Competence and performance in belief-desire reasoning across two cultures: The truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth about false belief?

Cognition

Volumn 100, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 343-368

  Yazdi, Amir Amin ^a   German, Tim P ^b   Defeyter, Margaret Anne ^c   Siegal, Michael ^d  

^a FERDOWSI UNIVERSITY OF MASHHAD   (Iran)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^c NORTHUMBRIA UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

^d UNIVERSITY OF SHEFFIELD   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Belief desire reasoning; Competence performance; Look first; Modularity; Theory of mind; Theory theory

Indexed keywords

AGE DISTRIBUTION; ARTICLE; COGNITION; COMPETENCE; CONCEPT ANALYSIS; CONTROLLED STUDY; CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY; FEMALE; HUMAN; MALE; MEMORY; MENTAL TASK; PRESCHOOL CHILD; PRIORITY JOURNAL; QUESTIONNAIRE; TASK PERFORMANCE;

ATTITUDE; CHILD, PRESCHOOL; COGNITION; CULTURE; DECISION MAKING; FEMALE; HUMANS; MALE;

EID: 33745153738     PISSN: 00100277     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2005.05.004     Document Type: Article

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