Comparing organizational structures in health services

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 49, Issue 4, 2002, Pages 501-522

  Jelovac, Izabela ^a   Macho Stadler, Inés ^b  

^a MAASTRICHT UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

^b UNIVERSITAT AUTÒNOMA DE BARCELONA   (Spain)

Author keywords

Health services; Organizational structure; Two sided moral hazard

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036331530     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0167-2681(02)00008-2     Document Type: Article

References (20)

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5. Issues in the industrial organization of the market for physician services
6. The costs and benefits of ownership: A theory of vertical and lateral integration
7. The internal organization of hospitals: Some economic implications
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9. Collusion and delegation
10. Health care payment systems: Cost and quality incentives
11. Centralized and decentralized contracts in moral hazard environments
12. Double risque moral et délégation
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15. Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
16. El sistema sanitario español: Alternativas para su reforma
17. Medical care costs: How much welfare loss?
18. Can the theory of incentives explain decentralization?
19. Administered pricing and vertical integration in the hospital industry