Monitoring versus incentives

European Economic Review

Volumn 45, Issue 9, 2001, Pages 1741-1764

  Demougin, Dominique ^a,b   Fluet, Claude ^b  

^a HUMBOLDT UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITÉ DU QUÉBEC À MONTRÉAL   (Canada)

Author keywords

High powered incentives; Monitoring; Principal agent

Indexed keywords

MONITORING;

EID: 0034801508     PISSN: 00142921     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0014-2921(00)00051-9     Document Type: Article

References (17)

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