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Volumn 69, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 470-489

Pareto optimality and optimistic stability in repeated extensive form games

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Indexed keywords


EID: 0030141038     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1996.0064     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (6)

References (14)
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    • Asheim, G.1
  • 2
    • 38249015898 scopus 로고
    • A unique solution for the n-person bargaining game
    • G. ASHEIM, A unique solution for the n-person bargaining game, Games Econ. Behav. 4 (1992), 161-181.
    • (1992) Games Econ. Behav. , vol.4 , pp. 161-181
    • Asheim, G.1
  • 3
    • 0000429880 scopus 로고
    • Collective dynamic consistency in repeated games
    • D. BERNHEIM AND D. RAY, Collective dynamic consistency in repeated games, Games Econ. Behav. 1 (1989), 295-326.
    • (1989) Games Econ. Behav. , vol.1 , pp. 295-326
    • Bernheim, D.1    Ray, D.2
  • 4
    • 0000457748 scopus 로고
    • Equivalence of information patterns and essentially determinate games
    • H. W. Kuhn and A. W. Tucker, Eds., Princeton Univ. Press, Princeton, NJ
    • N. DALKEY, Equivalence of information patterns and essentially determinate games, in "Contributions to the Theory of Games" (H. W. Kuhn and A. W. Tucker, Eds.), Vol. 2, pp. 217-243, Princeton Univ. Press, Princeton, NJ, 1953.
    • (1953) Contributions to the Theory of Games , vol.2 , pp. 217-243
    • Dalkey, N.1
  • 5
    • 0001435324 scopus 로고
    • Renegotiation in repeated games
    • J. FARRELL AND E. MASKIN, Renegotiation in repeated games, Games Econ. Behav. 1 (1989), 295-326.
    • (1989) Games Econ. Behav. , vol.1 , pp. 295-326
    • Farrell, J.1    Maskin, E.2
  • 6
    • 0001437482 scopus 로고
    • Subgame perfect equilibria of finite and infinite-horizon games
    • D. FUDENBERG AND D. LEVINE, Subgame perfect equilibria of finite and infinite-horizon games, J. Econ. Theory 31 (1983), 251-268.
    • (1983) J. Econ. Theory , vol.31 , pp. 251-268
    • Fudenberg, D.1    Levine, D.2
  • 7
    • 38249024314 scopus 로고
    • An application of the theory of social situations to repeated games
    • J. GREENBERG, An application of the theory of social situations to repeated games, J. Econ. Theory 49 (1989), 278-293.
    • (1989) J. Econ. Theory , vol.49 , pp. 278-293
    • Greenberg, J.1
  • 8
    • 38249024749 scopus 로고
    • Deriving strong and coalition proof Nash equilibrium from an abstract system
    • J. GREENBERG, Deriving strong and coalition proof Nash equilibrium from an abstract system, J. Econ. Theory 49 (1989), 195-202.
    • (1989) J. Econ. Theory , vol.49 , pp. 195-202
    • Greenberg, J.1
  • 11
    • 38249014765 scopus 로고
    • The good, the bad and the ugly: Coalition proof equilibria in infinite games
    • C. M. KAHN AND D. MOOKHERJEE, The good, the bad and the ugly: Coalition proof equilibria in infinite games, Games Econ. Behav. 4 (1992), 101-121.
    • (1992) Games Econ. Behav. , vol.4 , pp. 101-121
    • Kahn, C.M.1    Mookherjee, D.2
  • 12
    • 0011575362 scopus 로고
    • Optimistic stability in games of perfect information
    • B. SHITOVITZ, Optimistic stability in games of perfect information, Math. Social Sci. 28 (1994), 199-214.
    • (1994) Math. Social Sci. , vol.28 , pp. 199-214
    • Shitovitz, B.1
  • 13
    • 0022669114 scopus 로고
    • On repeated games with complete information
    • S. SORIN, On repeated games with complete information, Math. Oper. Res. 11 (1986), 147-160.
    • (1986) Math. Oper. Res. , vol.11 , pp. 147-160
    • Sorin, S.1


* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.