The breakdown of cooperation in iterative real-time trust dilemmas

Experimental Economics

Volumn 9, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 147-166

  Murphy, Ryan O ^a   Rapoport, Amnon ^b,c   Parco, James E ^d  

^a The Sanford C Bernstein Co Center for Leadership and Ethics   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA   (United States)

^c HONG KONG UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY   (Hong Kong)

^d UNITED STATES AIR FORCE ACADEMY   (United States)

Author keywords

Centipede game; Cooperation; Population dynamics; Trust; Trust dilemmas

Indexed keywords

EID: 33744809046     PISSN: 13864157     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10683-006-7049-4     Document Type: Article

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