Unobserved delegation

International Economic Review

Volumn 38, Issue 4, 1997, Pages 763-774

  Fershtman, Chaim ^a   Kalai, Ehud ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0348139680     PISSN: 00206598     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2527214     Document Type: Article

References (18)

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