International regimes, domestic veto-players, and capital controls policy stability

International Studies Quarterly

Volumn 47, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 1-22

  Kastner, Scott L ^a   Rector, Chad ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CAPITAL FLOW; DECISION MAKING; ECONOMIC POLICY; POLITICAL ECONOMY;

EID: 0037354994     PISSN: 00208833     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-2478.4701001     Document Type: Article

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