Veto players and institutional analysis

Governance

Volumn 13, Issue 4, 2000, Pages 441-474

  Tsebelis, George ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034355393     PISSN: 09521895     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/0952-1895.00141     Document Type: Article

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