Shirking and motivations in firms: Survey evidence on worker attitudes

International Journal of Industrial Organization

Volumn 22, Issue 6, 2004, Pages 863-884

  Minkler, Lanse ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT   (United States)

Author keywords

Fairness; Incentives; Intrinsic; Moral; Shirking

Indexed keywords

COMMUNICATION; EMPLOYMENT; PERFORMANCE; PERSONNEL; PROBLEM SOLVING; SOCIETIES AND INSTITUTIONS;

FAIRNESS; INCENTIVES; INTRINSICS; MORALS; SHIRKINGS;

MOTIVATION;

EID: 3142611456     PISSN: 01677187     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2004.03.003     Document Type: Article

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