1930 [London, 1980]). For a discussion of the evolution of modern world-ending literature and its connection with science and cultural and political ideas about progress see W. Warren Wagar, Terminal Visions: The Literature of Last Things (Bloomington, 1982).
69. For example, Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley published The Last Man in 1826. The book contained lengthy descriptions about how war, plague, and other misuses of technology had annihilated most of humanity. Camille Flammarion wrote La Fin du monde in 1894, in which the last survivor huddled in a greenhouse as the earth's atmosphere leaked away. Matthew Shiel posited humanity destroyed by poison gas released by a scientist in The Purple Cloud (1901). Jack London wrote The Iron Heel and The Scarlet Plague, the former about a brutal, technocratic oligarchy reducing civilization to savagery, and the latter about an advanced industrial civilization being brought down by an epidemic. In Anatole France's Penguin Island' (1908), terrorist-physicists destroy entire cities with miniature atomic explosives. In H. G. Wells's The World Set Free (1913), entire cities are again destroyed by atomic bombs, this time dropped from airplanes during a world war. Wells described cities reduced to pillars of flame and "luminous, radio-active vapor . . . killing and scorching all they overtook," images that would deeply affect Leo Szilard, Samuel K. Allison, Harold Urey, and other physicists who read the book years later. The enormity of destruction during the First World War escalated the literature and helped to establish the genre of science fiction in the United States and Western Europe. Interwar discussions and speculations about air power and the speculative images of fleets of bombers raining destruction on helpless cities reinforced the idea of the destructive power of science and technology (see, for example, Uri Bailor, The Shadow of the Bomber: The Fear of Air Attack and British Politics, 1932-1930 [London, 1980]). For a discussion of the evolution of modern world-ending literature and its connection with science and cultural and political ideas about progress see W. Warren Wagar, Terminal Visions: The Literature of Last Things (Bloomington, 1982).
70. For example, Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley published The Last Man in 1826. The book contained lengthy descriptions about how war, plague, and other misuses of technology had annihilated most of humanity. Camille Flammarion wrote La Fin du monde in 1894, in which the last survivor huddled in a greenhouse as the earth's atmosphere leaked away. Matthew Shiel posited humanity destroyed by poison gas released by a scientist in The Purple Cloud (1901). Jack London wrote The Iron Heel and The Scarlet Plague, the former about a brutal, technocratic oligarchy reducing civilization to savagery, and the latter about an advanced industrial civilization being brought down by an epidemic. In Anatole France's Penguin Island' (1908), terrorist-physicists destroy entire cities with miniature atomic explosives. In H. G. Wells's The World Set Free (1913), entire cities are again destroyed by atomic bombs, this time dropped from airplanes during a world war. Wells described cities reduced to pillars of flame and "luminous, radio-active vapor . . . killing and scorching all they overtook," images that would deeply affect Leo Szilard, Samuel K. Allison, Harold Urey, and other physicists who read the book years later. The enormity of destruction during the First World War escalated the literature and helped to establish the genre of science fiction in the United States and Western Europe. Interwar discussions and speculations about air power and the speculative images of fleets of bombers raining destruction on helpless cities reinforced the idea of the destructive power of science and technology (see, for example, Uri Bailor, The Shadow of the Bomber: The Fear of Air Attack and British Politics, 1932-1930 [London, 1980]). For a discussion of the evolution of modern world-ending literature and its connection with science and cultural and political ideas about progress see W. Warren Wagar, Terminal Visions: The Literature of Last Things (Bloomington, 1982).
71. For example, Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley published The Last Man in 1826. The book contained lengthy descriptions about how war, plague, and other misuses of technology had annihilated most of humanity. Camille Flammarion wrote La Fin du monde in 1894, in which the last survivor huddled in a greenhouse as the earth's atmosphere leaked away. Matthew Shiel posited humanity destroyed by poison gas released by a scientist in The Purple Cloud (1901). Jack London wrote The Iron Heel and The Scarlet Plague, the former about a brutal, technocratic oligarchy reducing civilization to savagery, and the latter about an advanced industrial civilization being brought down by an epidemic. In Anatole France's Penguin Island' (1908), terrorist-physicists destroy entire cities with miniature atomic explosives. In H. G. Wells's The World Set Free (1913), entire cities are again destroyed by atomic bombs, this time dropped from airplanes during a world war. Wells described cities reduced to pillars of flame and "luminous, radio-active vapor . . . killing and scorching all they overtook," images that would deeply affect Leo Szilard, Samuel K. Allison, Harold Urey, and other physicists who read the book years later. The enormity of destruction during the First World War escalated the literature and helped to establish the genre of science fiction in the United States and Western Europe. Interwar discussions and speculations about air power and the speculative images of fleets of bombers raining destruction on helpless cities reinforced the idea of the destructive power of science and technology (see, for example, Uri Bailor, The Shadow of the Bomber: The Fear of Air Attack and British Politics, 1932-1930 [London, 1980]). For a discussion of the evolution of modern world-ending literature and its connection with science and cultural and political ideas about progress see W. Warren Wagar, Terminal Visions: The Literature of Last Things (Bloomington, 1982).
72. For example, Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley published The Last Man in 1826. The book contained lengthy descriptions about how war, plague, and other misuses of technology had annihilated most of humanity. Camille Flammarion wrote La Fin du monde in 1894, in which the last survivor huddled in a greenhouse as the earth's atmosphere leaked away. Matthew Shiel posited humanity destroyed by poison gas released by a scientist in The Purple Cloud (1901). Jack London wrote The Iron Heel and The Scarlet Plague, the former about a brutal, technocratic oligarchy reducing civilization to savagery, and the latter about an advanced industrial civilization being brought down by an epidemic. In Anatole France's Penguin Island' (1908), terrorist-physicists destroy entire cities with miniature atomic explosives. In H. G. Wells's The World Set Free (1913), entire cities are again destroyed by atomic bombs, this time dropped from airplanes during a world war. Wells described cities reduced to pillars of flame and "luminous, radio-active vapor . . . killing and scorching all they overtook," images that would deeply affect Leo Szilard, Samuel K. Allison, Harold Urey, and other physicists who read the book years later. The enormity of destruction during the First World War escalated the literature and helped to establish the genre of science fiction in the United States and Western Europe. Interwar discussions and speculations about air power and the speculative images of fleets of bombers raining destruction on helpless cities reinforced the idea of the destructive power of science and technology (see, for example, Uri Bailor, The Shadow of the Bomber: The Fear of Air Attack and British Politics, 1932-1930 [London, 1980]). For a discussion of the evolution of modern world-ending literature and its connection with science and cultural and political ideas about progress see W. Warren Wagar, Terminal Visions: The Literature of Last Things (Bloomington, 1982).
73. For example, Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley published The Last Man in 1826. The book contained lengthy descriptions about how war, plague, and other misuses of technology had annihilated most of humanity. Camille Flammarion wrote La Fin du monde in 1894, in which the last survivor huddled in a greenhouse as the earth's atmosphere leaked away. Matthew Shiel posited humanity destroyed by poison gas released by a scientist in The Purple Cloud (1901). Jack London wrote The Iron Heel and The Scarlet Plague, the former about a brutal, technocratic oligarchy reducing civilization to savagery, and the latter about an advanced industrial civilization being brought down by an epidemic. In Anatole France's Penguin Island' (1908), terrorist-physicists destroy entire cities with miniature atomic explosives. In H. G. Wells's The World Set Free (1913), entire cities are again destroyed by atomic bombs, this time dropped from airplanes during a world war. Wells described cities reduced to pillars of flame and "luminous, radio-active vapor . . . killing and scorching all they overtook," images that would deeply affect Leo Szilard, Samuel K. Allison, Harold Urey, and other physicists who read the book years later. The enormity of destruction during the First World War escalated the literature and helped to establish the genre of science fiction in the United States and Western Europe. Interwar discussions and speculations about air power and the speculative images of fleets of bombers raining destruction on helpless cities reinforced the idea of the destructive power of science and technology (see, for example, Uri Bailor, The Shadow of the Bomber: The Fear of Air Attack and British Politics, 1932-1930 [London, 1980]). For a discussion of the evolution of modern world-ending literature and its connection with science and cultural and political ideas about progress see W. Warren Wagar, Terminal Visions: The Literature of Last Things (Bloomington, 1982).
74. For example, Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley published The Last Man in 1826. The book contained lengthy descriptions about how war, plague, and other misuses of technology had annihilated most of humanity. Camille Flammarion wrote La Fin du monde in 1894, in which the last survivor huddled in a greenhouse as the earth's atmosphere leaked away. Matthew Shiel posited humanity destroyed by poison gas released by a scientist in The Purple Cloud (1901). Jack London wrote The Iron Heel and The Scarlet Plague, the former about a brutal, technocratic oligarchy reducing civilization to savagery, and the latter about an advanced industrial civilization being brought down by an epidemic. In Anatole France's Penguin Island' (1908), terrorist-physicists destroy entire cities with miniature atomic explosives. In H. G. Wells's The World Set Free (1913), entire cities are again destroyed by atomic bombs, this time dropped from airplanes during a world war. Wells described cities reduced to pillars of flame and "luminous, radio-active vapor . . . killing and scorching all they overtook," images that would deeply affect Leo Szilard, Samuel K. Allison, Harold Urey, and other physicists who read the book years later. The enormity of destruction during the First World War escalated the literature and helped to establish the genre of science fiction in the United States and Western Europe. Interwar discussions and speculations about air power and the speculative images of fleets of bombers raining destruction on helpless cities reinforced the idea of the destructive power of science and technology (see, for example, Uri Bailor, The Shadow of the Bomber: The Fear of Air Attack and British Politics, 1932-1930 [London, 1980]). For a discussion of the evolution of modern world-ending literature and its connection with science and cultural and political ideas about progress see W. Warren Wagar, Terminal Visions: The Literature of Last Things (Bloomington, 1982).
75. H. G. Wells developed this theme extensively in several of his novels and social commentaries, and so did American astronomer Simon Newcomb in a series of popular articles and books. For discussions of this "phoenix" scenario in the literature of Wells, Newcomb, and others see W. Warren Wagar, The Next Three Futures: Paradigms of Things to Come (New York, 1989), 20-23; Rosylnn D. Haynes, H. G. Wells: Discoverer of the Future (New York, 1980), 91-98; Richard Hauer Costa, H. G. Wells (New York, 1967), 113-25; and John R. Reed, The Natural History of H. G. Wells (Athens, OH, 1982), 105-9, 155-58. See also Weart, Nuclear Images, 30; and Kevles, The Physicists, 252-54.
76. H. G. Wells developed this theme extensively in several of his novels and social commentaries, and so did American astronomer Simon Newcomb in a series of popular articles and books. For discussions of this "phoenix" scenario in the literature of Wells, Newcomb, and others see W. Warren Wagar, The Next Three Futures: Paradigms of Things to Come (New York, 1989), 20-23; Rosylnn D. Haynes, H. G. Wells: Discoverer of the Future (New York, 1980), 91-98; Richard Hauer Costa, H. G. Wells (New York, 1967), 113-25; and John R. Reed, The Natural History of H. G. Wells (Athens, OH, 1982), 105-9, 155-58. See also Weart, Nuclear Images, 30; and Kevles, The Physicists, 252-54.
77. H. G. Wells developed this theme extensively in several of his novels and social commentaries, and so did American astronomer Simon Newcomb in a series of popular articles and books. For discussions of this "phoenix" scenario in the literature of Wells, Newcomb, and others see W. Warren Wagar, The Next Three Futures: Paradigms of Things to Come (New York, 1989), 20-23; Rosylnn D. Haynes, H. G. Wells: Discoverer of the Future (New York, 1980), 91-98; Richard Hauer Costa, H. G. Wells (New York, 1967), 113-25; and John R. Reed, The Natural History of H. G. Wells (Athens, OH, 1982), 105-9, 155-58. See also Weart, Nuclear Images, 30; and Kevles, The Physicists, 252-54.
78. H. G. Wells developed this theme extensively in several of his novels and social commentaries, and so did American astronomer Simon Newcomb in a series of popular articles and books. For discussions of this "phoenix" scenario in the literature of Wells, Newcomb, and others see W. Warren Wagar, The Next Three Futures: Paradigms of Things to Come (New York, 1989), 20-23; Rosylnn D. Haynes, H. G. Wells: Discoverer of the Future (New York, 1980), 91-98; Richard Hauer Costa, H. G. Wells (New York, 1967), 113-25; and John R. Reed, The Natural History of H. G. Wells (Athens, OH, 1982), 105-9, 155-58. See also Weart, Nuclear Images, 30; and Kevles, The Physicists, 252-54.
79. H. G. Wells developed this theme extensively in several of his novels and social commentaries, and so did American astronomer Simon Newcomb in a series of popular articles and books. For discussions of this "phoenix" scenario in the literature of Wells, Newcomb, and others see W. Warren Wagar, The Next Three Futures: Paradigms of Things to Come (New York, 1989), 20-23; Rosylnn D. Haynes, H. G. Wells: Discoverer of the Future (New York, 1980), 91-98; Richard Hauer Costa, H. G. Wells (New York, 1967), 113-25; and John R. Reed, The Natural History of H. G. Wells (Athens, OH, 1982), 105-9, 155-58. See also Weart, Nuclear Images, 30; and Kevles, The Physicists, 252-54.
80. H. G. Wells developed this theme extensively in several of his novels and social commentaries, and so did American astronomer Simon Newcomb in a series of popular articles and books. For discussions of this "phoenix" scenario in the literature of Wells, Newcomb, and others see W. Warren Wagar, The Next Three Futures: Paradigms of Things to Come (New York, 1989), 20-23; Rosylnn D. Haynes, H. G. Wells: Discoverer of the Future (New York, 1980), 91-98; Richard Hauer Costa, H. G. Wells (New York, 1967), 113-25; and John R. Reed, The Natural History of H. G. Wells (Athens, OH, 1982), 105-9, 155-58. See also Weart, Nuclear Images, 30; and Kevles, The Physicists, 252-54.
81. Kevles, The Physicists, 183.
82. On Robert Millikan's perspective on international relations see Robert H. Kargon, The Rise of Robert Millikan: Portrait in a Lift of American Science (Ithaca, NY, 1982), 16-20, 119;
83. and Robert A. Millikan, The Autobiography of Robert A. Millikan (New York, 1950), 200-203, 251-63, 284-87.
84. See also Tobey, The Ideology of American Science, 190-91;
85. and Kevles, The Physicists, 179, 183-84.
86. Victor F. Weisskopf, "Niels Bohr and International Scientific Collaboration," in Niels Bohr: His Life and Work as Seen by His friends and Colleagues, ed. S. Rozental (New York, 1967), 265.
87. Alice Kimball Smith, A Peril and a Hope: The Scientists' Movement, 1945-1947 (Chicago, 1965), 14-24. Edward Teller has told physicist and writer Gregory Benford that prewar fiction and commentary relating to these themes provided the scientists at Los Alamos with a basis for thinking about the social and political implications of their work during the war. See Gregory Benford, "Old Legends," Nebula Awards 31 (New York, 1997), 206-20. Teller himself mentions these "lunch-table" discussions in his own book, The Legacy of Hiroshima (New York, 1962).
88. Alice Kimball Smith, A Peril and a Hope: The Scientists' Movement, 1945-1947 (Chicago, 1965), 14-24. Edward Teller has told physicist and writer Gregory Benford that prewar fiction and commentary relating to these themes provided the scientists at Los Alamos with a basis for thinking about the social and political implications of their work during the war. See Gregory Benford, "Old Legends," Nebula Awards 31 (New York, 1997), 206-20. Teller himself mentions these "lunch-table" discussions in his own book, The Legacy of Hiroshima (New York, 1962).
89. Alice Kimball Smith, A Peril and a Hope: The Scientists' Movement, 1945-1947 (Chicago, 1965), 14-24. Edward Teller has told physicist and writer Gregory Benford that prewar fiction and commentary relating to these themes provided the scientists at Los Alamos with a basis for thinking about the social and political implications of their work during the war. See Gregory Benford, "Old Legends," Nebula Awards 31 (New York, 1997), 206-20. Teller himself mentions these "lunch-table" discussions in his own book, The Legacy of Hiroshima (New York, 1962).
90. Niels Bohr to Franklin Roosevelt, 3 July 1944, J. Robert Oppenheimer Papers, file: Frankfurter-Bohr, Library of Congress, Washington, DC. Bohr also wondered whether the effects of nuclear weapons ought to demonstrated publicly, perhaps used once, to avoid a larger catastrophe in the future. Although Bohr later repudiated the idea, it remained an intriguing possibility to many colleagues, including Robert Oppenheimer, Arthur Compton, and Philip Morrison. The idea found its way into Harvey Bundy's draft for an essay on the reasons for dropping the bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, written by Henry Stimson and published in Harper's Magazine in February 1947. See "Notes on the Use by the United States of the Atomic Bomb," 25 September 1946, Papers of the Manhattan Engineering District, Top Secret Documents of Interest to General Groves No. 20, National Archives, Washington, DC; Paul Boyer, By the Bomb's Early Light: American Thought and Culture at the Dawn of the Atomic Age (Chapel Hill, 1994), 70-72. It is worth noting that H. G. Wells, Robert Heinlein, and other writers of speculative fiction had imagined the impact of weapons of mass destruction well before Hiroshima; governments had been frightened into foreswearing against the use of such weapons and had formed institutions of collective security to enforce their pledge. Bohr's assessment preceded a debate over whether nuclear weapons were unique or simply a more powerful weapon. See Michael Mandelbaum, The Nuclear Revolution: International Politics before and after Hiroshima (New York, 1981), particularly chap. 1; Sherwin, A World Destroyed, 93-96; and Abraham Pais, Niels Bohr's Times, in Physics, Philosophy, and Polity (Oxford, 1991), 492-96.
91. Niels Bohr to Franklin Roosevelt, 3 July 1944, J. Robert Oppenheimer Papers, file: Frankfurter-Bohr, Library of Congress, Washington, DC. Bohr also wondered whether the effects of nuclear weapons ought to demonstrated publicly, perhaps used once, to avoid a larger catastrophe in the future. Although Bohr later repudiated the idea, it remained an intriguing possibility to many colleagues, including Robert Oppenheimer, Arthur Compton, and Philip Morrison. The idea found its way into Harvey Bundy's draft for an essay on the reasons for dropping the bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, written by Henry Stimson and published in Harper's Magazine in February 1947. See "Notes on the Use by the United States of the Atomic Bomb," 25 September 1946, Papers of the Manhattan Engineering District, Top Secret Documents of Interest to General Groves No. 20, National Archives, Washington, DC; Paul Boyer, By the Bomb's Early Light: American Thought and Culture at the Dawn of the Atomic Age (Chapel Hill, 1994), 70-72. It is worth noting that H. G. Wells, Robert Heinlein, and other writers of speculative fiction had imagined the impact of weapons of mass destruction well before Hiroshima; governments had been frightened into foreswearing against the use of such weapons and had formed institutions of collective security to enforce their pledge. Bohr's assessment preceded a debate over whether nuclear weapons were unique or simply a more powerful weapon. See Michael Mandelbaum, The Nuclear Revolution: International Politics before and after Hiroshima (New York, 1981), particularly chap. 1; Sherwin, A World Destroyed, 93-96; and Abraham Pais, Niels Bohr's Times, in Physics, Philosophy, and Polity (Oxford, 1991), 492-96.
92. Niels Bohr to Franklin Roosevelt, 3 July 1944, J. Robert Oppenheimer Papers, file: Frankfurter-Bohr, Library of Congress, Washington, DC. Bohr also wondered whether the effects of nuclear weapons ought to demonstrated publicly, perhaps used once, to avoid a larger catastrophe in the future. Although Bohr later repudiated the idea, it remained an intriguing possibility to many colleagues, including Robert Oppenheimer, Arthur Compton, and Philip Morrison. The idea found its way into Harvey Bundy's draft for an essay on the reasons for dropping the bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, written by Henry Stimson and published in Harper's Magazine in February 1947. See "Notes on the Use by the United States of the Atomic Bomb," 25 September 1946, Papers of the Manhattan Engineering District, Top Secret Documents of Interest to General Groves No. 20, National Archives, Washington, DC; Paul Boyer, By the Bomb's Early Light: American Thought and Culture at the Dawn of the Atomic Age (Chapel Hill, 1994), 70-72. It is worth noting that H. G. Wells, Robert Heinlein, and other writers of speculative fiction had imagined the impact of weapons of mass destruction well before Hiroshima; governments had been frightened into foreswearing against the use of such weapons and had formed institutions of collective security to enforce their pledge. Bohr's assessment preceded a debate over whether nuclear weapons were unique or simply a more powerful weapon. See Michael Mandelbaum, The Nuclear Revolution: International Politics before and after Hiroshima (New York, 1981), particularly chap. 1; Sherwin, A World Destroyed, 93-96; and Abraham Pais, Niels Bohr's Times, in Physics, Philosophy, and Polity (Oxford, 1991), 492-96.
93. Niels Bohr to Franklin Roosevelt, 3 July 1944, J. Robert Oppenheimer Papers, file: Frankfurter-Bohr, Library of Congress, Washington, DC. Bohr also wondered whether the effects of nuclear weapons ought to demonstrated publicly, perhaps used once, to avoid a larger catastrophe in the future. Although Bohr later repudiated the idea, it remained an intriguing possibility to many colleagues, including Robert Oppenheimer, Arthur Compton, and Philip Morrison. The idea found its way into Harvey Bundy's draft for an essay on the reasons for dropping the bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, written by Henry Stimson and published in Harper's Magazine in February 1947. See "Notes on the Use by the United States of the Atomic Bomb," 25 September 1946, Papers of the Manhattan Engineering District, Top Secret Documents of Interest to General Groves No. 20, National Archives, Washington, DC; Paul Boyer, By the Bomb's Early Light: American Thought and Culture at the Dawn of the Atomic Age (Chapel Hill, 1994), 70-72. It is worth noting that H. G. Wells, Robert Heinlein, and other writers of speculative fiction had imagined the impact of weapons of mass destruction well before Hiroshima; governments had been frightened into foreswearing against the use of such weapons and had formed institutions of collective security to enforce their pledge. Bohr's assessment preceded a debate over whether nuclear weapons were unique or simply a more powerful weapon. See Michael Mandelbaum, The Nuclear Revolution: International Politics before and after Hiroshima (New York, 1981), particularly chap. 1; Sherwin, A World Destroyed, 93-96; and Abraham Pais, Niels Bohr's Times, in Physics, Philosophy, and Polity (Oxford, 1991), 492-96.
94. Niels Bohr to Franklin Roosevelt, 3 July 1944, J. Robert Oppenheimer Papers, file: Frankfurter-Bohr, Library of Congress, Washington, DC. Bohr also wondered whether the effects of nuclear weapons ought to demonstrated publicly, perhaps used once, to avoid a larger catastrophe in the future. Although Bohr later repudiated the idea, it remained an intriguing possibility to many colleagues, including Robert Oppenheimer, Arthur Compton, and Philip Morrison. The idea found its way into Harvey Bundy's draft for an essay on the reasons for dropping the bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, written by Henry Stimson and published in Harper's Magazine in February 1947. See "Notes on the Use by the United States of the Atomic Bomb," 25 September 1946, Papers of the Manhattan Engineering District, Top Secret Documents of Interest to General Groves No. 20, National Archives, Washington, DC; Paul Boyer, By the Bomb's Early Light: American Thought and Culture at the Dawn of the Atomic Age (Chapel Hill, 1994), 70-72. It is worth noting that H. G. Wells, Robert Heinlein, and other writers of speculative fiction had imagined the impact of weapons of mass destruction well before Hiroshima; governments had been frightened into foreswearing against the use of such weapons and had formed institutions of collective security to enforce their pledge. Bohr's assessment preceded a debate over whether nuclear weapons were unique or simply a more powerful weapon. See Michael Mandelbaum, The Nuclear Revolution: International Politics before and after Hiroshima (New York, 1981), particularly chap. 1; Sherwin, A World Destroyed, 93-96; and Abraham Pais, Niels Bohr's Times, in Physics, Philosophy, and Polity (Oxford, 1991), 492-96.
95. Niels Bohr to Franklin Roosevelt, 3 July 1944, J. Robert Oppenheimer Papers, file: Frankfurter-Bohr, Library of Congress, Washington, DC. Bohr also wondered whether the effects of nuclear weapons ought to demonstrated publicly, perhaps used once, to avoid a larger catastrophe in the future. Although Bohr later repudiated the idea, it remained an intriguing possibility to many colleagues, including Robert Oppenheimer, Arthur Compton, and Philip Morrison. The idea found its way into Harvey Bundy's draft for an essay on the reasons for dropping the bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, written by Henry Stimson and published in Harper's Magazine in February 1947. See "Notes on the Use by the United States of the Atomic Bomb," 25 September 1946, Papers of the Manhattan Engineering District, Top Secret Documents of Interest to General Groves No. 20, National Archives, Washington, DC; Paul Boyer, By the Bomb's Early Light: American Thought and Culture at the Dawn of the Atomic Age (Chapel Hill, 1994), 70-72. It is worth noting that H. G. Wells, Robert Heinlein, and other writers of speculative fiction had imagined the impact of weapons of mass destruction well before Hiroshima; governments had been frightened into foreswearing against the use of such weapons and had formed institutions of collective security to enforce their pledge. Bohr's assessment preceded a debate over whether nuclear weapons were unique or simply a more powerful weapon. See Michael Mandelbaum, The Nuclear Revolution: International Politics before and after Hiroshima (New York, 1981), particularly chap. 1; Sherwin, A World Destroyed, 93-96; and Abraham Pais, Niels Bohr's Times, in Physics, Philosophy, and Polity (Oxford, 1991), 492-96.
96. Bohr, "Memorandum," 30 September 1944, Oppenheimer Papers, file: Frankfurter-Bohr.
97. Bohr, "Memorandum," 8 May 1945, Bohr to Roosevelt, 3 July 1944, Oppenheimer Papers, file: Frankfurter-Bohr. On Bohr's influence on his colleagues at Los Alamos see Smith, A Peril and a Hope, 5-12; and Pais, Niels Bohr's Times, 490-508.
98. Bohr, "Memorandum," 8 May 1945, Bohr to Roosevelt, 3 July 1944, Oppenheimer Papers, file: Frankfurter-Bohr. On Bohr's influence on his colleagues at Los Alamos see Smith, A Peril and a Hope, 5-12; and Pais, Niels Bohr's Times, 490-508.
99. Zay Jeffries et al., "Prospectus on Nucleonics," 18 November 1944, Papers of the Manhattan Engineer District, Harrison-Bundy Files, file: 151, National Archives.
100. Conant, marginal note on Bush to Conant, "Shurcliff's Memo on Post-War Policies," 17 April 1944, Atomic Energy Commission Historical Document, No. 180.
101. Bush to Harrison, 30 September 1945, Papers of the Manhattan Engineering District, Harrison-Bundy Files, file: 19.
102. Bush and Conant to Stimson, "Memorandum," 30 September 1944, Papers of the Manhattan Engineering District, Office of the Chief Engineer, Foreign Intelligence, file: 26.
103. Hershberg, James B. Conant, 199.
104. Conant to Grenville Clark, 8 October 1945, Vannevar Bush Papers, file: James B. Conant 1939-1946, Library of Congress.
105. Wells's "aircorps" was developed in The World Set Free and in The Shape of Things to Come (1934). On Wells's internationalist perspective on science see Haynes, H. G. Wells: Discoverer of the Future, 91-98; and Costa, H. G. Wells, 113-25. Before and during the Second World War, many other writers and commentators, Jules Verne, Jack London, and Robert Heinlein, for example, or scientists such as Robert Millikan, Albert Einstein, and Ernest Rutherford, speculated on an international authority that would control science and use its power to enforce law and provide for the world's welfare.
106. Wells's "aircorps" was developed in The World Set Free and in The Shape of Things to Come (1934). On Wells's internationalist perspective on science see Haynes, H. G. Wells: Discoverer of the Future, 91-98; and Costa, H. G. Wells, 113-25. Before and during the Second World War, many other writers and commentators, Jules Verne, Jack London, and Robert Heinlein, for example, or scientists such as Robert Millikan, Albert Einstein, and Ernest Rutherford, speculated on an international authority that would control science and use its power to enforce law and provide for the world's welfare.
107. Wells's "aircorps" was developed in The World Set Free and in The Shape of Things to Come (1934). On Wells's internationalist perspective on science see Haynes, H. G. Wells: Discoverer of the Future, 91-98; and Costa, H. G. Wells, 113-25. Before and during the Second World War, many other writers and commentators, Jules Verne, Jack London, and Robert Heinlein, for example, or scientists such as Robert Millikan, Albert Einstein, and Ernest Rutherford, speculated on an international authority that would control science and use its power to enforce law and provide for the world's welfare.
108. Hershberg, James B. Conant, 199. Hershberg also states that Conant overestimated "the atomic bomb's ability to frighten the world and the USSR into an international control agreement" in his attempts to "crack the Chinese wall" by using the unrestricted exchange of scientific information as a diplomatic device. It was a common mistake among the scientific community. See ibid., 217-19.
109. Hershberg, James B. Conant, 199. Hershberg also states that Conant overestimated "the atomic bomb's ability to frighten the world and the USSR into an international control agreement" in his attempts to "crack the Chinese wall" by using the unrestricted exchange of scientific information as a diplomatic device. It was a common mistake among the scientific community. See ibid., 217-19.
110. It is important to recognize the difference between the immediate choices or actions of individual scientists and general assumptions about the profession and its role in the future. Ideological agreement does not guarantee political solidarity, only a relatively predictable response to ideas and events, particularly among loose professional confederations, like those of the scientists. Methods and approaches to various issues were different and often depended on whether the scientist was operating inside government as an adviser or policymaker, like Vannevar Bush, for example, or outside of government as a critic, such as Leo Szilard. But the assumptions and ideas about the future of science that Bush expressed in Science: The Endless Frontier (Washington, 1947), and those that Szilard espoused during his career were significantly similar; Bush and Szilard, after all, were members of a professional community.
111. Wiener to Giorgio de Santillana, 16 October 1945, Norbert Wiener Papers, box 2, file: 69, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Boston.
112. Teller to Szilard, 2 July 1945, Oppenheimer Papers, file: Edward Teller.
113. Later, Teller would answer these questions himself: "If development is possible, it is out of our powers to prevent it. . . . The terrible consequences of a super bomb will not be avoided by ignoring or postponing the issue, but by wise and provident planning." Teller to Enrico Fermi, 31 October 1945, Papers of the Manhattan Engineering District, Harrison-Bundy Files, file: 76.
114. A large number of studies chronicle political activism among the scientific community during this period, including Smith, A Peril and a Hope, Don Strickland, Scientists in Politics: The Atomic Scientists Movement, 1945-1946 (West Lafayette, IN, 1968); and Joseph Rotblat, Scientists in a Quest for Peace (Cambridge, MA, 1972).
115. A large number of studies chronicle political activism among the scientific community during this period, including Smith, A Peril and a Hope, Don Strickland, Scientists in Politics: The Atomic Scientists Movement, 1945-1946 (West Lafayette, IN, 1968); and Joseph Rotblat, Scientists in a Quest for Peace (Cambridge, MA, 1972).
116. A large number of studies chronicle political activism among the scientific community during this period, including Smith, A Peril and a Hope, Don Strickland, Scientists in Politics: The Atomic Scientists Movement, 1945-1946 (West Lafayette, IN, 1968); and Joseph Rotblat, Scientists in a Quest for Peace (Cambridge, MA, 1972).
117. Documents describing these efforts are numerous; see, for example, American Institute of Physics, "Some Contributions on Behalf of International Relations in Science," 18 September 1946,
118. Department of State, Records of the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State on Atomic Energy Matters, 31: folder 15I10, National Archives;
119. Eugene Rabinowitch, "International Cooperation of Scientists," BAS2; no. 5-6 (September 1946): I; W. A. Higinbotham to Rafael W. Keith, 28 September 1946, Papers of the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), box 16, file: 3, University of Chicago; Detlev Bronk to Lloyd V. Berkner, 10 December 1946, National Academy of Sciences (NAS), NAS-NRC Central File, Policy Files, Foreign Relations 1946, Committee on International Scientific Unions, Washington, DC; and "Report on the Activities of the Committee on Inter-American Scientific Publication," 18 July 1947, Harlow Shapley Papers, Personal and Biographical Material, 1909-1973, file: "Report . . ." Harvard University, Cambridge, MA.
120. The Committee for Foreign Correspondence, "Dear Colleague . . ." July 1946, FAS, box 13, file: 6.
121. See, for example, "Conference on International Meetings and Congresses," 25 April 1946, NAS-NRC Central Files, Policy Files, 1946-49, Foreign Relations, 1946: Conference on the Resumption of International Congresses and Conferences.
122. See, for example, "Conference on International Meetings and Congresses," 25 April 1946, NAS-NRC Central Files, Policy Files, 1946-49, Foreign Relations, 1946: Conference on the Resumption of International Congresses and Conferences.
123. See, for example, "Conference on International Meetings and Congresses," 25 April 1946, NAS-NRC Central Files, Policy Files, 1946-49, Foreign Relations, 1946: Conference on the Resumption of International Congresses and Conferences.
124. See, for example, "Conference on International Meetings and Congresses," 25 April 1946, NAS-NRC Central Files, Policy Files, 1946-49, Foreign Relations, 1946: Conference on the Resumption of International Congresses and Conferences.
125. Eugene Rabinowitch was an interesting example of this larger group. A Russian-born biophysicist, he played a major role in writing the Jeffries report, and after the war he joined the Federation of Atomic (later American) Scientists and became editor of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.
126. Bush to Henry L. Stimson, 13 November 1945, Bush Papers, box 109, file: Stimson; "Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development (Bush) to the Secretary of State," 5 November 1945, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945 (Washington, 1967), 2:69-74 (hereafter FRUS); "Memorandum by an Informal Interdepartmental Committee," 10 December 1945, FRUS, 1945 2:93-94. See also U.S. Department of State, "The Three-Nation Agreed Declaration, 15 November 1945," in The International Control of Atomic Energy: Growth of a Policy, an Informal Summary Record of Official Declarations and Proposals Relating to the International Control of Atomic Energy Made Between August 6, 1945 and October 15, 1946 ( Washington, 1946), 24-27. On Bush's role in framing the early policy see R. Gordon Arneson to John M. Hancock, 10 September 1946, Bernard M. Baruch Papers, box 56, file: On the Subject of Security, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ.
127. Bush to Henry L. Stimson, 13 November 1945, Bush Papers, box 109, file: Stimson; "Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development (Bush) to the Secretary of State," 5 November 1945, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945 (Washington, 1967), 2:69-74 (hereafter FRUS); "Memorandum by an Informal Interdepartmental Committee," 10 December 1945, FRUS, 1945 2:93-94. See also U.S. Department of State, "The Three-Nation Agreed Declaration, 15 November 1945," in The International Control of Atomic Energy: Growth of a Policy, an Informal Summary Record of Official Declarations and Proposals Relating to the International Control of Atomic Energy Made Between August 6, 1945 and October 15, 1946 ( Washington, 1946), 24-27. On Bush's role in framing the early policy see R. Gordon Arneson to John M. Hancock, 10 September 1946, Bernard M. Baruch Papers, box 56, file: On the Subject of Security, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ.
128. Bush to Henry L. Stimson, 13 November 1945, Bush Papers, box 109, file: Stimson; "Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development (Bush) to the Secretary of State," 5 November 1945, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945 (Washington, 1967), 2:69-74 (hereafter FRUS); "Memorandum by an Informal Interdepartmental Committee," 10 December 1945, FRUS, 1945 2:93-94. See also U.S. Department of State, "The Three-Nation Agreed Declaration, 15 November 1945," in The International Control of Atomic Energy: Growth of a Policy, an Informal Summary Record of Official Declarations and Proposals Relating to the International Control of Atomic Energy Made Between August 6, 1945 and October 15, 1946 ( Washington, 1946), 24-27. On Bush's role in framing the early policy see R. Gordon Arneson to John M. Hancock, 10 September 1946, Bernard M. Baruch Papers, box 56, file: On the Subject of Security, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ.
129. Hewlett and Anderson, The New World, 473.
130. Acheson to Byrnes, 15 December 1945, RG 59, State Department decimal file 740.00119/12-1545; Hershberg, James B. Conant, 251-52.
131. James B. Conant, My Several Lives: Memoirs of a Social Inventor (New York, 1970), 485-89. While in Moscow, Conant received a proposal from Leo Szilard and University of Chicago chancellor Robert Hutchins to invite a number of Russian physicists to American universities for discussions about the state of science and the role of science in Soviet-American relations, another indication that scientists in Szilard's and Conant's positions, despite their differences, were thinking about foreign relations along similar lines.
132. Bush to Conant, 2 January 1946, Bush Papers, box 29, file: James B. Conant, 1939-46.
133. Acheson had another agenda, for the more he learned about how atomic energy policy had been made, the more incensed he became. He believed that the War Department, especially Gen. Leslie R. Groves, was usurping the State Department's role in foreign policy in that area. "Why you sons of bitches set up your own State Department!" he shouted at Groves's aide, when he learned about the American program to control global uranium and thorium resources. Acheson decided that the role of the committee would be policy-setting instead of merely advisory, because he felt compelled to place nuclear energy matters in foreign affairs within a "proper" State Department context. For that reason, he found it expedient to place scientists, instead of military technical advisers, on the committee and on the board and to listen to their point of view. See Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York, 1969), 152; Helmreich, Gathering Rare Ores, 110, David E. Lilienthal, Atomic Energy Years (New York, 1964), 9-11.
134. Acheson had another agenda, for the more he learned about how atomic energy policy had been made, the more incensed he became. He believed that the War Department, especially Gen. Leslie R. Groves, was usurping the State Department's role in foreign policy in that area. "Why you sons of bitches set up your own State Department!" he shouted at Groves's aide, when he learned about the American program to control global uranium and thorium resources. Acheson decided that the role of the committee would be policy-setting instead of merely advisory, because he felt compelled to place nuclear energy matters in foreign affairs within a "proper" State Department context. For that reason, he found it expedient to place scientists, instead of military technical advisers, on the committee and on the board and to listen to their point of view. See Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York, 1969), 152; Helmreich, Gathering Rare Ores, 110, David E. Lilienthal, Atomic Energy Years (New York, 1964), 9-11.
135. Acheson had another agenda, for the more he learned about how atomic energy policy had been made, the more incensed he became. He believed that the War Department, especially Gen. Leslie R. Groves, was usurping the State Department's role in foreign policy in that area. "Why you sons of bitches set up your own State Department!" he shouted at Groves's aide, when he learned about the American program to control global uranium and thorium resources. Acheson decided that the role of the committee would be policy-setting instead of merely advisory, because he felt compelled to place nuclear energy matters in foreign affairs within a "proper" State Department context. For that reason, he found it expedient to place scientists, instead of military technical advisers, on the committee and on the board and to listen to their point of view. See Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York, 1969), 152; Helmreich, Gathering Rare Ores, 110, David E. Lilienthal, Atomic Energy Years (New York, 1964), 9-11.
136. Oppenheimer, "Informal Notes, Dr. J. R. Oppenheimer to Mr. D. E. Lilienthal," 2 February 1946, Oppenheimer Papers, file: Lilienthal. See also Arneson to Hancock, 10 September 1946, Baruch Papers, box 56, file: On the Subject of Security.
137. They based their concerns on a board report: C.I.B., "Principles of Control of Production and Use of Fissionable Materials," 6 December 1946, David E. Lilienthal Papers, box 114, file: Chester I. Barnard, Princeton University. See also Hewlett and Anderson, The New World, 540-54. Acheson's frustration with some of the principles inherent in scientific internationalism continued during the debate over the hydrogen bomb several years later. When Robert Oppenheimer tried to convince him that the "super" ought not to be developed, Acheson confided to an associate, "I don't know what the hell he's talking about. How do you disarm an adversary [the Soviet Union] by example?" See R. Gordon Arneson, "The H-bomb Decision," Foreign Service Journal 46 (May 1969): 29.
138. They based their concerns on a board report: C.I.B., "Principles of Control of Production and Use of Fissionable Materials," 6 December 1946, David E. Lilienthal Papers, box 114, file: Chester I. Barnard, Princeton University. See also Hewlett and Anderson, The New World, 540-54. Acheson's frustration with some of the principles inherent in scientific internationalism continued during the debate over the hydrogen bomb several years later. When Robert Oppenheimer tried to convince him that the "super" ought not to be developed, Acheson confided to an associate, "I don't know what the hell he's talking about. How do you disarm an adversary [the Soviet Union] by example?" See R. Gordon Arneson, "The H-bomb Decision," Foreign Service Journal 46 (May 1969): 29.
139. U. S. Department of State, Secretary of State's Committee on Atomic Energy, A Report on the International Control of Atomic Energy (Washington, 1946);
140. David Lilienthal to Bernard Baruch, 19 May 1946, Baruch Papers, box 65, Princeton University; Dean Acheson to James F. Byrnes, 17 March 1946, FRUS, 1946 (Washington, 1972), 1: 762-63.
141. Dexter Masters and Katherine Way, ed., One World or None: A Report to the Public on the full Meaning of the Atomic Bomb (New York, 1946).
142. Historians Barton Bernstein and Peter Galison observe that "openness" and "the physicists' ethic," elements of scientific internationalism, cut across divisiveness in the scientific community over whether to build the hydrogen bomb. Even those who supported the project justified it as a "warning" to humanity to find a new basis for international relations. See Peter Galison and Barton Bernstein, "In Any Light: Scientists and the Decision to Build the Superbomb, 1952-1954," HSPBS 19, no. 2 (1989): 275, 335, 342.
143. W. A. Higinbotham to Irving Kaplan, FAS Papers, box 6, file: 1.
144. Hershberg, James B. Conant, 268.
145. Press quote from the Chicago Tribune, quoted in Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State ( Boston, 1977), 237.
146. Vannevar Bush, Pieces of the Action (New York, 1970), 298.
147. Herken, The Winning Weapon, 162; Ferdinand Eberstadt, diary entry, 28 March 1946, Ferdinand Eberstadt Papers, Princeton University.
148. Quoted in Herken, The Winning Weapon, 161.
149. Eberstadt, diary entry, 28 March 1946, Eberstadt Papers.
150. Strickland, Scientists in Politics, 121.
151. Herken, The Winning Weapon, 151-70; Lilienthal, Atomic Energy Years, 42-50 Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, 1992), 115-16.
152. Herken, The Winning Weapon, 151-70; Lilienthal, Atomic Energy Years, 42-50 Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, 1992), 115-16.
153. Herken, The Winning Weapon, 151-70; Lilienthal, Atomic Energy Years, 42-50 Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, 1992), 115-16.
154. See State Department opinion from "Proposals Regarding Atomic Energy Policies," 14 August 1947, U.S. Department of State, Records of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, lot file 57D-688, National Archives; Frederick Osborne diary, 29 March 1947, Frederick Osborne Papers, file: UNAEC diary, Princeton University; United Nations Security Council, Official Records, Third Year No. 88, 325 Meeting, 22 June 1948, New York; "Editorial Note" and "Minutes of the Eighteenth Meeting of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly, Hotel d'llena, Paris," 19 October 1948, FRUS, 1948 (Washington, 1975), 1:484-88.
155. See State Department opinion from "Proposals Regarding Atomic Energy Policies," 14 August 1947, U.S. Department of State, Records of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, lot file 57D-688, National Archives; Frederick Osborne diary, 29 March 1947, Frederick Osborne Papers, file: UNAEC diary, Princeton University; United Nations Security Council, Official Records, Third Year No. 88, 325 Meeting, 22 June 1948, New York; "Editorial Note" and "Minutes of the Eighteenth Meeting of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly, Hotel d'llena, Paris," 19 October 1948, FRUS, 1948 (Washington, 1975), 1:484-88.
156. See State Department opinion from "Proposals Regarding Atomic Energy Policies," 14 August 1947, U.S. Department of State, Records of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, lot file 57D-688, National Archives; Frederick Osborne diary, 29 March 1947, Frederick Osborne Papers, file: UNAEC diary, Princeton University; United Nations Security Council, Official Records, Third Year No. 88, 325 Meeting, 22 June 1948, New York; "Editorial Note" and "Minutes of the Eighteenth Meeting of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly, Hotel d'llena, Paris," 19 October 1948, FRUS, 1948 (Washington, 1975), 1:484-88.
157. See State Department opinion from "Proposals Regarding Atomic Energy Policies," 14 August 1947, U.S. Department of State, Records of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, lot file 57D-688, National Archives; Frederick Osborne diary, 29 March 1947, Frederick Osborne Papers, file: UNAEC diary, Princeton University; United Nations Security Council, Official Records, Third Year No. 88, 325 Meeting, 22 June 1948, New York; "Editorial Note" and "Minutes of the Eighteenth Meeting of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly, Hotel d'llena, Paris," 19 October 1948, FRUS, 1948 (Washington, 1975), 1:484-88.
158. See State Department opinion from "Proposals Regarding Atomic Energy Policies," 14 August 1947, U.S. Department of State, Records of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, lot file 57D-688, National Archives; Frederick Osborne diary, 29 March 1947, Frederick Osborne Papers, file: UNAEC diary, Princeton University; United Nations Security Council, Official Records, Third Year No. 88, 325 Meeting, 22 June 1948, New York; "Editorial Note" and "Minutes of the Eighteenth Meeting of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly, Hotel d'llena, Paris," 19 October 1948, FRUS, 1948 (Washington, 1975), 1:484-88.
159. U.S. Department of State, International Control of Atomic Energy, 138-47.
160. Smith, A Peril and a Hope, 338, 350.
161. Boyer, By the Bomb's Early Light, 33-45 . See also Leo Szilard, "The Physicist Invades Politics," Saturday Review of Literature, 3 May 1947, 8, 31-34.
162. Boyer, By the Bomb's Early Light, 33-45 . See also Leo Szilard, "The Physicist Invades Politics," Saturday Review of Literature, 3 May 1947, 8, 31-34.
163. Wiley Higinbotham to Normal Veall, 21 February 1946, FAS, box 12, file: 8; Edward U. Condon, "An Appeal to Reason," BAS 1, no. 3 (15 March 1946): 6. 73. Wiener to Rabinowitch, 22 June 1951, Wiener Papers, box 2, file: 138.
164. Rabinowitch to Wiener, 18 July 1951, Wiener Papers, box 2, file: 138.
165. A. S. Bishop to W. A. Higinbotham, 24 June 1947, FAS, box 13, file: 8. Soviet leaders also had difficulty understanding the concept of scientific relations and cooperative exchanges. Lavrenti Beria thought that the dialogue among American scientists about professional cooperation on an international level indicated that they were generally sympathetic to Soviet communism. Similar dialogues among Russian professionals just after the war motivated the Stalin government to purge the scientific community. See Bruce Parrot, Politics and Technology in the Soviet Union (Cambridge, MA, 1987), 101-4; David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb (New Haven, 1994), 208-13; and Werhner Hahn, Postwar Soviet Politics: The Fall of Zhdanov and the Defeat of Moderation (Ithaca, 1984), 58-93.
166. A. S. Bishop to W. A. Higinbotham, 24 June 1947, FAS, box 13, file: 8. Soviet leaders also had difficulty understanding the concept of scientific relations and cooperative exchanges. Lavrenti Beria thought that the dialogue among American scientists about professional cooperation on an international
167. A. S. Bishop to W. A. Higinbotham, 24 June 1947, FAS, box 13, file: 8. Soviet leaders also had difficulty understanding the concept of scientific relations and cooperative exchanges. Lavrenti Beria thought that the dialogue among American scientists about professional cooperation on an international level indicated that they were generally sympathetic to Soviet communism. Similar dialogues among Russian professionals just after the war motivated the Stalin government to purge the scientific community. See Bruce Parrot, Politics and Technology in the Soviet Union (Cambridge, MA, 1987), 101-4; David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb (New Haven, 1994), 208-13; and Werhner Hahn, Postwar Soviet Politics: The Fall of Zhdanov and the Defeat of Moderation (Ithaca, 1984), 58-93.
168. A. S. Bishop to W. A. Higinbotham, 24 June 1947, FAS, box 13, file: 8. Soviet leaders also had difficulty understanding the concept of scientific relations and cooperative exchanges. Lavrenti Beria thought that the dialogue among American scientists about professional cooperation on an international level indicated that they were generally sympathetic to Soviet communism. Similar dialogues among Russian professionals just after the war motivated the Stalin government to purge the scientific community. See Bruce Parrot, Politics and Technology in the Soviet Union (Cambridge, MA, 1987), 101-4; David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb (New Haven, 1994), 208-13; and Werhner Hahn, Postwar Soviet Politics: The Fall of Zhdanov and the Defeat of Moderation (Ithaca, 1984), 58-93.
169. See, for example, Francis J. Graling to Richard H. Davis, 11 November 1947, RG 59, decimal file 861.92/11-1147; A. Szent-Györgyi to Detlev Bronk, 23 September 1947, and Bronk to Szent-Györgyi, 2 October 1947, NAS-NRC Central File, Policy Files, 1946-49, International Relations, Exchange of Scientific Personnel 1947; Bernard Peters to Urner Lidell, 18 August 1948, FAS, box 33, file: 4; Peters to Secretary of State Dean Acheson, 18 February 1950, NAS-NRC Central File, Policy Files, 1950-56, Agencies and Departments, State: General, 1950; "The New Immigration Law," AAAS Board and Council Minutes, 1941-53, Minutes of the Council, 27-30 December 1952, American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), Washington, DC; Jesse M. MacKnight, "Memorandum by Mr. Jesse M. MacKnight to the Department of State Policy Committee on Immigration and Naturalization with Enclosure," n. d., FRUS, 1950 (Washington, 1977), 1:896-904; "Meetings of the AAAS Council in Philadelphia," 27-29 December 195-1, AAAS Board and Council Minutes, 1941-53, Minutes of the Executive Council; Edward A. Shils, "America's Paper Curtain," BAS 8 (October 1952): 210.
170. Such reactions were numerous, and even the State Department by the early fifties was acknowledging the problem. See, for example, "Conference on International Meetings and Congresses," 25 April 1946, NAS-NRC Central Files, Policy Files, 1946-49, Foreign Relations 1946: Conference on Resumption of International Congresses and Conferences; "The International Mathematical Union and Its Work: Report of the First Session Held in Rome, March 6-8, 1952," Department of State Bulletin 26:675, 870-72; Victor F. Weisskopf, "British Conference," BAS 2 (December 1946): 5; John A. Simpson, "Summary of Report on Visit to England and Paris," March 1946, Papers of the Association of Cambridge Scientists, box 2, file: 4; Copy of the petition, 11 june 1949, enclosed in M. Demerec to Harry S. Truman, 23 July 1949, NAS-NRC Central File, Policy Files, 1946-49, International Relations: Exchange of Scientific Personnel 1949; Alan T. Waterman, "Comments on the Agenda, Thirty-Second Meeting of the Interdepartmental Meeting on Scientific Research and Development," 24 October 1950, Records of the National Science Foundation, Office of the Director, Subject File, 1951-56, Alan T. Waterman, Diary File, National Science Foundation, Washington, DC.
171. See, for example, Douglas Whitaker to Detlev Bronk, 9 January 1949, NAS-NRC, Central File, Policy Files, 1946-49, International Relations, International Science Policy Survey of State Department, NRC Portion of Study: Circular Replies. The letter discusses a survey by the National Academy of Sciences among the scientific community, asking for opinions about government policies toward scientific relations. Whitaker, an official with the NAS, characterized the responses as strongly negative and politically dangerous for the institution and the respondents. The numerous enclosed letters bear out his assessment.
172. Ellen Schrecker, No Ivory Tower. McCarthyism and the Universities (Oxford, 1986), 149-60.
173. Alan T. Waterman, "Comments on the Agenda, Thirty-Second Meeting of the Interdepartmental Committee on Scientific Research and Development," 24 October 1950, Records of the National Science Foundation, Office of the Director, Subject File, 1951-56, Alan T. Waterman Diary File. An NSF "guideline" is also found in this document.
174. Ellsworth C. Dougherty to "Dick," 2 January 1949, FAS, box 28, file: 10.
175. Quoted in Donald W. Cox, America's New Policy Makers: The Scientists' Rise to Power (Philadelphia, 1964), 39.
176. "Hugh," memorandum to Paul Doty, 26 October 1946, FAS, box 25, file: 7. See also J. H. Rush to Rafael Grinrield, 28 September 1946, FAS, box 16, file: 3.
177. A. V. Hill to Dr. Harrison Brown, 8 March 1948, Emergency Committee of Atomic Scientists papers, box 16, file: 7.
178. Albert Einstein, Robert Oppenheimer, David Lilienthal, and Hans Bethe spoke out on this issue on a television show moderated by Eleanor Roosevelt in February 1950. See the transcript of "Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt's Simulcast on Sunday, February 12, 1950, 4:00 p.m. EST, over NBC network," Lilienthal Papers. See also Samuel K. Allison, Kenneth Bainbridge, et.al., "Let Us Pledge Not to Use the H-bomb First!" BAS 6, no. 3 (March 1950): 75.
179. See S. M. Ulam, Adventures of a Mathematician (New York, 1976), 216-17; Edward Teller, "Back to the Laboratories," BAS 6, no. 3 (March 1950): 71-72; Harold Urey, "Should America Build the H-bomb?" ibid., 72-73.
180. See S. M. Ulam, Adventures of a Mathematician (New York, 1976), 216-17; Edward Teller, "Back to the Laboratories," BAS 6, no. 3 (March 1950): 71-72; Harold Urey, "Should America Build the H-bomb?" ibid., 72-73.
181. See S. M. Ulam, Adventures of a Mathematician (New York, 1976), 216-17; Edward Teller, "Back to the Laboratories," BAS 6, no. 3 (March 1950): 71-72; Harold Urey, "Should America Build the H-bomb?" ibid., 72-73.
182. Wheeler's recollection of a conversation with Bohr quoted in Galison and Bernstein, "In Any Light," 319.
183. U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer (Washington, 1954), 328.
184. Hans Bethe, "The Hydrogen Bomb," BAS 6, no. 4 (April 1950): 99-104.
185. U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer, 328. See also Jeremy Bernstein, Hans Bethe: Prophet of Energy (New York, 1980), 95; for a discussion on the anti-Communist motives of some of the nuclear physicists see Herbert F. York, The Advisor: Oppenheimer, Teller and the Superbomb (San Francisco, 1976), 46-56 ; and Bernstein, "Four Physicists and the Bomb," 257-62.
186. U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer, 328. See also Jeremy Bernstein, Hans Bethe: Prophet of Energy (New York, 1980), 95; for a discussion on the anti-Communist motives of some of the nuclear physicists see Herbert F. York, The Advisor: Oppenheimer, Teller and the Superbomb (San Francisco, 1976), 46-56 ; and Bernstein, "Four Physicists and the Bomb," 257-62.
187. U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer, 328. See also Jeremy Bernstein, Hans Bethe: Prophet of Energy (New York, 1980), 95; for a discussion on the anti-Communist motives of some of the nuclear physicists see Herbert F. York, The Advisor: Oppenheimer, Teller and the Superbomb (San Francisco, 1976), 46-56 ; and Bernstein, "Four Physicists and the Bomb," 257-62.
188. U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer, 328. See also Jeremy Bernstein, Hans Bethe: Prophet of Energy (New York, 1980), 95; for a discussion on the anti-Communist motives of some of the nuclear physicists see Herbert F. York, The Advisor: Oppenheimer, Teller and the Superbomb (San Francisco, 1976), 46-56 ; and Bernstein, "Four Physicists and the Bomb," 257-62.
189. T. Harrison Davies, "Soviet Atomic Espionage," The Atomic Age, ed. Morton Grodzins and Eugene Rabinowitch (New York, 1964), 360-72; the original article was published in BAS in May 1951.
190. Eugene Rabinowitch, "Atomic Spy Trials: Some Heretical Afterthoughts," The Atomic Age, 373-83; the article was originally published in BAS in May 1951.
191. Wiley Higinbotham to A. S. Bishop, 21 July 1947, FAS, box 13, file: 7.
192. Sergei Vavilov, A. N. Frumkin, A. F. Ioffe, N. N. Semyonov, "Open Letter to Dr. Einstein," reprinted in BAS 4, no. 2 (February 1948): 54, 37-38; Albert Einstein, "A Reply to the Soviet Scientists," ibid., 35-37.
193. Sergei Vavilov, A. N. Frumkin, A. F. Ioffe, N. N. Semyonov, "Open Letter to Dr. Einstein," reprinted in BAS 4, no. 2 (February 1948): 54, 37-38; Albert Einstein, "A Reply to the Soviet Scientists," ibid., 35-37.
194. As David Holloway points out in Stalin and the Bomb, however, purges against physicists were moderated by political and strategic judgments about their importance to the state. Physicists in the Soviet atomic energy program routinely used theoretical and mathematical principles of quantum mechanics and scientific literature from the West, but did not proclaim them publicly. That arrangement was acceptable to Beria and other Soviet leaders. See Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, 208-13; G. A. Goncharov, N. I. Komov, A. S. Stepanov, "The Russian Nuclear Project: Setting Up the A-Bomb Effort, 1946," Cold War International History Bulletin 8-9 (Winter 1996-97): 412, 415.
195. As David Holloway points out in Stalin and the Bomb, however, purges against physicists were moderated by political and strategic judgments about their importance to the state. Physicists in the Soviet atomic energy program routinely used theoretical and mathematical principles of quantum mechanics and scientific literature from the West, but did not proclaim them publicly. That arrangement was acceptable to Beria and other Soviet leaders. See Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, 208-13; G. A. Goncharov, N. I. Komov, A. S. Stepanov, "The Russian Nuclear Project: Setting Up the A-Bomb Effort, 1946," Cold War International History Bulletin 8-9 (Winter 1996-97): 412, 415.
196. David Joravsky, The Lysenko Affair (Cambridge, MA, 1970), 132-41; Parrot, Politics and Technology in the Soviet Union, 108-10.
197. David Joravsky, The Lysenko Affair (Cambridge, MA, 1970), 132-41; Parrot, Politics and Technology in the Soviet Union, 108-10.
198. Walter Bedell Smith to the secretary of state, 10 December 1948, RG 59, decimal file 861.92/12-1048. See also American embassy in Moscow, "Confidential Memorandum," 11 September 1947, RG 59, decimal file 861.921/9-1147; Smith to secretary of state, 7 August 1948, RG 59, decimal file 861.92/8-648; Kohler to secretary of state 15 January 1949, RG 59, decimal file 861.92/1-1549.
199. George V. Allen, "Science Falls Victim of Communism's Straightjacket," Department of State Bulletin, 26 December 1948, 409-10.
200. Walter Bedell Smith to secretary of state, 24 March 1948, RG 59, decimal file 861.92/3-2448.
201. "Memorandum by the executive secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)," 21 May 1951, FRUS, 1951 (Washington, 1980), 1: 721-30.
202. M. Stanley Livingston, Particle Accelerators: A Brief History (Cambridge, MA, 1969), 60-75; Richard G. Hewlett and Jack M. Holl, Atoms for Peace and War, 1953-1961: Eisenhower and the Atomic Energy Commission (Berkeley, 1989), 258.
203. M. Stanley Livingston, Particle Accelerators: A Brief History (Cambridge, MA, 1969), 60-75; Richard G. Hewlett and Jack M. Holl, Atoms for Peace and War, 1953-1961: Eisenhower and the Atomic Energy Commission (Berkeley, 1989), 258.
204. "Armaments and American Policy. A Report of the Panel of Consultants on Disarmament of the Department of State," 15 January 1953, RG 59, decimal file 330:13/1-1553.
205. Quoted in Herken, Cardinal Choices, 71.
206. For Elsenhower's own point of view on these matters see Dwight D. Elsenhower, Mandate for Change, 1953-1956 (Garden City, NY, 1963), 252-54. See also Thomas S. Soapes, "A Cold Warrior Seeks Peace: Elsenhower's Strategy' for Nuclear Disarmament," Diplomatic History 4 (Winter 1980): 57-71; Herken, Cardinal Choices, 71-72; Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower. The President (New York, 1984), 38, 123-25-135; Robert R. Bowie, "Elsenhower, Atomic Weapons, and Atoms for Peace," and Richard G. Hewlett, "From Proposal to Program," both in Atoms for Peace: An Analysis After Thirty Years, 181-206, ed. Charles K. Ebinger, Robert E. Pendley, and Joseph Pilat (Boulder, 1985).
207. For Elsenhower's own point of view on these matters see Dwight D. Elsenhower, Mandate for Change, 1953-1956 (Garden City, NY, 1963), 252-54. See also Thomas S. Soapes, "A Cold Warrior Seeks Peace: Elsenhower's Strategy' for Nuclear Disarmament," Diplomatic History 4 (Winter 1980): 57-71; Herken, Cardinal Choices, 71-72; Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower. The President (New York, 1984), 38, 123-25-135; Robert R. Bowie, "Elsenhower, Atomic Weapons, and Atoms for Peace," and Richard G. Hewlett, "From Proposal to Program," both in Atoms for Peace: An Analysis After Thirty Years, 181-206, ed. Charles K. Ebinger, Robert E. Pendley, and Joseph Pilat (Boulder, 1985).
208. For Elsenhower's own point of view on these matters see Dwight D. Elsenhower, Mandate for Change, 1953-1956 (Garden City, NY, 1963), 252-54. See also Thomas S. Soapes, "A Cold Warrior Seeks Peace: Elsenhower's Strategy' for Nuclear Disarmament," Diplomatic History 4 (Winter 1980): 57-71; Herken, Cardinal Choices, 71-72; Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower. The President (New York, 1984), 38, 123-25-135; Robert R. Bowie, "Elsenhower, Atomic Weapons, and Atoms for Peace," and Richard G. Hewlett, "From Proposal to Program," both in Atoms for Peace: An Analysis After Thirty Years, 181-206, ed. Charles K. Ebinger, Robert E. Pendley, and Joseph Pilat (Boulder, 1985).
209. For Elsenhower's own point of view on these matters see Dwight D. Elsenhower, Mandate for Change, 1953-1956 (Garden City, NY, 1963), 252-54. See also Thomas S. Soapes, "A Cold Warrior Seeks Peace: Elsenhower's Strategy' for Nuclear Disarmament," Diplomatic History 4 (Winter 1980): 57-71; Herken, Cardinal Choices, 71-72; Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower. The President (New York, 1984), 38, 123-25-135; Robert R. Bowie, "Elsenhower, Atomic Weapons, and Atoms for Peace," and Richard G. Hewlett, "From Proposal to Program," both in Atoms for Peace: An Analysis After Thirty Years, 181-206, ed. Charles K. Ebinger, Robert E. Pendley, and Joseph Pilat (Boulder, 1985).
210. For Elsenhower's own point of view on these matters see Dwight D. Elsenhower, Mandate for Change, 1953-1956 (Garden City, NY, 1963), 252-54. See also Thomas S. Soapes, "A Cold Warrior Seeks Peace: Elsenhower's Strategy' for Nuclear Disarmament," Diplomatic History 4 (Winter 1980): 57-71; Herken, Cardinal Choices, 71-72; Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower. The President (New York, 1984), 38, 123-25-135; Robert R. Bowie, "Elsenhower, Atomic Weapons, and Atoms for Peace," and Richard G. Hewlett, "From Proposal to Program," both in Atoms for Peace: An Analysis After Thirty Years, 181-206, ed. Charles K. Ebinger, Robert E. Pendley, and Joseph Pilat (Boulder, 1985).
211. For Elsenhower's own point of view on these matters see Dwight D. Elsenhower, Mandate for Change, 1953-1956 (Garden City, NY, 1963), 252-54. See also Thomas S. Soapes, "A Cold Warrior Seeks Peace: Elsenhower's Strategy' for Nuclear Disarmament," Diplomatic History 4 (Winter 1980): 57-71; Herken, Cardinal Choices, 71-72; Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower. The President (New York, 1984), 38, 123-25-135; Robert R. Bowie, "Elsenhower, Atomic Weapons, and Atoms for Peace," and Richard G. Hewlett, "From Proposal to Program," both in Atoms for Peace: An Analysis After Thirty Years, 181-206, ed. Charles K. Ebinger, Robert E. Pendley, and Joseph Pilat (Boulder, 1985).
212. FRUS, 1952-1954 (Washington, 1984), 2:1224-26.
213. Ad Hoc Committee on Armaments, "Draft Presidential Speech on Atomic Energy," 22 June 1953, Bush Papers, box 108, file: State Department. For a perspective on the political and propagandistic value of this approach see Robert Cutler to C. D. Jackson and Lewis Strauss, 10 September 1953, Whitman Administrative File, box 5, file: "Atoms for Peace," Elsenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas.
214. Samuel Goudsmit, "Our Task in Germany," BAS 4, no. 4 (April 1948): 106.
215. Oppenheimer to Oliver E. Buckley, 28 November 1951, Oppenheimer Papers, box 189, file: Science Advisory Committee, Exchange of Technical Information with Allies.
216. See, for example, Robert A. Divine, Elsenhower and the Cold War (Oxford, 1981), 113; Peter Lyon, Eisenhower: Portrait of a Hero ( Boston, 1974), 584; Harold L. Neiburg, Nuclear Secrecy and Foreign Policy (Washington, 1964), chap. 6; and Richard H. Immerman, "Confessions of an Eisenhower Revisionist: An Agonizing Reappraisal," Diplomatic History 14 (Summer 1990): 319-42. For general appraisals of nuclear proliferation in the context of Elsenhower's foreign policy initiatives see Ambrose, Eisenhower The President, and Fred I. Greenstein, The Hidden Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader (New York, 1982).
217. See, for example, Robert A. Divine, Elsenhower and the Cold War (Oxford, 1981), 113; Peter Lyon, Eisenhower: Portrait of a Hero ( Boston, 1974), 584; Harold L. Neiburg, Nuclear Secrecy and Foreign Policy (Washington, 1964), chap. 6; and Richard H. Immerman, "Confessions of an Eisenhower Revisionist: An Agonizing Reappraisal," Diplomatic History 14 (Summer 1990): 319-42. For general appraisals of nuclear proliferation in the context of Elsenhower's foreign policy initiatives see Ambrose, Eisenhower The President, and Fred I. Greenstein, The Hidden Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader (New York, 1982).
218. See, for example, Robert A. Divine, Elsenhower and the Cold War (Oxford, 1981), 113; Peter Lyon, Eisenhower: Portrait of a Hero ( Boston, 1974), 584; Harold L. Neiburg, Nuclear Secrecy and Foreign Policy (Washington, 1964), chap. 6; and Richard H. Immerman, "Confessions of an Eisenhower Revisionist: An Agonizing Reappraisal," Diplomatic History 14 (Summer 1990): 319-42. For general appraisals of nuclear proliferation in the context of Elsenhower's foreign policy initiatives see Ambrose, Eisenhower The President, and Fred I. Greenstein, The Hidden Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader (New York, 1982).
219. See, for example, Robert A. Divine, Elsenhower and the Cold War (Oxford, 1981), 113; Peter Lyon, Eisenhower: Portrait of a Hero ( Boston, 1974), 584; Harold L. Neiburg, Nuclear Secrecy and Foreign Policy (Washington, 1964), chap. 6; and Richard H. Immerman, "Confessions of an Eisenhower Revisionist: An Agonizing Reappraisal," Diplomatic History 14 (Summer 1990): 319-42. For general appraisals of nuclear proliferation in the context of Elsenhower's foreign policy initiatives see Ambrose, Eisenhower The President, and Fred I. Greenstein, The Hidden Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader (New York, 1982).
220. See, for example, Robert A. Divine, Elsenhower and the Cold War (Oxford, 1981), 113; Peter Lyon, Eisenhower: Portrait of a Hero ( Boston, 1974), 584; Harold L. Neiburg, Nuclear Secrecy and Foreign Policy (Washington, 1964), chap. 6; and Richard H. Immerman, "Confessions of an Eisenhower Revisionist: An Agonizing Reappraisal," Diplomatic History 14 (Summer 1990): 319-42. For general appraisals of nuclear proliferation in the context of Elsenhower's foreign policy initiatives see Ambrose, Eisenhower The President, and Fred I. Greenstein, The Hidden Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader (New York, 1982).
221. See, for example, Robert A. Divine, Elsenhower and the Cold War (Oxford, 1981), 113; Peter Lyon, Eisenhower: Portrait of a Hero ( Boston, 1974), 584; Harold L. Neiburg, Nuclear Secrecy and Foreign Policy (Washington, 1964), chap. 6; and Richard H. Immerman, "Confessions of an Eisenhower Revisionist: An Agonizing Reappraisal," Diplomatic History 14 (Summer 1990): 319-42. For general appraisals of nuclear proliferation in the context of Elsenhower's foreign policy initiatives see Ambrose, Eisenhower The President, and Fred I. Greenstein, The Hidden Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader (New York, 1982).
222. See, for example, "Memorandum of Conversation, Secretary John Foster Dulles and Sir Roger Makins, British Ambassador," 7 January 1954, Whitman Administrative Papers, box 4, file: AEC 1953-54 no. 5.
223. Planning for this possibility occurred quite early. See Richard Hirsch, "A Program to Exploit the A-Bank Proposals of the President's UN Speech of Decembers, 1953, in Domestic and International Public Opinion Fields," 4 February 1954, C. D. Jackson Papers, box 24, file: Time, Inc., Atoms tor Peace Evolution, no. 1, Eisenhower Library; the cover letter states that the document, including two attachments, represents the combined recommendations of the Operations Coordinating Board, the Department of State, and the Central Intelligence Agency. See also C. D. Jackson to OCB, 9 December 1953, Jackson Papers, box 1, file: OCB-Misc. Memo no. 2; "Cooperation with Other Nations in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy," NSC doc. no. 5431/1.
224. August 1954, White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, NSC Series, Policy Papers, box 12, file: NSC 5431/1: Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, Eisenhower Library.
225. See, for example, "Disclosure of Atomic Information to Allied Countries," 4 December 1955, RG 273. National Security Council Policy Paper No. 151/2.
226. On these various policy changes, see, for example, Richard Hirsch, "A Program to Exploit the A-Bank Proposals in the President's UN Speech . . ., Tab 'A,' Recommended Implementing Actions," and "Tab 'B,' Checklist of Suggested Agency Actions," White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, NSC Series, Policy Papers, box 12; Victor F. Weisskopf, "Visas for Foreign Scientists," BAS 10, no. 3 (March 1954): 66-67; T. H. McCabe, "The Gubser Resolutions," ibid., 71; U.S. House of Representatives, Judiciary Committee, House Resolution. 308, 83d Cong., 2d sess. (1954), p. 2; United States Atomic Energy Commission, Fifteen Semiannual Report of the Atomic Energy Commission (Washington, 1954), 138, 143-48; U.S. House of Representatives, "Message from the President of the United States Transmitting Recommendations Relative to the Atomic Energy Act of 1946," House Doc. No. 328, 83d Cong., 2d sess., pp. 10-11; "Cooperation with other Nations in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy," National Security Council, document no. 5431/1, 13 August 1954, White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, NSC Series, Policy Papers, box 12, file: NSC 5431/1: Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy; "Section on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy -International Agency," 15 September 1954, John Foster Dulles Papers, Selected Correspondence, box 78, file: Atomic Energy, Atomic Weapons and Disarmament, Princeton University; "An Atomic Power Proposal for Latin America," n. d. [1954], Whitman Administrative Papers, box 4, file: Atomic Energy Commission 1953-54 no.1; John B. Hollister to Dwight D. Eisenhower, 14 November 1955, Whitman Administrative Papers, box 4, file: AEC 1955-56 no. 6; "Address of John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State, on International Cooperation in Developing Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy," 23 September 1954, NAS-NRC Central File, Policy Files, 1950-56, International Relations 1955, United Nations: Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy: Geneva Convention; "Press Release by United States Atomic Energy Commission, Special Session of Radioisotope Technique Course to be Opened to Foreign Scientists, December 6, 1954," in Atoms for Peace Manual, 336-37. The declassified information and the research reactor program are often cited as tangible evidence in criticisms about nuclear proliferation.
227. On these various policy changes, see, for example, Richard Hirsch, "A Program to Exploit the A-Bank Proposals in the President's UN Speech . . ., Tab 'A,' Recommended Implementing Actions," and "Tab 'B,' Checklist of Suggested Agency Actions," White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, NSC Series, Policy Papers, box 12; Victor F. Weisskopf, "Visas for Foreign Scientists," BAS 10, no. 3 (March 1954): 66-67; T. H. McCabe, "The Gubser Resolutions," ibid., 71; U.S. House of Representatives, Judiciary Committee, House Resolution. 308, 83d Cong., 2d sess. (1954), p. 2; United States Atomic Energy Commission, Fifteen Semiannual Report of the Atomic Energy Commission (Washington, 1954), 138, 143-48; U.S. House of Representatives, "Message from the President of the United States Transmitting Recommendations Relative to the Atomic Energy Act of 1946," House Doc. No. 328, 83d Cong., 2d sess., pp. 10-11; "Cooperation with other Nations in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy," National Security Council, document no. 5431/1, 13 August 1954, White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, NSC Series, Policy Papers, box 12, file: NSC 5431/1: Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy; "Section on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy -International Agency," 15 September 1954, John Foster Dulles Papers, Selected Correspondence, box 78, file: Atomic Energy, Atomic Weapons and Disarmament, Princeton University; "An Atomic Power Proposal for Latin America," n. d. [1954], Whitman Administrative Papers, box 4, file: Atomic Energy Commission 1953-54 no.1; John B. Hollister to Dwight D. Eisenhower, 14 November 1955, Whitman Administrative Papers, box 4, file: AEC 1955-56 no. 6; "Address of John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State, on International Cooperation in Developing Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy," 23 September 1954, NAS-NRC Central File, Policy Files, 1950-56, International Relations 1955, United Nations: Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy: Geneva Convention; "Press Release by United States Atomic Energy Commission, Special Session of Radioisotope Technique Course to be Opened to Foreign Scientists, December 6, 1954," in Atoms for Peace Manual, 336-37. The declassified information and the research reactor program are often cited as tangible evidence in criticisms about nuclear proliferation.
228. On these various policy changes, see, for example, Richard Hirsch, "A Program to Exploit the A-Bank Proposals in the President's UN Speech . . ., Tab 'A,' Recommended Implementing Actions," and "Tab 'B,' Checklist of Suggested Agency Actions," White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, NSC Series, Policy Papers, box 12; Victor F. Weisskopf, "Visas for Foreign Scientists," BAS 10, no. 3 (March 1954): 66-67; T. H. McCabe, "The Gubser Resolutions," ibid., 71; U.S. House of Representatives, Judiciary Committee, House Resolution. 308, 83d Cong., 2d sess. (1954), p. 2; United States Atomic Energy Commission, Fifteen Semiannual Report of the Atomic Energy Commission (Washington, 1954), 138, 143-48; U.S. House of Representatives, "Message from the President of the United States Transmitting Recommendations Relative to the Atomic Energy Act of 1946," House Doc. No. 328, 83d Cong., 2d sess., pp. 10-11; "Cooperation with other Nations in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy," National Security Council, document no. 5431/1, 13 August 1954, White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, NSC Series, Policy Papers, box 12, file: NSC 5431/1: Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy; "Section on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy -International Agency," 15 September 1954, John Foster Dulles Papers, Selected Correspondence, box 78, file: Atomic Energy, Atomic Weapons and Disarmament, Princeton University; "An Atomic Power Proposal for Latin America," n. d. [1954], Whitman Administrative Papers, box 4, file: Atomic Energy Commission 1953-54 no.1; John B. Hollister to Dwight D. Eisenhower, 14 November 1955, Whitman Administrative Papers, box 4, file: AEC 1955-56 no. 6; "Address of John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State, on International Cooperation in Developing Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy," 23 September 1954, NAS-NRC Central File, Policy Files, 1950-56, International Relations 1955, United Nations: Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy: Geneva Convention; "Press Release by United States Atomic Energy Commission, Special Session of Radioisotope Technique Course to be Opened to Foreign Scientists, December 6, 1954," in Atoms for Peace Manual, 336-37. The declassified information and the research reactor program are often cited as tangible evidence in criticisms about nuclear proliferation.
229. On these various policy changes, see, for example, Richard Hirsch, "A Program to Exploit the A-Bank Proposals in the President's UN Speech . . ., Tab 'A,' Recommended Implementing Actions," and "Tab 'B,' Checklist of Suggested Agency Actions," White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, NSC Series, Policy Papers, box 12; Victor F. Weisskopf, "Visas for Foreign Scientists," BAS 10, no. 3 (March 1954): 66-67; T. H. McCabe, "The Gubser Resolutions," ibid., 71; U.S. House of Representatives, Judiciary Committee, House Resolution. 308, 83d Cong., 2d sess. (1954), p. 2; United States Atomic Energy Commission, Fifteen Semiannual Report of the Atomic Energy Commission (Washington, 1954), 138, 143-48; U.S. House of Representatives, "Message from the President of the United States Transmitting Recommendations Relative to the Atomic Energy Act of 1946," House Doc. No. 328, 83d Cong., 2d sess., pp. 10-11; "Cooperation with other Nations in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy," National Security Council, document no. 5431/1, 13 August 1954, White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, NSC Series, Policy Papers, box 12, file: NSC 5431/1: Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy; "Section on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy -International Agency," 15 September 1954, John Foster Dulles Papers, Selected Correspondence, box 78, file: Atomic Energy, Atomic Weapons and Disarmament, Princeton University; "An Atomic Power Proposal for Latin America," n. d. [1954], Whitman Administrative Papers, box 4, file: Atomic Energy Commission 1953-54 no.1; John B. Hollister to Dwight D. Eisenhower, 14 November 1955, Whitman Administrative Papers, box 4, file: AEC 1955-56 no. 6; "Address of John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State, on International Cooperation in Developing Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy," 23 September 1954, NAS-NRC Central File, Policy Files, 1950-56, International Relations 1955, United Nations: Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy: Geneva Convention; "Press Release by United States Atomic Energy Commission, Special Session of Radioisotope Technique Course to be Opened to Foreign Scientists, December 6, 1954," in Atoms for Peace Manual, 336-37. The declassified information and the research reactor program are often cited as tangible evidence in criticisms about nuclear proliferation.
230. On these various policy changes, see, for example, Richard Hirsch, "A Program to Exploit the A-Bank Proposals in the President's UN Speech . . ., Tab 'A,' Recommended Implementing Actions," and "Tab 'B,' Checklist of Suggested Agency Actions," White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, NSC Series, Policy Papers, box 12; Victor F. Weisskopf, "Visas for Foreign Scientists," BAS 10, no. 3 (March 1954): 66-67; T. H. McCabe, "The Gubser Resolutions," ibid., 71; U.S. House of Representatives, Judiciary Committee, House Resolution. 308, 83d Cong., 2d sess. (1954), p. 2; United States Atomic Energy Commission, Fifteen Semiannual Report of the Atomic Energy Commission (Washington, 1954), 138, 143-48; U.S. House of Representatives, "Message from the President of the United States Transmitting Recommendations Relative to the Atomic Energy Act of 1946," House Doc. No. 328, 83d Cong., 2d sess., pp. 10-11; "Cooperation with other Nations in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy," National Security Council, document no. 5431/1, 13 August 1954, White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, NSC Series, Policy Papers, box 12, file: NSC 5431/1: Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy; "Section on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy -International Agency," 15 September 1954, John Foster Dulles Papers, Selected Correspondence, box 78, file: Atomic Energy, Atomic Weapons and Disarmament, Princeton University; "An Atomic Power Proposal for Latin America," n. d. [1954], Whitman Administrative Papers, box 4, file: Atomic Energy Commission 1953-54 no.1; John B. Hollister to Dwight D. Eisenhower, 14 November 1955, Whitman Administrative Papers, box 4, file: AEC 1955-56 no. 6; "Address of John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State, on International Cooperation in Developing Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy," 23 September 1954, NAS-NRC Central File, Policy Files, 1950-56, International Relations 1955, United Nations: Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy: Geneva Convention; "Press Release by United States Atomic Energy Commission, Special Session of Radioisotope Technique Course to be Opened to Foreign Scientists, December 6, 1954," in Atoms for Peace Manual, 336-37. The declassified information and the research reactor program are often cited as tangible evidence in criticisms about nuclear proliferation.
231. On these various policy changes, see, for example, Richard Hirsch, "A Program to Exploit the A-Bank Proposals in the President's UN Speech . . ., Tab 'A,' Recommended Implementing Actions," and "Tab 'B,' Checklist of Suggested Agency Actions," White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, NSC Series, Policy Papers, box 12; Victor F. Weisskopf, "Visas for Foreign Scientists," BAS 10, no. 3 (March 1954): 66-67; T. H. McCabe, "The Gubser Resolutions," ibid., 71; U.S. House of Representatives, Judiciary Committee, House Resolution. 308, 83d Cong., 2d sess. (1954), p. 2; United States Atomic Energy Commission, Fifteen Semiannual Report of the Atomic Energy Commission (Washington, 1954), 138, 143-48; U.S. House of Representatives, "Message from the President of the United States Transmitting Recommendations Relative to the Atomic Energy Act of 1946," House Doc. No. 328, 83d Cong., 2d sess., pp. 10-11; "Cooperation with other Nations in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy," National Security Council, document no. 5431/1, 13 August 1954, White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, NSC Series, Policy Papers, box 12, file: NSC 5431/1: Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy; "Section on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy -International Agency," 15 September 1954, John Foster Dulles Papers, Selected Correspondence, box 78, file: Atomic Energy, Atomic Weapons and Disarmament, Princeton University; "An Atomic Power Proposal for Latin America," n. d. [1954], Whitman Administrative Papers, box 4, file: Atomic Energy Commission 1953-54 no.1; John B. Hollister to Dwight D. Eisenhower, 14 November 1955, Whitman Administrative Papers, box 4, file: AEC 1955-56 no. 6; "Address of John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State, on International Cooperation in Developing Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy," 23 September 1954, NAS-NRC Central File, Policy Files, 1950-56, International Relations 1955, United Nations: Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy: Geneva Convention; "Press Release by United States Atomic Energy Commission, Special Session of Radioisotope Technique Course to be Opened to Foreign Scientists, December 6, 1954," in Atoms for Peace Manual, 336-37. The declassified information and the research reactor program are often cited as tangible evidence in criticisms about nuclear proliferation.
232. The public campaign is discussed in Peter Pringle and James J. Spigelman, The Nuclear Barons (New York, 1981), 125-26.
233. . Laura Fermi, Atoms for the World (Chicago, 1957), 105-7; "Report of the United States Delegation to the United Nations International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy," NAS-NRC Central File, Policy Files, 1950-56, International elations 1955, United Nations, Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy: Geneva General; "Press Release by United States Atomic Energy Commission, '1100 United States Scientists and Engineers Submit Ideas for Papers at United Nations Conference at Geneva,'" 6 May 1955, in Atoms for Peace Manual, 397.
234. . Laura Fermi, Atoms for the World (Chicago, 1957), 105-7; "Report of the United States Delegation to the United Nations International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy," NAS-NRC Central File, Policy Files, 1950-56, International elations 1955, United Nations, Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy: Geneva General; "Press Release by United States Atomic Energy Commission, '1100 United States Scientists and Engineers Submit Ideas for Papers at United Nations Conference at Geneva,'" 6 May 1955, in Atoms for Peace Manual, 397.
235. See "Report of the United States Delegation . . . ," 19-28; various articles in BAS 11, no. 8 (October 1955 ), especially Eugene Rabinowitch, "The Lesson of Geneva," 275; L. W. Nordheim to FAS, 30 August 1955, FAS, box 59, file: 1.
236. D. J. Hughes to Lewis Strauss, 15 December 1955; and Strauss to Dwight D. Eisenhower, 14 June 1956, FAS, box 33, file: 4.
237. See McDougall, The Heavens and the Earth, 117-18. An early perspective on this problem can be found in Paul Kecskemeti, "The Satellite Rocket Vehicle: Political and Psychological Problems," RAND RM-567, 4 October 1950.
238. NSC doc. no. 5520, "Draft Statement of Policy on U.S. Scientific Satellite Program," 20 May 1955, PRUS, 1955-57 (Washington, 1988), 11:725, 730-31. See also NSC doc. no. 5440, 14 December 1954; and NSC doc. no. 5501, 7 January 1955.
239. "Memorandum: Discussion at the 339th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, October 10, 1957," Whitman NSC Files, box 9, file: 339 Meeting NSC October 10, 1957.
240. U.S. Senate, Committee on the Armed Services, Inquiry into the Satellite and Missile Programs: Hearings Before the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, 85th Cong., 1st and 2d sess. (Washington, 1958), 1:1-3, 21-23- See also U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Government Operations, Availability of Information from Federal Departments and Agencies, Part 15, Restrictions on the Flow of Scientific and Technical Information, 85th Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, 1958), 3436, 3563.
241. U.S. Senate, Committee on the Armed Services, Inquiry into the Satellite and Missile Programs: Hearings Before the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, 85th Cong., 1st and 2d sess. (Washington, 1958), 1:1-3, 21-23- See also U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Government Operations, Availability of Information from Federal Departments and Agencies, Part 15, Restrictions on the Flow of Scientific and Technical Information, 85th Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, 1958), 3436, 3563.
242. Declassified Documents Reference System 1975 Retrospective 914A, National Security Archive, Washington; Ambrose, Eisenhower The President, 457.
243. Quoted in Robert A. Divine, Blowing in the Wind:The Nuclear Test Ban Debate, 1954-1960 (New York, 1978), 151.
244. Alan Mazur, "Disputes Between Experts," .Minerva 11, no. 2 (1977): 261.
245. "Report of the Ad Hoc Panel on Nuclear Testing," 21 July 1961, Declassified Documents Reference System 1981 Ret 636A.
246. Senator Stuart Symington quoted in Herken, Cardinal Choices, 142.
247. Jerome Wiesner, Where Science and Politics Meet (New York, 1965), 11.
248. In fact, Western science had lost a great deal of its own autonomy during the postwar period. Government contracts and sponsorships with corporations, institutions, and individuals largely set the direction of American science in the forties and fifties. Comparatively speaking, controls were less pronounced in the West, and American scientists chose to focus on this fact. But the profound effects of the Second World War and the Cold War on state-science relationships were similar around the world. For overviews on this subject see Ralph E. Lapp, The New Priesthood: the Scientific Elite and the Uses of Power (New York, 1965) ;Terry L. Deibel and Walter P. Roberts, Culture and Information: Two Foreign Policy Functions (Beverly Hills, 1976); Erik P. Hoffman, "The Scientific-Technological Revolution" and Soviet Foreign Polity (New York, 1982); Clement Allan Tisdell, Science and Technology Policy: Priorities of Governments (New York, 1981); Bruce L. R. Smith, American Science Policy since World War II (Washington, 1990); Mazur, "Disputes Between Experts," 260-71; William McGuken, "On Freedom and Planning in Science: The Society for Freedom in Science, 1940-1946," Minerva 16, no. 1 (1978): 42-72; Yaron Ezrahi, "Utopian and Pragmatic Rationalism: The Political Context of Scientific Advice," ibid. 18, no. 1 (1980): 111-31; Hollinger, "Free Enterprise and Free Inquiry," 897-919.
249. In fact, Western science had lost a great deal of its own autonomy during the postwar period. Government contracts and sponsorships with corporations, institutions, and individuals largely set the direction of American science in the forties and fifties. Comparatively speaking, controls were less pronounced in the West, and American scientists chose to focus on this fact. But the profound effects of the Second World War and the Cold War on state-science relationships were similar around the world. For overviews on this subject see Ralph E. Lapp, The New Priesthood: the Scientific Elite and the Uses of Power (New York, 1965) ;Terry L. Deibel and Walter P. Roberts, Culture and Information: Two Foreign Policy Functions (Beverly Hills, 1976); Erik P. Hoffman, "The Scientific-Technological Revolution" and Soviet Foreign Polity (New York, 1982); Clement Allan Tisdell, Science and Technology Policy: Priorities of Governments (New York, 1981); Bruce L. R. Smith, American Science Policy since World War II (Washington, 1990); Mazur, "Disputes Between Experts," 260-71; William McGuken, "On Freedom and Planning in Science: The Society for Freedom in Science, 1940-1946," Minerva 16, no. 1 (1978): 42-72; Yaron Ezrahi, "Utopian and Pragmatic Rationalism: The Political Context of Scientific Advice," ibid. 18, no. 1 (1980): 111-31; Hollinger, "Free Enterprise and Free Inquiry," 897-919.
250. In fact, Western science had lost a great deal of its own autonomy during the postwar period. Government contracts and sponsorships with corporations, institutions, and individuals largely set the direction of American science in the forties and fifties. Comparatively speaking, controls were less pronounced in the West, and American scientists chose to focus on this fact. But the profound effects of the Second World War and the Cold War on state-science relationships were similar around the world. For overviews on this subject see Ralph E. Lapp, The New Priesthood: the Scientific Elite and the Uses of Power (New York, 1965) ;Terry L. Deibel and Walter P. Roberts, Culture and Information: Two Foreign Policy Functions (Beverly Hills, 1976); Erik P. Hoffman, "The Scientific-Technological Revolution" and Soviet Foreign Polity (New York, 1982); Clement Allan Tisdell, Science and Technology Policy: Priorities of Governments (New York, 1981); Bruce L. R. Smith, American Science Policy since World War II (Washington, 1990); Mazur, "Disputes Between Experts," 260-71; William McGuken, "On Freedom and Planning in Science: The Society for Freedom in Science, 1940-1946," Minerva 16, no. 1 (1978): 42-72; Yaron Ezrahi, "Utopian and Pragmatic Rationalism: The Political Context of Scientific Advice," ibid. 18, no. 1 (1980): 111-31; Hollinger, "Free Enterprise and Free Inquiry," 897-919.
251. In fact, Western science had lost a great deal of its own autonomy during the postwar period. Government contracts and sponsorships with corporations, institutions, and individuals largely set the direction of American science in the forties and fifties. Comparatively speaking, controls were less pronounced in the West, and American scientists chose to focus on this fact. But the profound effects of the Second World War and the Cold War on state-science relationships were similar around the world. For overviews on this subject see Ralph E. Lapp, The New Priesthood: the Scientific Elite and the Uses of Power (New York, 1965) ;Terry L. Deibel and Walter P. Roberts, Culture and Information: Two Foreign Policy Functions (Beverly Hills, 1976); Erik P. Hoffman, "The Scientific-Technological Revolution" and Soviet Foreign Polity (New York, 1982); Clement Allan Tisdell, Science and Technology Policy: Priorities of Governments (New York, 1981); Bruce L. R. Smith, American Science Policy since World War II (Washington, 1990); Mazur, "Disputes Between Experts," 260-71; William McGuken, "On Freedom and Planning in Science: The Society for Freedom in Science, 1940-1946," Minerva 16, no. 1 (1978): 42-72; Yaron Ezrahi, "Utopian and Pragmatic Rationalism: The Political Context of Scientific Advice," ibid. 18, no. 1 (1980): 111-31; Hollinger, "Free Enterprise and Free Inquiry," 897-919.
252. In fact, Western science had lost a great deal of its own autonomy during the postwar period. Government contracts and sponsorships with corporations, institutions, and individuals largely set the direction of American science in the forties and fifties. Comparatively speaking, controls were less pronounced in the West, and American scientists chose to focus on this fact. But the profound effects of the Second World War and the Cold War on state-science relationships were similar around the world. For overviews on this subject see Ralph E. Lapp, The New Priesthood: the Scientific Elite and the Uses of Power (New York, 1965) ;Terry L. Deibel and Walter P. Roberts, Culture and Information: Two Foreign Policy Functions (Beverly Hills, 1976); Erik P. Hoffman, "The Scientific-Technological Revolution" and Soviet Foreign Polity (New York, 1982); Clement Allan Tisdell, Science and Technology Policy: Priorities of Governments (New York, 1981); Bruce L. R. Smith, American Science Policy since World War II (Washington, 1990); Mazur, "Disputes Between Experts," 260-71; William McGuken, "On Freedom and Planning in Science: The Society for Freedom in Science, 1940-1946," Minerva 16, no. 1 (1978): 42-72; Yaron Ezrahi, "Utopian and Pragmatic Rationalism: The Political Context of Scientific Advice," ibid. 18, no. 1 (1980): 111-31; Hollinger, "Free Enterprise and Free Inquiry," 897-919.
253. In fact, Western science had lost a great deal of its own autonomy during the postwar period. Government contracts and sponsorships with corporations, institutions, and individuals largely set the direction of American science in the forties and fifties. Comparatively speaking, controls were less pronounced in the West, and American scientists chose to focus on this fact. But the profound effects of the Second World War and the Cold War on state-science relationships were similar around the world. For overviews on this subject see Ralph E. Lapp, The New Priesthood: the Scientific Elite and the Uses of Power (New York, 1965) ;Terry L. Deibel and Walter P. Roberts, Culture and Information: Two Foreign Policy Functions (Beverly Hills, 1976); Erik P. Hoffman, "The Scientific-Technological Revolution" and Soviet Foreign Polity (New York, 1982); Clement Allan Tisdell, Science and Technology Policy: Priorities of Governments (New York, 1981); Bruce L. R. Smith, American Science Policy since World War II (Washington, 1990); Mazur, "Disputes Between Experts," 260-71; William McGuken, "On Freedom and Planning in Science: The Society for Freedom in Science, 1940-1946," Minerva 16, no. 1 (1978): 42-72; Yaron Ezrahi, "Utopian and Pragmatic Rationalism: The Political Context of Scientific Advice," ibid. 18, no. 1 (1980): 111-31; Hollinger, "Free Enterprise and Free Inquiry," 897-919.
254. In fact, Western science had lost a great deal of its own autonomy during the postwar period. Government contracts and sponsorships with corporations, institutions, and individuals largely set the direction of American science in the forties and fifties. Comparatively speaking, controls were less pronounced in the West, and American scientists chose to focus on this fact. But the profound effects of the Second World War and the Cold War on state-science relationships were similar around the world. For overviews on this subject see Ralph E. Lapp, The New Priesthood: the Scientific Elite and the Uses of Power (New York, 1965) ;Terry L. Deibel and Walter P. Roberts, Culture and Information: Two Foreign Policy Functions (Beverly Hills, 1976); Erik P. Hoffman, "The Scientific-Technological Revolution" and Soviet Foreign Polity (New York, 1982); Clement Allan Tisdell, Science and Technology Policy: Priorities of Governments (New York, 1981); Bruce L. R. Smith, American Science Policy since World War II (Washington, 1990); Mazur, "Disputes Between Experts," 260-71; William McGuken, "On Freedom and Planning in Science: The Society for Freedom in Science, 1940-1946," Minerva 16, no. 1 (1978): 42-72; Yaron Ezrahi, "Utopian and Pragmatic Rationalism: The Political Context of Scientific Advice," ibid. 18, no. 1 (1980): 111-31; Hollinger, "Free Enterprise and Free Inquiry," 897-919.
255. In fact, Western science had lost a great deal of its own autonomy during the postwar period. Government contracts and sponsorships with corporations, institutions, and individuals largely set the direction of American science in the forties and fifties. Comparatively speaking, controls were less pronounced in the West, and American scientists chose to focus on this fact. But the profound effects of the Second World War and the Cold War on state-science relationships were similar around the world. For overviews on this subject see Ralph E. Lapp, The New Priesthood: the Scientific Elite and the Uses of Power (New York, 1965) ;Terry L. Deibel and Walter P. Roberts, Culture and Information: Two Foreign Policy Functions (Beverly Hills, 1976); Erik P. Hoffman, "The Scientific-Technological Revolution" and Soviet Foreign Polity (New York, 1982); Clement Allan Tisdell, Science and Technology Policy: Priorities of Governments (New York, 1981); Bruce L. R. Smith, American Science Policy since World War II (Washington, 1990); Mazur, "Disputes Between Experts," 260-71; William McGuken, "On Freedom and Planning in Science: The Society for Freedom in Science, 1940-1946," Minerva 16, no. 1 (1978): 42-72; Yaron Ezrahi, "Utopian and Pragmatic Rationalism: The Political Context of Scientific Advice," ibid. 18, no. 1 (1980): 111-31; Hollinger, "Free Enterprise and Free Inquiry," 897-919.
256. In fact, Western science had lost a great deal of its own autonomy during the postwar period. Government contracts and sponsorships with corporations, institutions, and individuals largely set the direction of American science in the forties and fifties. Comparatively speaking, controls were less pronounced in the West, and American scientists chose to focus on this fact. But the profound effects of the Second World War and the Cold War on state-science relationships were similar around the world. For overviews on this subject see Ralph E. Lapp, The New Priesthood: the Scientific Elite and the Uses of Power (New York, 1965) ;Terry L. Deibel and Walter P. Roberts, Culture and Information: Two Foreign Policy Functions (Beverly Hills, 1976); Erik P. Hoffman, "The Scientific-Technological Revolution" and Soviet Foreign Polity (New York, 1982); Clement Allan Tisdell, Science and Technology Policy: Priorities of Governments (New York, 1981); Bruce L. R. Smith, American Science Policy since World War II (Washington, 1990); Mazur, "Disputes Between Experts," 260-71; William McGuken, "On Freedom and Planning in Science: The Society for Freedom in Science, 1940-1946," Minerva 16, no. 1 (1978): 42-72; Yaron Ezrahi, "Utopian and Pragmatic Rationalism: The Political Context of Scientific Advice," ibid. 18, no. 1 (1980): 111-31; Hollinger, "Free Enterprise and Free Inquiry," 897-919.
257. David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest (New York, 1969), 153-14.
258. For a contemporary discussion of the American agenda for international cooperation in space see Arnold W. Frutkin, International Cooperation in Space (Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1965).
259. R. Lane, "The Decline of Politics and Ideology in a Knowledgeable Society," American Sociological Review 22, no. 2 (1966): 661-62 . On the "end of ideology" argument see Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology (Glencoe, IL, 1960).
260. R. Lane, "The Decline of Politics and Ideology in a Knowledgeable Society," American Sociological Review 22, no. 2 (1966): 661-62 . On the "end of ideology" argument see Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology (Glencoe, IL, 1960).