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Volumn 73, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 25-56

Strategic Delegation under Quality Competition

Author keywords

Delegation; Incentive scheme; Price competition; Quality competition

Indexed keywords


EID: 0347238368     PISSN: 09318658     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/BF02339580     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (36)

References (11)
  • 1
    • 0039224112 scopus 로고
    • Quality and Quantity Competition
    • Dixit, A. (1979): "Quality and Quantity Competition." Review of Economic Studies 46: 587-599.
    • (1979) Review of Economic Studies , vol.46 , pp. 587-599
    • Dixit, A.1
  • 2
    • 0001034321 scopus 로고
    • Managerial Incentives as a Strategic Variable in Duopolistic Environment
    • Fershtman, C. (1985): "Managerial Incentives as a Strategic Variable in Duopolistic Environment." International Journal of Industrial Organization 3: 245-253.
    • (1985) International Journal of Industrial Organization , vol.3 , pp. 245-253
    • Fershtman, C.1
  • 3
    • 0001589592 scopus 로고
    • Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly
    • Fershtman, C., and Judd, K. L. (1987): "Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly." American Economic Review 77: 927-940.
    • (1987) American Economic Review , vol.77 , pp. 927-940
    • Fershtman, C.1    Judd, K.L.2
  • 4
    • 0003023829 scopus 로고
    • Observable Contracts: Strategic Delegation and Cooperation
    • Fershtman, C., Judd, K. L., and Kalai, E. (1991): "Observable Contracts: Strategic Delegation and Cooperation." International Economic Review 32: 551-559.
    • (1991) International Economic Review , vol.32 , pp. 551-559
    • Fershtman, C.1    Judd, K.L.2    Kalai, E.3
  • 5
    • 0002430504 scopus 로고
    • Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design
    • Holmström, B., and Milgrom, P. (1991): "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design." Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 7: 26-52.
    • (1991) Journal of Law, Economics and Organization , vol.7 , pp. 26-52
    • Holmström, B.1    Milgrom, P.2
  • 7
    • 0001754046 scopus 로고
    • Game-Playing Agents: Unobservable Contracts as Precommitments
    • Katz, M. L. (1991): "Game-Playing Agents: Unobservable Contracts as Precommitments." Rand Journal of Economics 22: 307-328.
    • (1991) Rand Journal of Economics , vol.22 , pp. 307-328
    • Katz, M.L.1
  • 9
    • 85076418693 scopus 로고
    • The Strategic Choice of Managerial Incentives
    • Sklivas, S. D. (1987): "The Strategic Choice of Managerial Incentives." Rand Journal of Economics 18: 452-458.
    • (1987) Rand Journal of Economics , vol.18 , pp. 452-458
    • Sklivas, S.D.1
  • 10
    • 84873321089 scopus 로고
    • Monopoly, Quality, and Regulation
    • Spence, A. M. (1975): "Monopoly, Quality, and Regulation." Bell Journal of Economics 6: 417-429.
    • (1975) Bell Journal of Economics , vol.6 , pp. 417-429
    • Spence, A.M.1
  • 11
    • 0001609937 scopus 로고
    • Delegation and the Theory of the Firm
    • Vickers, J. (1985): "Delegation and the Theory of the Firm." Economic Journal, Suppl. 95: 138-147.
    • (1985) Economic Journal, Suppl. , vol.95 , pp. 138-147
    • Vickers, J.1


* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.