Lying, integrity, and cooperation

Review of Social Economy

Volumn 62, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 27-50

  Minkler, Lanse P ^a   Miceli, Thomas J ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT   (United States)

Author keywords

Cooperation; Integrity; Lying; Moral motivation; Prisoner s dilemma

Indexed keywords

EID: 1842478928     PISSN: 00346764     EISSN: 14701162     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/0034676042000183817     Document Type: Article

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