Reexamination of the International Export Quota Game through the Theory of Social Situations

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 27, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 132-152

  Nakanishi, Noritsugu ^a  

^a KOBE UNIVERSITY   (Japan)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0039119816     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.1998.0677     Document Type: Article

References (18)

1. Bernhardt D., Enders A. Free Trade equilibria to multi-country quota games. J. Internat. Econ. 27:1989;319-333.
2. Copeland B. R. Tariffs and quotas: Retaliation and negotiation with two instruments of protection. J. Internat. Econ. 26:1989;179-188.
3. Csaplar W. W. Jr. Quota wars in conjectural variations. Rev. Internat. Econ. 3:1995;355-366.
4. Dixit A. Strategic aspects of trade policy. Advances in Economic Theory: Fifth World Congress. 1987;Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge.
5. Dixit A., Norman V. Theory of International Trade: A Dual, General Equilibrium Approach. 1980;Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge.
6. Greenberg J. The Theory of Social Situations: An Alternative Game-Theoretic Approach. 1990;Cambridge Univ. Press. Cambridge.
7. Hungerford T. L. GATT: A cooperative equilibrium in a noncooperative trading regime? J. Internat. Econ. 31:1991;357-369.
8. Johnson H. G. Optimum tariffs and retaliation. Rev. Econ. Studies. 55:1953-54;142-153.
9. Mayer W. Theoretical considerations on negotiated tariff adjustments. Oxford Economic Papers. 33:1981;135-153.
10. Muto, S. Okada, D. 1992, Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in Cournot competition, Tohoku Economics Research Group (TERG), Faculty of Economics, Tohoku University, Japan.
11. Nakanishi N. New diagrammatical tools for analyzing international export quota games. The Annals of Economic Studies. 40:1994;147-166.
12. Nakanishi, N. 1995, Reexamination of the international export quota game through the theory of social situations, Department of Economics, Queen's University, Canada.
13. Nakanishi, N. 1996, Stable solutions to the export quota game with non-binding joint moves, Faculty of Economics, Kobe University, Japan.
14. Riezman R. Tariff retaliation from a strategic viewpoint. Southern Econ. J. 48:1982;583-593.
15. Riezman R. Dynamic tariffs with asymmetric information. J. Internat. Econ. 30:1991;267-283.
16. Rodriguez C. A. The non-equivalence of tariffs and quotas under retaliation. J. Internat. Econ. 4:1974;295-298.
17. Tadelis S. Pareto optimality and optimistic stability in repeated extensive form games. J. Econ. Theory. 69:1996;470-489.
18. Tower E. The optimum quota and retaliation. Rev. of Econ. Studies. 42:1975;623-630.