Minds, modules, and meta-analysis

Child Development

Volumn 72, Issue 3, 2001, Pages 696-701

  Scholl, Brian J ^a   Leslie, Alan M ^b  

^a YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b RUTGERS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CHILD; CHILD DEVELOPMENT; CONCEPT FORMATION; HUMAN; META ANALYSIS; NOTE; PERCEPTION; PERCEPTION DISORDER; PRESCHOOL CHILD; PROBLEM SOLVING; SELF CONCEPT; VISION;

CHILD; CHILD DEVELOPMENT; CHILD, PRESCHOOL; CONCEPT FORMATION; HUMANS; META-ANALYSIS; PERCEPTUAL DISTORTION; PROBLEM SOLVING; SELF CONCEPT; SOCIAL PERCEPTION; VISUAL PERCEPTION;

EID: 0035346992     PISSN: 00093920     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-8624.00308     Document Type: Article

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