General systems and φ -stable sets - a formal analysis of socioeconomic environments

Journal of Mathematical Economics

Volumn 36, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 95-109

  Luo, Xiao ^a  

^a NATIONAL TAIWAN UNIVERSITY   (Taiwan)

Author keywords

stable sets; C70; C71; C72; General systems; Lattices; Rationalizability; Tarski's fixed point theorem

Indexed keywords

EID: 0042910295     PISSN: 03044068     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0304-4068(01)00065-9     Document Type: Article

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