Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Program: Turning Points and Nuclear Choices

International Security

Volumn 23, Issue 4, 1999, Pages 178-204

  Ahmed, Samina ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0033468742     PISSN: 01622889     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/isec.23.4.178     Document Type: Article

References (68)

1. To date the government has provided very little technical data on the nuclear tests, and officials have contradicted one another about the number of tests conducted.
2. Quoted in "Prime Minister Links Pak-India Amity to Kashmir Solution," News, June 14, 1998.
3. According to Minister for Information Mushahid Hussain Syed, "The world community now tests Pakistan and India as equals." Quoted in "N-Tests Elevated Pakistan's Political Stature: Mushahid," News June 26, 1998. See also Sandy Gordon, "Capping South Asia's Nuclear Weapons Progam: A Window of Opportunity?" Asian Survey, Vol. 34, No. 7 (July 1994), p. 667.
4. According to Minister for Information Mushahid Hussain Syed, "The world community now tests Pakistan and India as equals." Quoted in "N-Tests Elevated Pakistan's Political Stature: Mushahid," News June 26, 1998. See also Sandy Gordon, "Capping South Asia's Nuclear Weapons Progam: A Window of Opportunity?" Asian Survey, Vol. 34, No. 7 (July 1994), p. 667.
5. According to Minister for Information Mushahid Hussain Syed, "The world community now tests Pakistan and India as equals." Quoted in "N-Tests Elevated Pakistan's Political Stature: Mushahid," News June 26, 1998. See also Sandy Gordon, "Capping South Asia's Nuclear Weapons Progam: A Window of Opportunity?" Asian Survey, Vol. 34, No. 7 (July 1994), p. 667.
6. Addressing the National Assembly on September 8, 1998, Commerce Minister Ishaq Dar admitted that Pakistan was on the verge of financial default as a result of the sanctions. Mariana Babar, "Pakistan Faces Engineered Default, Dar Tells NA," News, September 9, 1998.
7. Pakistan became a member of a number of U.S.-sponsored security alliances in the mid-1950s, including the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization and the Baghdad Pact (later renamed the Central Treaty Organization).
8. Yunas Samad, "The Military and Democracy in Pakistan," Contemporary South Asia, Vol. 3, No. 3 (Fall 1994), p. 190.
9. Quoted in Samina Ahmed and David Cortright, "Going Nuclear: The Weaponization Option," in Ahmed and Cortright, eds., Pakistan and the Bomb: Public Opinion and Nuclear Options (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1998), p. 90.
10. Cited in Zafar Iqbal Cheema, "Pakistan's Nuclear Policies: Attitudes and Postures," in P.R. Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, and Iftekharuzzaman, eds., Nuclear Non-Proliferation in India and Pakistan: South Asian Perspectives (New Delhi: Monohar, 1996), p. 10.
11. Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party had won a majority of seats in West Pakistan during the 1970 general elections.
12. Bhutto's army chief, for example, declared that an Indian acquisition of nuclear weapons would mean that "we will have to beg or borrow to develop our own nuclear capability." Quote in Leonard S. Spector, Nuclear Proliferation Today (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1984), p. 34.
13. Ibid., pp. 75-76.
14. Ibid., p. 79.
15. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, If I am Assasinated . . . (New Delhi: Vikas, 1979), pp. 137-138.
16. bhutto claimed that Kissinger had "threathened" to make "a horrible example" put of him if he did not give up the nuclear weapons program. Quoted in Stamley Wolpert, Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan: His life and Times (Oxford, U. K.: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 273.
17. Quoted in Akhtar Ali, Pakistan's Nuclear Dillema: Energy and Security Dimensions (Karachi: Economic Reasearch UNit, 1994), P. 10. See also Mitchell Reiss, "Safeguarding the Nuclear Peace in South Asia," Asian Survey, Vol. 33, No. 12 (December 1993), pp. 1110-1111.
18. Quoted in Akhtar Ali, Pakistan's Nuclear Dillema: Energy and Security Dimensions (Karachi: Economic Reasearch UNit, 1994), P. 10. See also Mitchell Reiss, "Safeguarding the Nuclear Peace in South Asia," Asian Survey, Vol. 33, No. 12 (December 1993), pp. 1110-1111.
19. Spector, Nuclear Proliferation Today, p. 101.
20. Pakistan's KANUPP plant did not require uranium enriched beyond 3 to 5 percent U235.
21. U. S. intelligence agencies believed that Pakistan had acquired weaons-grade material, and had even cold-tested some components of its nuclear device by 1986. Leonard S. Spector with Jacqueline R. Smith, Nuclear Ambitions: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 1989-1990 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1990), pp. 95, 99.
22. In an interview with an Urdu-language newspaper, Nawai-i-Waqt, in 1984, Abdul Qadeer Khan declared that Pakistan could "efficiently enrich (weapons-grade) uranium." This represented the first public, albeit unofficial, acknowledgment of Pakistan's nuclear weapons capability. Quoted in Spector, Nuclear Proliferation Today, pp. 98-99.
23. Ali, Pakistan's Nuclear Dilemma, p. 62.
24. In an interview with an Indian journalist, Kuldip Nayyar, Abdul Qadeer Khan disclosed that Pakistan had the ability to assemble a nuclear weapon. Nayyar, "Pakistan Has the Bomb," Tribune, March 1, 1987.
25. Beg delayed the transfer of power to Benazir Bhutto after the 1988 general elections until Bhutto agreed to the military's control over defense and security matters. Samad, "The Military and Democracy," pp. 194-195.
26. General Mirza Aslam Beg (ret.), "Who will Press the Button?" News, April 23, 1994.
27. Spector, Nuclear Ambitions, pp. 100-101, 107.
28. Pakistan officials did admit that weapons cores stockpiled before 1990 had not been destroyed. Reiss, "Safeguarding the Nuclear Peace in South Asia," p. 1111.
29. Zahid Hussain, "Deliberate NUclear Ambiguity," Ahmed and Cortright, Pakistan and the Bomb, pp. 38-39.
30. "Special Rack-Fitted F-16s Heading for Airfields," Patriot, May 26, 1990.
31. According to Pervez Hoodbhoy, although "the facts seem to indicate that the alleged reports of nuclear movements (in 1990) were false, the belief that Pakistan's threat of nuclear devastation stopped Indian agression dead in its tracks has become enshrined as an article of faith." Hoodbhoy, "Pakistan's Nuclear Future," In Ahmed and Cortright, Pakistan and the Bomb, p. 71.
32. Pakistan's nuclear infrastructure now included a plutonium production reactor and a reprocessing facility at Khushab, both under construction with Chinese assistance.
33. Quoted in Samina Ahmed and David Cortright, "Pakistani Public Opinion and Nuclear Weapons Policy," in Ahmed and Cortright, Pakistan and the Bomb, pp. 3-4.
34. Hussain, "Deliberate Nuclear Ambiguity," p. 40.
35. U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott made a similar offer the same year.
36. During a visit to the United States in 1994, Army Chief Abdul Waheed Kakar rejected a cap in return for the F-16s. Zahid Hussain, "Carrot Talk," Newsline (April 1994), p. 26.
37. The Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, however, refused to make another concession to the Pakistani military. Specifically, it would not resume military-to-military links under the International Military and Education Training program, proposed in the Harkin-Warner amendment to the Foreign Operation Appropriations Act in mid-1997.
38. Quoted in "Pakistan Wants Good Ties with India," Frontier Post, June 9, 1997.
39. The BJP-led coalition's National Agenda for Governance also reiterated this pledge. Savita Pande, "The Nuclear Option," Pioneer, February 17, 1998; and "BJP's National Agenda for Governance," Hindu, March 19, 1998.
40. The BJP-led coalition's National Agenda for Governance also reiterated this pledge. Savita Pande, "The Nuclear Option," Pioneer, February 17, 1998; and "BJP's National Agenda for Governance," Hindu, March 19, 1998.
41. The Pakistani government has repeteadly refuted media reports that the Ghauri was developed with technology acquired from North Korea.
42. As a result of assurances given ny India during high-level meetings between Indian and U.S. officials, the United States believed the India would continue to exercise nuclear restraint. These meetings included Indian Foreign Secretary K. Ragunath's visit to the United States on April 2 and presisential envoy Bill Richardson's visit to India in early May. Jyothi Malhotra, "Days of Dialogue," Indian Express, May 1, 1998.
43. Quoted in Zahid Hussain, "The Bomb and After," Newsline (June 1998) p. 23.
44. According to Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, Pakistan's preparations for test explosion were meant to deter India and to warn the West "that they had better do something to stop the Indians." Quoted in Zahid Hussain, "Laying the Groundwork," Newsline (June 1998) p. 24.
45. Quoted in Michael Hirsh and John Barry, "Nuclear Jitters," Newsweek, June 8, 1998, p. 16.
46. Quoted in "Advani Flexes Nuclear Muscle in Kashmir," Telegraph, May 19, 1998.
47. Quoted in Hussain, "The Bomb and After," p. 22.
48. Urging the international community to find a solution to the Kashmir dispute, Foreign Minister Ayub warned that "with the situation so volatile and in the presence of mistrust and suspicion . . . a nuclear conflict could erupt." Quoted in Anwar Iqbal, "Pakistan Yet to React to U.S. Sanctions," News, June 20, 1998.
49. The decision to test was influenced by the Pakistani belief that sanctions would not last long. This was reflected in the 1998 budget, in which estimates were based on projected foreign assistance inflows of 152 billion rupees for 1998, an increase over similar inflows of 141 billion rupees in 1997. See "IMF Puts Loans to Pakistan on Hold," Dawn, June 17, 1998; and "Economic Experts' Views: Budget Lacks Steps to Steps to Offset of Curbs," Dawn, June 22, 1998.
50. The decision to test was influenced by the Pakistani belief that sanctions would not last long. This was reflected in the 1998 budget, in which estimates were based on projected foreign assistance inflows of 152 billion rupees for 1998, an increase over similar inflows of 141 billion rupees in 1997. See "IMF Puts Loans to Pakistan on Hold," Dawn, June 17, 1998; and "Economic Experts' Views: Budget Lacks Steps to Steps to Offset of Curbs," Dawn, June 22, 1998.
51. "Sartaj Sees IMF Pact after Easing of Sanctions," News, November 8, 1998.
52. "Text of Resolution Moved in NA," News, June 6, 1998.
53. the Muslim League's parliamntary secretary in the National Assembly, Syed Zafar Ali Shah, claimed hat Mengal's governement could have arrested the scientists invlolved in the nuclear explosions had a state of emergency imposed, a charge later refuted by his own government. "Mengal Denies PML Leadrder's Charges," Dawn, June 11, 1998.
54. Quotation in "U.S., China to Target N-Weapons at Each Other," News, June 28, 1998; and "China Vows to Stop Missile Cooperation with Pakistan: U.S.," News, June 29, 1998.
55. Quotation in "U.S., China to Target N-Weapons at Each Other," News, June 28, 1998; and "China Vows to Stop Missile Cooperation with Pakistan: U.S.," News, June 29, 1998.
56. Although on September 9 the Islamic Development Bank agreed to formally launch the Pakistan Fund, including a $1.5 billion financial package. This is a new fund established by the Islamic Development Bank. However, release of the funding is dependent on IMF approval. Special Correspondent, "IDB Agrees to Launch Pakistan Fund," News, September 10, 1998.
57. Hasan Akhtar, "Islamabad Calls Big Five Stance Biased," Dawn, June 7, 1998.
58. According to Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, modification of the NPT and CTBT to accept India and Pakistan as a nuclear weapons states would constitute "an incentive for other nuclear want-to-be's to blast their way into the same status - it would be breakingthe faith with the many non-nuclear would-have-been's that had the wisdom and good sense to break away from brink." Quoted in Nayan Chanda, "Risk Management: U.S. Grapples with New Nuclear Reality," Far Eastern Economic Review, June 18, 1998, p. 28.
59. Quoted in Anwar Iqbal, "N-Moratorium Can Be Reversed If India Provokes," News, June 19, 1998.
60. In his address to the UN General Assembly on September 22, Sharif declared that Pakistan would sign the CTBT before September 1999 (the first meeting of CTBT state members) "only in conditions free from coercion and pressure." Quoted in Masood Hyder, "PM Seeks Parity with India on CTBT Issue," Dawn, September 24, 1998; and Raja Zulfiqar, "Pakistan Ready to Adhere to the CTBT," News, September 24, 1998.
61. In his address to the UN General Assembly on September 22, Sharif declared that Pakistan would sign the CTBT before September 1999 (the first meeting of CTBT state members) "only in conditions free from coercion and pressure." Quoted in Masood Hyder, "PM Seeks Parity with India on CTBT Issue," Dawn, September 24, 1998; and Raja Zulfiqar, "Pakistan Ready to Adhere to the CTBT," News, September 24, 1998.
62. Quoted in "U.S. Partially Lifts Curbs against Pakistan, India," News, November 8, 1998. U.S. Export-Import Bank lending and access to loans from the Trade and Development Agency, Overseas Private Investmentn Corporation risk insurance cover, and international military education training have been restored to both Pakistan and India.
63. Shakil Sheikh, "Lifting of Sanction to Avert Short-term Crisis, Says Sartaj," News, November 9, 1998.
64. According to IMF sources, Pakistan's existing annual funding gap is more than $5 billion.
65. The militay's opposition to the NPT is faithfully relected in the Sharif government. According to Foreign Minister Sartaz Aziz, Pakistan would not sign the NPT "on account of its discriminiatory nature." Quoted in "CTBT Signing after Sanctions Waiver: Sartaj," News, October 28, 1998.
66. Shakil Sheikh, "Nawaz Hopeful of Talks on All Issues with Vajpayee," News, June 25, 1998.
67. Comment by Pakistani official following the first round of negotiation in Islamabad during the first week of November. Shakil Sheikh, "Crucial Pak-India Talks Start Tomorrow," News, November 4, 1998.
68. David Cortright and Samina Ahmed, "Sanctions: Modify 'em," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 45, 5 (September 1998), pp. 22-23.