The missing link in the paradox of the Linda conjunction problem: Beyond knowing and thinking of the conjunction rule, the intrinsic appeal of heuristic processing

Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin

Volumn 25, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 204-214

  Epstein, Seymour ^a   Donovan, Sean ^b   Denes Raj, Veronika ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS   (United States)

^b University of Massachusetts ^*

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033249180     PISSN: 01461672     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0146167299025002006     Document Type: Article

References (33)

1. Agnoli, F., & Krantz, D. H. (1989). Suppressing natural heuristics by formal instruction: The case of the conjunction fallacy. Cognitive Psychology, 21, 515-550.
2. Chaiken, S., Liberman, A., & Eagly, A. H. (1989). Heuristic and systematic information processing within and beyond the persuasion context. In J. S. Uleman & J. A. Bargh (Eds.), Unintended thought (pp. 212-252). New York: Guilford.
3. Chaiken, S., & Maheswaren, D. (1994). Heuristic processing can bias systematic processing: Effects of source credibility, argument ambiguity, and task importance on attitude judgment. Journal of Personality and Soacial Psychology, 66, 460-473.
4. Chapman, L. J., & Chapman, J. (1982). Test results are what you think they are. In D. Kahneman, P. Slovic, & A. Tversky (Eds.), Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases (pp. 239-248). New York: Cambridge University Press.
5. Cosmides, L., & Tooby, J. (1996). Are humans good intuitive statisticians after all? Rethinking some conclusions from the literature on judgment under uncertainty. Cognition, 58, 1-73.
6. Denes-Raj, V., & Epstein, S. (1994). Conflict between intuitive and rational processing: When people behave against their better judgment. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 66, 819-829.
7. Denes-Raj, V., Epstein, S., & Cole, J. (1995). The generality of the ratio-bias phenomenon. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 21, 1083-1092.
8. Donovan, S., & Epstein, S. (1997). The difficulty of the Linda conjunction problem can be attributed to its simultaneous concrete and unnatural representation, and not to conversational implicature. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 33, 1-20.
9. Edwards, K. (1990). The interplay of affect and cognition in attitude formation and change. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 59, 202-216.
10. Epstein, S. (1992). Cognitive-experiential self-theory: An integrative theory of personality. In R. C. Curtis (Ed.), The relational self: Theoretical convergences in psychoanalysis and social psychology. New York: Guilford.
11. Epstein, S. (1994). Integration of the cognitive and psychodynamic unconscious. American Psychologist, 49, 709-724.
12. Epstein, S., Denes-Raj, V., & Pacini, R. (1995). The Linda problem revisited from the perspective of cognitive-experiential self-theory. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 21, 1124-1138.
13. Epstein, S., & Donovan, S. (1995). [Is the Linda problem a true conjunction problem? Implications from responses of engineering students and liberal arts majors to frequency and probability versions]. Unpublished raw data.
14. Epstein, S., Lipson, A., Holstein, C., & Huh, E. (1992). Irrational reactions to negative outcomes: Evidence for two conceptual systems. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 62, 328-339.
15. Epstein, S., & Pacini, R. (1995). [The Linda problem: A true conjunction problem, or does the conjunction rule not apply to multiple attributes in a single person?] Unpublished raw data.
16. Epstein, S., Pacini, R., Denes-Raj, V., & Heier, H. (1996). Individual differences in intuitive-experiential and analytical-rational thinking styles. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71, 390-405.
17. Fiedler, K. (1988). The dependence of the conjunction fallacy on subtle linguistic factors. Psychological Research, 50, 123-129.
18. Fiske. S. T., & Taylor, S. E. (1991 ). Social cognition, New York: McGraw-Hill.
19. Gigerenzer, G. (1991). How to make cognitive illusions disappear: Beyond "heuristics and biases." European Review of Social Psychology, 2, 83-115.
20. Gilhooly, K.J., & Falconer, W. A. (1974). Concrete and abstract terms and relations in testing a rule. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 26, 335-359.
21. Johnson-Laird, P. N., & Wason, P. C. (1977). A theoretical analysis of insight into a reasoning task. In P. N. Johnson-Laird & P. C. Wason (Eds.), Thinking. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
22. Kahneman, D., Slovic, P., & Tversky, A. (Eds.). (1982). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
23. Kirkpatrick, L. A., & Epstein, S. (1992). Cognitive-experiential self-theory and subjective probability: Further evidence for two conceptual systems. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 63, 534-544.
24. Larrick, R. P., Morgan, J. N., & Nisbett, R. E. (1990). Teaching the use of cost-benefit reasoning in everyday life. Psychological Science, 1, 362-370.
25. Morier, D. M., & Borgida, E. (1984). The conjunction fallacy: A task specific phenomenon? Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 10, 243-252.
26. Nisbett, R., Krantz, D. H., Jepson, C., & Kunda, Z. (1983). The use of statistical heuristics in everyday inductive reasoning. Psychological Review, 90, 339-363.
27. Nisbett, R. E., & Ross, L. (1983). Human inference: Strategies and shortcomings of social judgment. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
28. Pacini, R., & Epstein, S. (1995). Lessons in intuitive reasoning from the ratio-bias phenomenon: The concretive, associationistic, imagistic, and affirmative representation principles. Manuscript submitted for publication.
29. Petty, R. E., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1981). Attitudes and persuasion: Classic and contemporary approaches. Dubuque, IA: W. C. Brown.
30. Schwarz, N., Strack, F., Hilton, D., & Naderer, G. (1991). Base rates, representativeness, and the logic of conversation: The contextual relevance of "irrelevant" information. Social Cognition, 9, 67-84.
31. Tversky, A. & Kahneman, D. (1983). Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment. Psychological Review, 90, 293-315.
32. Yates, J. F., & Carlson, B. W. (1986). Conjunction errors: Evidence for multiple judgment procedures, including "signed summation." Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 37, 230-253.
33. Zukier, H., & Pepitone, A. (1984). Social roles and strategies in prediction: Some determinants of the use of base-rate information. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 47, 349-360.