Executive compensation and firm performance in Italy

International Journal of Industrial Organization

Volumn 19, Issue 1-2, 2001, Pages 133-161

  Brunello, Giorgio ^a,b   Graziano, Clara ^c   Parigi, Bruno ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PADOVA   (Italy)

^b CEPR   (United Kingdom)

^c UNIVERSITY OF UDINE   (Italy)

Author keywords

Corporate governance; D82; Executive compensation; J33; Principal agent

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035545494     PISSN: 01677187     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0167-7187(99)00026-0     Document Type: Article

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