Selection of treatment under prospective payment systems in the hospital sector

Journal of Health Economics

Volumn 25, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 479-499

  Siciliani, Luigi ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF YORK   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Contracting; Diagnosis related groups; Hospitals

Indexed keywords

HOSPITAL SECTOR; INCENTIVE; INFORMATION; MODEL;

ARTICLE; DISEASE SEVERITY; HEALTH CARE COST; HEALTH CARE PERSONNEL; HEALTH CARE SYSTEM; HOSPITAL; MATHEMATICAL ANALYSIS; MATHEMATICAL MODEL; MEDICAL INFORMATION; THEORETICAL MODEL;

ALGORITHMS; CONTRACTS; DIAGNOSIS-RELATED GROUPS; GREAT BRITAIN; HOSPITALS, PUBLIC; HUMANS; PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM; SEVERITY OF ILLNESS INDEX; STATE MEDICINE;

EID: 33646069315     PISSN: 01676296     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2005.09.007     Document Type: Article

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