Equilibrium play and adaptive learning in a three-person centipede game

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 43, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 239-265

  Rapoport, Amnon ^a   Stein, William E ^b   Parco, James E ^c   Nicholas, Thomas E ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA   (United States)

^b TEXAS A AND M UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c UNITED STATES AIR FORCE ACADEMY   (United States)

Author keywords

Adaptive learning; Backward induction; Centipede game; Experimental study; High vs. low stakes

Indexed keywords

EID: 0037716305     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00009-5     Document Type: Article

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