Correlated equilibrium as a stable standard of behavior

Review of Economic Design

Volumn 3, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 257-269

  Ray, Indrajit ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF YORK   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Correlated equilibrium; Social situations; Stable standard of behavior

Indexed keywords

EID: 54649083876     PISSN: 14344742     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s100580050016     Document Type: Article

References (17)

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