Hospital quality choice and market structure in a regulated duopoly

Journal of Health Economics

Volumn 22, Issue 6, 2003, Pages 1011-1036

  Beitia, Arantza ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF THE BASQUE COUNTRY UPV EHU   (Spain)

Author keywords

Asymmetry of information; Health care; Market structure; Quality competition

Indexed keywords

COMPETITION (ECONOMICS); HEALTH CARE; MARKET CONDITIONS; MONOPOLY; THEORETICAL STUDY;

ARTICLE; HEALTH CARE; HEALTH CARE COST; HEALTH CARE FINANCING; HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY; HOSPITAL FINANCE; HOSPITAL MANAGEMENT; HOSPITAL RUNNING COST; SOCIAL WELFARE;

EID: 0242266470     PISSN: 01676296     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0167-6296(03)00049-3     Document Type: Article

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