An optimal contract approach to hospital financing

Journal of Health Economics

Volumn 23, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 85-110

  Boadway, Robin ^a   Marchand, Maurice ^b   Sato, Motohiro ^c  

^a QUEEN S UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

^b UNIVERSITÉ CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN   (Belgium)

^c HITOTSUBASHI UNIVERSITY   (Japan)

Author keywords

Hospital financing; Lump sum; Optimal contract

Indexed keywords

FINANCIAL PROVISION; HEALTH CARE; MODELING;

CONTRACT; DECISION MAKING; DISEASE SEVERITY; GOVERNMENT; HOSPITAL CHARGE; HOSPITAL FINANCE; HUMAN; MANAGER; MATHEMATICAL COMPUTING; MODEL; PHYSICIAN; RESOURCE ALLOCATION; REVIEW; TECHNOLOGY;

EID: 1042277769     PISSN: 01676296     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2003.08.001     Document Type: Article

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