Global, Constitutional, and Partisan Determinants of Redistribution in Fifteen OECD Countries

Comparative Politics

Volumn 34, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 169-188

  Crepaz, Markus M L ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0036336213     PISSN: 00104159     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/4146936     Document Type: Article

References (69)

1. On the former, see, for example, Vivien Schmidt, "The New World Order, Incorporated: The Rise of Business and the Decline of the Nation State," Daedalus, 124 (1995), 75-106; Philip G. Cerny, "The Dynamics of Financial Globalization: Technology, Market Structure and Policy Response," Policy Sciences, 27 (1994), 319-42; Vincent Cable, "The Diminished Nation State: A Study in the Loss of Economic Power," Daedalus, 124 (1995), 23-54; Kenichi Ohmae, The End of the Nation State (New York: Free Press, 1995); Dani Rodrik, Has Globalization Gone Too Far? (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1997). On the latter, see, for example, David A. Smith, Dorothy J. Solinger, and Steven C. Topik, eds., States and Sovereignty in the Global Economy (London: Routledge, 1999); Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson, Globalization in Question: The International Economy and the Possibilities of Governance (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996); Suzanne Berger and Ronald Dore, eds., National Diversity and Global Capitalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996); Robert Boyer and Daniel Drache eds., States against Markets: The Limits of Globalization (London: Routledge, 1996).
2. On the former, see, for example, Vivien Schmidt, "The New World Order, Incorporated: The Rise of Business and the Decline of the Nation State," Daedalus, 124 (1995), 75-106; Philip G. Cerny, "The Dynamics of Financial Globalization: Technology, Market Structure and Policy Response," Policy Sciences, 27 (1994), 319-42; Vincent Cable, "The Diminished Nation State: A Study in the Loss of Economic Power," Daedalus, 124 (1995), 23-54; Kenichi Ohmae, The End of the Nation State (New York: Free Press, 1995); Dani Rodrik, Has Globalization Gone Too Far? (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1997). On the latter, see, for example, David A. Smith, Dorothy J. Solinger, and Steven C. Topik, eds., States and Sovereignty in the Global Economy (London: Routledge, 1999); Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson, Globalization in Question: The International Economy and the Possibilities of Governance (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996); Suzanne Berger and Ronald Dore, eds., National Diversity and Global Capitalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996); Robert Boyer and Daniel Drache eds., States against Markets: The Limits of Globalization (London: Routledge, 1996).
3. On the former, see, for example, Vivien Schmidt, "The New World Order, Incorporated: The Rise of Business and the Decline of the Nation State," Daedalus, 124 (1995), 75-106; Philip G. Cerny, "The Dynamics of Financial Globalization: Technology, Market Structure and Policy Response," Policy Sciences, 27 (1994), 319-42; Vincent Cable, "The Diminished Nation State: A Study in the Loss of Economic Power," Daedalus, 124 (1995), 23-54; Kenichi Ohmae, The End of the Nation State (New York: Free Press, 1995); Dani Rodrik, Has Globalization Gone Too Far? (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1997). On the latter, see, for example, David A. Smith, Dorothy J. Solinger, and Steven C. Topik, eds., States and Sovereignty in the Global Economy (London: Routledge, 1999); Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson, Globalization in Question: The International Economy and the Possibilities of Governance (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996); Suzanne Berger and Ronald Dore, eds., National Diversity and Global Capitalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996); Robert Boyer and Daniel Drache eds., States against Markets: The Limits of Globalization (London: Routledge, 1996).
4. On the former, see, for example, Vivien Schmidt, "The New World Order, Incorporated: The Rise of Business and the Decline of the Nation State," Daedalus, 124 (1995), 75-106; Philip G. Cerny, "The Dynamics of Financial Globalization: Technology, Market Structure and Policy Response," Policy Sciences, 27 (1994), 319-42; Vincent Cable, "The Diminished Nation State: A Study in the Loss of Economic Power," Daedalus, 124 (1995), 23-54; Kenichi Ohmae, The End of the Nation State (New York: Free Press, 1995); Dani Rodrik, Has Globalization Gone Too Far? (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1997). On the latter, see, for example, David A. Smith, Dorothy J. Solinger, and Steven C. Topik, eds., States and Sovereignty in the Global Economy (London: Routledge, 1999); Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson, Globalization in Question: The International Economy and the Possibilities of Governance (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996); Suzanne Berger and Ronald Dore, eds., National Diversity and Global Capitalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996); Robert Boyer and Daniel Drache eds., States against Markets: The Limits of Globalization (London: Routledge, 1996).
5. On the former, see, for example, Vivien Schmidt, "The New World Order, Incorporated: The Rise of Business and the Decline of the Nation State," Daedalus, 124 (1995), 75-106; Philip G. Cerny, "The Dynamics of Financial Globalization: Technology, Market Structure and Policy Response," Policy Sciences, 27 (1994), 319-42; Vincent Cable, "The Diminished Nation State: A Study in the Loss of Economic Power," Daedalus, 124 (1995), 23-54; Kenichi Ohmae, The End of the Nation State (New York: Free Press, 1995); Dani Rodrik, Has Globalization Gone Too Far? (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1997). On the latter, see, for example, David A. Smith, Dorothy J. Solinger, and Steven C. Topik, eds., States and Sovereignty in the Global Economy (London: Routledge, 1999); Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson, Globalization in Question: The International Economy and the Possibilities of Governance (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996); Suzanne Berger and Ronald Dore, eds., National Diversity and Global Capitalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996); Robert Boyer and Daniel Drache eds., States against Markets: The Limits of Globalization (London: Routledge, 1996).
6. On the former, see, for example, Vivien Schmidt, "The New World Order, Incorporated: The Rise of Business and the Decline of the Nation State," Daedalus, 124 (1995), 75-106; Philip G. Cerny, "The Dynamics of Financial Globalization: Technology, Market Structure and Policy Response," Policy Sciences, 27 (1994), 319-42; Vincent Cable, "The Diminished Nation State: A Study in the Loss of Economic Power," Daedalus, 124 (1995), 23-54; Kenichi Ohmae, The End of the Nation State (New York: Free Press, 1995); Dani Rodrik, Has Globalization Gone Too Far? (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1997). On the latter, see, for example, David A. Smith, Dorothy J. Solinger, and Steven C. Topik, eds., States and Sovereignty in the Global Economy (London: Routledge, 1999); Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson, Globalization in Question: The International Economy and the Possibilities of Governance (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996); Suzanne Berger and Ronald Dore, eds., National Diversity and Global Capitalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996); Robert Boyer and Daniel Drache eds., States against Markets: The Limits of Globalization (London: Routledge, 1996).
7. On the former, see, for example, Vivien Schmidt, "The New World Order, Incorporated: The Rise of Business and the Decline of the Nation State," Daedalus, 124 (1995), 75-106; Philip G. Cerny, "The Dynamics of Financial Globalization: Technology, Market Structure and Policy Response," Policy Sciences, 27 (1994), 319-42; Vincent Cable, "The Diminished Nation State: A Study in the Loss of Economic Power," Daedalus, 124 (1995), 23-54; Kenichi Ohmae, The End of the Nation State (New York: Free Press, 1995); Dani Rodrik, Has Globalization Gone Too Far? (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1997). On the latter, see, for example, David A. Smith, Dorothy J. Solinger, and Steven C. Topik, eds., States and Sovereignty in the Global Economy (London: Routledge, 1999); Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson, Globalization in Question: The International Economy and the Possibilities of Governance (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996); Suzanne Berger and Ronald Dore, eds., National Diversity and Global Capitalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996); Robert Boyer and Daniel Drache eds., States against Markets: The Limits of Globalization (London: Routledge, 1996).
8. On the former, see, for example, Vivien Schmidt, "The New World Order, Incorporated: The Rise of Business and the Decline of the Nation State," Daedalus, 124 (1995), 75-106; Philip G. Cerny, "The Dynamics of Financial Globalization: Technology, Market Structure and Policy Response," Policy Sciences, 27 (1994), 319-42; Vincent Cable, "The Diminished Nation State: A Study in the Loss of Economic Power," Daedalus, 124 (1995), 23-54; Kenichi Ohmae, The End of the Nation State (New York: Free Press, 1995); Dani Rodrik, Has Globalization Gone Too Far? (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1997). On the latter, see, for example, David A. Smith, Dorothy J. Solinger, and Steven C. Topik, eds., States and Sovereignty in the Global Economy (London: Routledge, 1999); Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson, Globalization in Question: The International Economy and the Possibilities of Governance (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996); Suzanne Berger and Ronald Dore, eds., National Diversity and Global Capitalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996); Robert Boyer and Daniel Drache eds., States against Markets: The Limits of Globalization (London: Routledge, 1996).
9. On the former, see, for example, Vivien Schmidt, "The New World Order, Incorporated: The Rise of Business and the Decline of the Nation State," Daedalus, 124 (1995), 75-106; Philip G. Cerny, "The Dynamics of Financial Globalization: Technology, Market Structure and Policy Response," Policy Sciences, 27 (1994), 319-42; Vincent Cable, "The Diminished Nation State: A Study in the Loss of Economic Power," Daedalus, 124 (1995), 23-54; Kenichi Ohmae, The End of the Nation State (New York: Free Press, 1995); Dani Rodrik, Has Globalization Gone Too Far? (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1997). On the latter, see, for example, David A. Smith, Dorothy J. Solinger, and Steven C. Topik, eds., States and Sovereignty in the Global Economy (London: Routledge, 1999); Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson, Globalization in Question: The International Economy and the Possibilities of Governance (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996); Suzanne Berger and Ronald Dore, eds., National Diversity and Global Capitalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996); Robert Boyer and Daniel Drache eds., States against Markets: The Limits of Globalization (London: Routledge, 1996).
10. For example, see David Cameron, "The Expansion of the Public Economy: A Comparative Analysis," American Political Science Review, 72 (1978), 1243-61; and Peter Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985). Also see Duane Swank, "Globalization, Democratic Institutions, and Policy Change in European Welfare States: The Corporatist Conservative Cases," paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 31-September 3, 2000.
11. For example, see David Cameron, "The Expansion of the Public Economy: A Comparative Analysis," American Political Science Review, 72 (1978), 1243-61; and Peter Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985). Also see Duane Swank, "Globalization, Democratic Institutions, and Policy Change in European Welfare States: The Corporatist Conservative Cases," paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 31-September 3, 2000.
12. For example, see David Cameron, "The Expansion of the Public Economy: A Comparative Analysis," American Political Science Review, 72 (1978), 1243-61; and Peter Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985). Also see Duane Swank, "Globalization, Democratic Institutions, and Policy Change in European Welfare States: The Corporatist Conservative Cases," paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 31-September 3, 2000.
13. Evelyne Huber, Charles Ragin, and John D. Stephens, "Social Demoracy, Christian Democracy, Constitutional Structure, and the Welfare State," American Journal of Sociology, 99 (1993), 711-49; George Tsebelis, "Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism," British Journal of Political Science, 25 (1995), 289-325; George Tsebelis, "Veto Players and Law Production in Parliamentary Democracies: An Empirical Analysis," American Political Science Review, 93 (1999), 591-608; Manfred Schmidt, "When Parties Matter: A Review of the Possibilities and Limits of Partisan Influence on Public Policy," European Journal of Political Research, 30 (1996), 155-83; Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Democracies (New Haven: Yale University Press 1999); Mark Hallerberg and Scott Basinger, "Internationalization and Changes in Tax Policy in OECD Countries: The Importance of Domestic Veto Players," Comparative Political Studies, 31 (1998), 321-52.
14. Evelyne Huber, Charles Ragin, and John D. Stephens, "Social Demoracy, Christian Democracy, Constitutional Structure, and the Welfare State," American Journal of Sociology, 99 (1993), 711-49; George Tsebelis, "Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism," British Journal of Political Science, 25 (1995), 289-325; George Tsebelis, "Veto Players and Law Production in Parliamentary Democracies: An Empirical Analysis," American Political Science Review, 93 (1999), 591-608; Manfred Schmidt, "When Parties Matter: A Review of the Possibilities and Limits of Partisan Influence on Public Policy," European Journal of Political Research, 30 (1996), 155-83; Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Democracies (New Haven: Yale University Press 1999); Mark Hallerberg and Scott Basinger, "Internationalization and Changes in Tax Policy in OECD Countries: The Importance of Domestic Veto Players," Comparative Political Studies, 31 (1998), 321-52.
15. Evelyne Huber, Charles Ragin, and John D. Stephens, "Social Demoracy, Christian Democracy, Constitutional Structure, and the Welfare State," American Journal of Sociology, 99 (1993), 711-49; George Tsebelis, "Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism," British Journal of Political Science, 25 (1995), 289-325; George Tsebelis, "Veto Players and Law Production in Parliamentary Democracies: An Empirical Analysis," American Political Science Review, 93 (1999), 591-608; Manfred Schmidt, "When Parties Matter: A Review of the Possibilities and Limits of Partisan Influence on Public Policy," European Journal of Political Research, 30 (1996), 155-83; Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Democracies (New Haven: Yale University Press 1999); Mark Hallerberg and Scott Basinger, "Internationalization and Changes in Tax Policy in OECD Countries: The Importance of Domestic Veto Players," Comparative Political Studies, 31 (1998), 321-52.
16. Evelyne Huber, Charles Ragin, and John D. Stephens, "Social Demoracy, Christian Democracy, Constitutional Structure, and the Welfare State," American Journal of Sociology, 99 (1993), 711-49; George Tsebelis, "Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism," British Journal of Political Science, 25 (1995), 289-325; George Tsebelis, "Veto Players and Law Production in Parliamentary Democracies: An Empirical Analysis," American Political Science Review, 93 (1999), 591-608; Manfred Schmidt, "When Parties Matter: A Review of the Possibilities and Limits of Partisan Influence on Public Policy," European Journal of Political Research, 30 (1996), 155-83; Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Democracies (New Haven: Yale University Press 1999); Mark Hallerberg and Scott Basinger, "Internationalization and Changes in Tax Policy in OECD Countries: The Importance of Domestic Veto Players," Comparative Political Studies, 31 (1998), 321-52.
17. Evelyne Huber, Charles Ragin, and John D. Stephens, "Social Demoracy, Christian Democracy, Constitutional Structure, and the Welfare State," American Journal of Sociology, 99 (1993), 711-49; George Tsebelis, "Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism," British Journal of Political Science, 25 (1995), 289-325; George Tsebelis, "Veto Players and Law Production in Parliamentary Democracies: An Empirical Analysis," American Political Science Review, 93 (1999), 591-608; Manfred Schmidt, "When Parties Matter: A Review of the Possibilities and Limits of Partisan Influence on Public Policy," European Journal of Political Research, 30 (1996), 155-83; Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Democracies (New Haven: Yale University Press 1999); Mark Hallerberg and Scott Basinger, "Internationalization and Changes in Tax Policy in OECD Countries: The Importance of Domestic Veto Players," Comparative Political Studies, 31 (1998), 321-52.
18. Evelyne Huber, Charles Ragin, and John D. Stephens, "Social Demoracy, Christian Democracy, Constitutional Structure, and the Welfare State," American Journal of Sociology, 99 (1993), 711-49; George Tsebelis, "Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism," British Journal of Political Science, 25 (1995), 289-325; George Tsebelis, "Veto Players and Law Production in Parliamentary Democracies: An Empirical Analysis," American Political Science Review, 93 (1999), 591-608; Manfred Schmidt, "When Parties Matter: A Review of the Possibilities and Limits of Partisan Influence on Public Policy," European Journal of Political Research, 30 (1996), 155-83; Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Democracies (New Haven: Yale University Press 1999); Mark Hallerberg and Scott Basinger, "Internationalization and Changes in Tax Policy in OECD Countries: The Importance of Domestic Veto Players," Comparative Political Studies, 31 (1998), 321-52.
19. Tsebelis, besides emphasizing the number of veto players, also indicates lack of congruence (dissimilarity of policy positions among veto players) and cohesion (similarity of policy positions among the constituent units of each veto player) as defining elements of the concept of veto players. Tsebelis, "Decision Making"; Tsebelis, "Veto Players."
20. Tsebelis, besides emphasizing the number of veto players, also indicates lack of congruence (dissimilarity of policy positions among veto players) and cohesion (similarity of policy positions among the constituent units of each veto player) as defining elements of the concept of veto players. Tsebelis, "Decision Making"; Tsebelis, "Veto Players."
21. Most representative examples are ibid., and Hallerberg and Basinger.
22. For more detail, see Vicki Birchfield and Markus M. L. Crepaz, "The Impact of Constitutional Structures and Collective and Competitive Veto Points on Income Inequality in Industrialized Democracies," European Journal of Political Research, 34 (1998), 175-200. Also, Markus M. L. Crepaz and Vicki Birchfield, "Global Economics, Local Politics: Lijphart's Theory of Consensus Democracy and the Politics of Inclusion," in Markus M. L. Crepaz, Thomas A. Koelble, and David Wilsford, eds., Democracy and Institutions: The Life Work of Arend Lijphart (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000).
23. For more detail, see Vicki Birchfield and Markus M. L. Crepaz, "The Impact of Constitutional Structures and Collective and Competitive Veto Points on Income Inequality in Industrialized Democracies," European Journal of Political Research, 34 (1998), 175-200. Also, Markus M. L. Crepaz and Vicki Birchfield, "Global Economics, Local Politics: Lijphart's Theory of Consensus Democracy and the Politics of Inclusion," in Markus M. L. Crepaz, Thomas A. Koelble, and David Wilsford, eds., Democracy and Institutions: The Life Work of Arend Lijphart (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000).
24. For a more detailed listing of the elements of disposable income, see Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Low Income Measures as computed by Koen Vleminckx, Luxembourg Income Study (LIS), August 1998. It can be found at http://lissy.ceps.lu/summary.htm. It starts with gross wages and salaries (including farm self-employment and nonfarm self-employment), plus factor incomes such as sick pay, disability pay, social retirement benefits, and maternity pay, plus means tested cash benefits, public sector pensions, alimony or child support, and others, minus mandatory contributions for self-employed, minus mandatory employee contributions, and minus income taxes.
25. Gøsta Esping-Andersen, "Positive Sum Solutions in a World of Trade-Offs," in Gøsta Esping-Andersen, ed., Welfare States in Transition: National Adaptations in Global Economics (London: Sage, 1996).
26. Schmidt, p. 77.
27. Cerny, p. 334.
28. For a more detailed version of this argument, see Duane Swank, Global Capital, Political Institutions, and Policy Change in Developed Welfare States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).
29. Wolfgang H. Reinecke, "Global Public Policy,"Foreign Affairs, 76 (1997), 127-39.
30. Rodrik, p. 4.
31. Global trade from 1950 to 1997 far outstripped growth in GDP. While over this period global economic growth increased by a factor of six, trade increased by a factor of eighteen compared to 1950. Foreign direct investment outflows increased from $12 billion in 1970 to $270 billion in 1995. Finally, the expansion of international finance has been the most phenomenal. Cross-border transactions of bonds and equities have grown by a factor of between fifty and one-hundred from 1980 to 1996 for the United States, Japan, Germany, France, Italy, and Canada. See, The Economist, "Markets Go Global" (September 1997).
32. Berger and Dore, eds., National Diversity and Global Capitalism; Boyer and Drache, eds., States against Markets.
33. Hirst and Thompson.
34. Duane Swank, "Funding the Welfare State: Globalization and the Taxation of Business in Advanced Market Economies," Political Studies, 46 (1998), 671-92.
35. Kenneth Waltz, "Globalization and Governance," Political Science and Politics, 32 (December 1999), 693-700.
36. Stephen Krasner, "Globalization and Sovereignty," in Smith, Solinger, and Topik, eds., p. 40.
37. John D. Stephens, Evelyn Huber, and Leonard Ray, "The Welfare State in Hard Times," in Herbert Kitschelt, Peter Lange, Gary Marks, and John D. Stephens, eds., Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 189.
38. Miriam A. Golden, Michael Wallerstein, and Peter Lange, "Postwar Trade-Union Organization and Industrial Relations," in Kitschelt, Lange, Marks, and Stephens, eds., p. 223.
39. Rodrik, p. 53.
40. Geoffrey Garrett, Partisan Politics in the Global Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 6.
41. Tsebelis, "Decision Making," p. 293.
42. Ibid., p. 322.
43. Tsebelis, "Veto Players," p. 594.
44. Schmidt, p. 173.
45. Hallerberg and Basinger, p. 339.
46. Robert E. Goodin, "Institutionalizing the Public Interest: The Defense of Deadlock and Beyond," American Political Science Review, 90 (1996), 331.
47. Ibid.
48. As one of the anonymous reviewers aptly put it, "in multiparty coalitions it is essential avoiding goring the ox of each constituent party in order to hold the coalition together."
49. For a similar argument see Noriel Roubini and Jeffrey D. Sachs, "Political and Economic Determinants of Budget Deficits in the Industrial Democracies," European Economic Review, 33 (1989), 803-38.
50. Barry Weingast, "A Rational Choice Perspective on Congressional Norm," American Journal of Political Science, 23 (1979), 245-63.
51. Birchfield and Crepaz, "The Impact."
52. Huber, Ragin, and Stephens, p. 722.
53. Arend Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984). This distinction is maintained in Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy.
54. Arend Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984). This distinction is maintained in Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy.
55. Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy, p. 5.
56. Ibid., pp. 3-4.
57. Ibid., p. 4.
58. Ibid., p. 2.
59. As argued by Huber, Ragin, and Stephens; Tsebelis, "Decision Making"; Tsebelis, "Veto Players"; and Schmidt.
60. As argued by Huber, Ragin, and Stephens; Tsebelis, "Decision Making"; Tsebelis, "Veto Players"; and Schmidt.
61. For a more detailed listing of the elements of disposable income, see Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Low Income Measures as computed by Koen Vleminckx, Luxembourg Income Study (LIS), August 1998, found at http://lissy.ceps.lu/summary.htm. It starts with gross wages and salaries (including farm self-employment and nonfarm self-employment), plus factor incomes such as sick pay, disability pay, social retirement benefits, and maternity pay, plus means tested cash benefits, public sector pensions, alimony or child support, and others, minus mandatory contributions for self-employed, minus mandatory employee contributions, and minus income taxes.
62. The Low Income LIS dataset provides three items: first, the percent of households with an income of less than 50 percent of the median household income before taxes; second, the percent of households with an income of less than 50 percent of the median household income before transfers; and third, the percent of households with an income of less than 50 percent of the median income after taxes and transfers. These items allow calculations of the tax effect and the transfer effect on the low income measures.
63. Dennis P. Quinn, "The Correlates of International Financial Liberation," American Political Science Review, 90 (1997), 531-51.
64. Postmodernism is particularly fond of the cultural aspects of globalization. See, for example, Fredric Jameson and Masao Miyoshi, The Cultures of Globalization (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998).
65. Garrett, p. 1.
66. For a most useful description of the American case, see Harold Wilensky, The Welfare State and Equality (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975).
67. These data are not shown in Table 2. They are available from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Low Income Measures as computed by Koen Vleminckx, Luxembourg Income Study (LIS), August 1998.
68. Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy.
69. David R. Cameron, Soo Yeon Kim, and Kathryn A. McDermott, "Openness, Political Institutions, and the Size of Government," paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D. C., August 31-September 3, 2000.