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Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 79, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 46-71

When Are Nonanonymous Players Negligible?

(3) Fudenberg, Drew a Levine, David b Pesendorfer, Wolfgang c

a HARVARD UNIVERSITY (United States)

b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA (United States)

c PRINCETON UNIVERSITY (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0002294278 PISSN: 00220531 EISSN: None Source Type: Journal
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1997.2373 Document Type: Article

Times cited : (35)

References (13)

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6
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- Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
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