Quantal response equilibria for normal form games

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 10, Issue 1, 1995, Pages 6-38

  McKelvey, Richard D ^a   Palfrey, Thomas R ^a  

^a CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0348166371     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.1995.1023     Document Type: Article

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