Pivotal Players and the Characterization of Influence

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 92, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 318-342

  Al Najjar, Nabil I ^a   Smorodinsky, Rann ^b  

^a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b TECHNION ISRAEL INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (Israel)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0001737445     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2000.2605     Document Type: Article

References (13)

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