Conservative stable standards of behavior and φ -stable sets

Theory and Decision

Volumn 60, Issue 4, 2006, Pages 395-402

  Luo, Xiao ^a  

^a INSTITUTE OF ECONOMICS   (Taiwan)

Author keywords

stable sets; CSSBs; General systems; Social situations

Indexed keywords

DECISION THEORY; GRAPH THEORY; SET THEORY; THEOREM PROVING;

Φ-STABLE SETS; CSSBS; GENERAL SYSTEMS; SOCIAL SITUATIONS;

BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH;

EID: 33646407098     PISSN: 00405833     EISSN: 15737187     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11238-005-4749-8     Document Type: Article

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