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Journal of Economic Theory
Volumn 79, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 46-71
When Are Nonanonymous Players Negligible?
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EID: 0002294278     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1997.2373     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (34)
References (13)
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  • 3
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    • Information patterns and Nash equilibria in extensive games, II
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  • 4
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    • Fudenberg, D.1    Levine, D.2
  • 5
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    • Reputation and equilibrium selection in games with a single patient player
    • Fudenberg D., Levine D. Reputation and equilibrium selection in games with a single patient player. Econometrica. 57:1989;759-778.
    • (1989) Econometrica , vol.57 , pp. 759-778
    • Fudenberg, D.1    Levine, D.2
  • 6
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    • Maintaining a reputation when strategies are unobserved
    • Fudenberg D., Levine D. Maintaining a reputation when strategies are unobserved. Rev. Econ. Stud. 59:1992;561-580.
    • (1992) Rev. Econ. Stud. , vol.59 , pp. 561-580
    • Fudenberg, D.1    Levine, D.2
  • 7
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    • The Folk theorem in repeated games with imperfect public information
    • Fudenberg D., Levine D., Maskin E. The Folk theorem in repeated games with imperfect public information. Econometrica. 62:1994;997-1039.
    • (1994) Econometrica , vol.62 , pp. 997-1039
    • Fudenberg, D.1    Levine, D.2    Maskin, E.3
  • 8
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  • 9
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    • Reputation and imperfect information
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    • Kreps, D.1    Wilson, R.2
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    • Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
    • Milgrom P., Roberts J. Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence. Econometrica. 50:1982;443-460.
    • (1982) Econometrica , vol.50 , pp. 443-460
    • Milgrom, P.1    Roberts, J.2
  • 12
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    • Anonymous repeated games with a large number of players and random outcomes
    • Sabourian Hamid. Anonymous repeated games with a large number of players and random outcomes. J. Econ. Theory. 51:1990;92-110.
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  • 13
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    • Reputation and equilibrium characterization in repeated games of conflicting interest
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    • (1993) Econometrica , vol.61 , pp. 325-351
    • Schmidt, K.1

* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.