The problem with negotiated settlements to ethnic civil wars

Security Studies

Volumn 13, Issue 4, 2004, Pages 230-279

  Downes, Alexander B ^a  

^a DUKE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 20544470885     PISSN: 09636412     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09636410490945893     Document Type: Review

References (315)

1. Examples from a vast and growing literature include Roy Licklider, ed., Stopping the Killing: How Civil Wars End (New York: New York University Press, 1993);
2. Licklider, "The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993," American Political Science Review 89, no. 3 (September 1995): 681-90;
3. T. David Mason and Patrick J. Fett, "How Civil Wars End: A Rational Choice Approach," Journal of Conflict Resolution 40, no. 4 (December 1996): 546-68;
4. Stephen John Stedman, "Negotiation and Mediation in Internal Conflict," in The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict, ed. Michael E. Brown (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996), 341-76;
5. Stedman, Donald Rothchild, and Elizabeth M. Cousens, ed., Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002);
6. Charles King, Ending Civil Wars, Adelphi Paper 308 (Oxford: International Institute for Strategic Studies [IISS]/Oxford University Press, 1997);
7. Barbara F. Walter, "The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement," International Organization 51, no. 3 (summer 1997): 335-64;
8. Walter, "Designing Transitions from Civil War: Demobilization, Democratization, and Commitments to Peace," International Security 24, no. 1 (summer 1999): 127-55;
9. Walter, Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002);
10. Caroline Hartzell, "Explaining the Stability of Negotiated Settlements to Intrastate Wars," Journal of Conflict Resolution 43, no. 1 (February 1999): 3-22;
11. Hartzell, Matthew Hoddie, and Donald Rothchild, "Stabilizing the Peace After Civil War: An Investigation of Some Key Variables," International Organization 55, no. 1 (winter 2001): 183-208;
12. Nicholas Sambanis, "Partition as a Solution to Ethnic War: An Empirical Critique of the Theoretical Literature," World Politics 49, no. 4 (July 2000): 437-83;
13. and Mark Peceny and William Stanley, "Liberal Social Reconstruction and the Resolution of Civil Wars in Central America," International Organization 55, no. 1 (winter 2001): 149-82. This focus on civil wars makes sense given that they compose the vast majority of current armed conflicts: intrastate wars of one kind or another accounted for 30 of 31 ongoing armed conflicts in 2002.
14. See Mikael Eriksson, Peter Wallensteen, Margareta Sollenberg, "Armed Conflict, 1989-2002," Journal of Peace Research 40, no. 5 (September 2003): 594.
15. Of ethnic civil wars that end, 20 to 25 percent terminate in negotiated settlements. See the datasets in Licklider, "Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars";
16. Mason and Fett, "How Civil Wars End";
17. Walter, Committing to Peace and "Critical Barrier";
18. and Sambanis, "Partition as a Solution to Ethnic War."
19. One scholar puts this rate as low as 15 percent (Stephen John Stedman, Peacemaking in Civil Wlars: International Mediation in Zimbabwe, 1974-1980 [Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1991], 4-9).
20. Others, using a more liberal definition of negotiated settlement, find that 40-45 percent of civil wars end in such agreements (Hartzell, "Explaining the Stability of Negotiated Settlements to Intrastate Wars," 12;
21. and Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild, "Stabilizing the Peace After Civil War," 194).
22. Licklider, "Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars," 686.
23. See Ted Robert Gurr, "Ethnic Warfare on the Wane," Foreign Affairs 79, no. 3 (May/June 2000): 52.
24. For further elaboration, see Gurr, Peoples versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2000);
25. and Gurr, Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993).
26. Other prominent works include Graham Smith, ed., Federalism: The Multiethnic Challenge (London: Longman, 1995);
27. Timothy D. Sisk, Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996);
28. Ruth Lapidoth, Autonomy: Flexible Solutions to Ethnic Conflict (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997);
29. and Yash Ghai, ed., Autonomy and Ethnicity: Negotiating Competing Claims in Multiethnic States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
30. Of course, arguments for power sharing and autonomy as solutions to ethnic conflict have been around for a long time. For early works on the former, see Arend Lijphart, "Consociational Democracy," World Politics 21, no. 2 (January 1969): 207-25;
31. and Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977);
32. on the latter, see Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 601-28. What is new is the acceptance and promotion of these policies by third party interveners in ethnic wars.
33. Ghai, "Ethnicity and Autonomy: A Framework for Analysis," in Ghai, Autonomy and Ethnicity, 15-16. There was also a sharp increase in the number of civil wars settled via negotiations in the 1990s. Monica Toft observed that negotiated settlements outnumbered decisive mititary victories as methods of civil war termination in the 1990s for the first time.
34. See Monica Duffy Toft, "Peace Through Victory?" (paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, PA, 27-31 August 2003), 10.
35. Dates given indicate the year when settlements were agreed upon.
36. This data is summarized in Alexander B. Downes, "The Holy Land Divided: Defending Partition as a Solution to Ethnic Wars," Security Studies 10, no. 4 (summer 2001): 89-97.
37. Stability in this context means solely that the likelihood of renewed warfare is minimized. I do not mean to imply that ethnic domination or separation is normatively superior or desirable.
38. On the ethnic security dilemma as a cause of war, see Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," Survival 35, no. 1 (spring 1993): 27-47;
39. William Rose, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict: Some New Hypotheses," Security Studies 9, no. 4 (summer 2000): 1-51;
40. Jack Snyder and Robert Jervis, "Civil War and the Security Dilemma," in Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention, ed. Barbara F. Walter and Jack Snyder (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 15-37;
41. and Flemming Splidsboel-Hansen, "The Outbreak and Settlement of Civil War: Neorealism and the Case of Tajikistan," Civil Wars 2, no. 4 (winter 1999): 1-22.
42. On the security dilemma as preventing wars from ending, see Chaim D. Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," International Security 20, no. 4 (spring 1996): 136-75;
43. and Kaufmann, "When All Else Fails: Ethnic Population Transfers and Partitions in the Twentieth Century," International Security 23, no. 2 (fall 1998): 120-56. Closely related to the security dilemma are arguments that focus on commitment problems: the inability of a majority group to do anything credible to commit itself not to use the power of the state to exploit the minority in the future.
44. See Walter, "Critical Barrier" and Committing to Peace;
45. and James D. Fearon, "Commitment Problems and the Spread of Ethnic Conflict," in The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation, ed. David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 107-26. Other authors have adjusted the security dilemma concept to include the state, arguing that if "the state cannot protect the interests of all ethnic groups, then each group will seek to control the state, decreasing the security of other groups and decreasing the ability of the state to provide security for any group."
46. See Stephen M. Saideman, "The Dual Dynamics of Disintegration: Ethnic Politics and Security Dilemmas in Eastern Europe," Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 2, no. 1 (spring 1996): 23;
47. and Saideman, "Is Pandora's Box Half-Empty or Half-Full? The Limited Virulence of Secession and the Domestic Sources of Disintegration," in Lake and Rothchild, The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict, 127-50.
48. I accept as given that ethnic war tends to cause ethnic separation, and that solutions to such wars should be based on separation; as Stathis Kalyvas puts it, "civil wars tend to produce segregation even when the intention is not to 'cleanse" (Stathis Kalyvas, "The Logic of Violence in Civil War," unpub. ms., University of Chicago, April 2003, 25). Intermingling by itself, however, does not cause ethnic wars in the first place; it is the effect of the war that makes intermingling dangerous.
49. Walter, Committing to Peace, 21.
50. John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001), 31.
51. See also Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 105-6.
52. Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," World Politics 30, no. 2 (January 1978): 168.
53. See also Dale C. Copeland, "The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism," International Security 25, no. 2 (fall 2000): 202-03. Jervis and other defensive realists argue, however, that when offensive and defensive military technologies are distinguishable, and the balance between them favors defense, not only is the security dilemma likely to be less intense, but states can signal their type (security-seeker or revisionist) by the types of weapons they procure (Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," 190;
54. and Charles L. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help," International Security 19, no. 3 [winter 1994 /95]: 67-70).
55. Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," 172;
56. Walter, "Critical Barrier," 338;
57. and Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. J. C. A. Gaskin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 85.
58. Roy Licklider, "Early Returns: Results of the First Wave of Statistical Studies of Civil War Termination," Civil Wars 1, no. 3 (autumn 1998): 122.
59. Fred Charles Iklé, Every War Must End, rev. ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 107. Put another way, "no matter what a civil war may initially have been about, once antagonists have set about killing one another they are likely to be concerned about their future security" (Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild, "Stabilizing the Peace After Civil War," 203).
60. Joanna Spear, "The Disarmament and Demobilization of Warring Factions in the Aftermath of Civil Wars: Key Implementation Issues," Civil Wars 2, no. 2 (summer 1999): 12.
61. Walter, "Critical Barrier," 338.
62. On the difficulties inherent in disarming and demobilizing, see Mats R. Berdal, Disarmament and Demobilization after Civil Wars, Adelphi Paper no. 303 (Oxford: IISS/Oxford University Press, 1996);
63. and Joanna Spear, "Disarmament and Demobilization," in Stedman, Rothchild, and Cousens, Ending Civil Wars, 141-82.
64. This was the case in Sudan, where Southern units in the army rebelled in 1983 (eleven years after they were integrated) when president Jaafar al-Nimeiri attempted to transfer them to the north in response to increasing tension between the two regions. See Nelson Kasfir, "Peacemaking and Social Cleavages in Sudan," in Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies, ed. Joseph V Montville (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1990), 363-87.
65. These twin problems contributed to the failure of three negotiated settlements in Angola (1989, 1991, and 1994). See Human Rights Watch, Angola Unravels: The Rise and Fall of the Lusaka Peace Process, at http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/angola.
66. On the former, see Spear, "Disarmament and Demobilization of Warring Factions," 17-19;
67. on the latter, see Walter, "Critical Barrier."
68. See the case study of Kosovo below.
69. Explaining the Stability of Negotiated Settlements, 6.
70. Stabilizing the Peace After Civic War,
71. Walter, Commiting to Peace.
72. Thomas L. Friedman, "Not Happening." New York Times, 23 January 2001, A21.
73. Using the Polity IV dataset, Toft finds that twenty years later, states that had a civil war end with a negotiated settlement are on average five points less democratic (on a 21-point scale) than they were before the war. After thirty years, such states are nearly seven points less democratic (Toft, "Peace Through Victory?" 23). These results are preliminary, however, and should be viewed with caution: because there are few negotiated settlements, one or two bad outcomes could wreck an otherwise positive trend.
74. Other scholars have found some support for the argument that the causes of the two types of civil wars are different. See Nicholas Sambanis, "Do Ethnic and Nonethnic Civil Wars Have the Same Causes? A Theoretical and Empirical Inquiry (Part 1)," Journal of Conflict Resolution 45, no. 3 (June 2001): 259-82.
75. Yash Ghai and Anthony Regan, "Bougainville and the Dialectics of Ethnicity, Autonomy and Separation," in Ghai, Autonomy and Ethnicity, 264.
76. Monica Duffy Toft, "Indivisible Territory, Geographic Concentration, and Ethnic War," Security Studies 12, no. 2 (winter 2002/3): 81-118;
77. and Toft, The Geography of Ethnic Violence. Identity, Interests, and Territory (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003).
78. Because most ethnic groups have a territorial base, regional autonomy or federalism are applicable, whereas those solutions usually do not pertain to ideological wars. Some form of regional autonomy has been implemented after a few ideological civil wars, such as the twenty-three development zones allocated to the Contras by the Nicaraguan peace accords in 1990. According to a study of the role of territorial autonomy in divided societies, however, "These zones were chosen not because the Contras controlled that territory or represented a majority group within those areas, but because the land was available for settlement" (Donald Rothchild and Caroline Hartzell, "Security in Deeply Divided Societies: The Role of Territorial Autonomy," Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 5, nos. 3-4 [autumn/winter 1999]: 261).
79. Incumbents in a subset of ethnic wars - typically colonial wars - attempt to recruit from the "enemy" ethnic group. This practice tends to reduce the reliability of ethnicity as a marker of loyalty over time (Kalyvas, "The Logic of Violence in Civil War").
80. John Mueller points out that people of ten face the choice of "being dominated by vicious bigots of one's own ethnic group or by vicious bigots of another ethnic group: Given that range of alternatives, the choice was easy" (John Mueller, "The Banality of Ethnic War," International Security 25, no. 1 [summer 2000]: 56).
81. The Independent International Commission on Kosovo (iick), The Follow-Up: Why Conditional Independence? (November 2001), 4. This document updates and restates the findings of the commission's original publication, The Kosovo Report (October 2000), found at http:// www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/thekosovoreport.htm.
82. Rothchild and Hartzell, "Security in Deeply Divided Societies," 256. The polarization of identity induced by violence, as these authors point out, declines over time: wartime levels of hostility do not remain constant forever. As discussed in the case studies below, however, uncertainty regarding the future political arrangements of the state and fear of what one's former adversary will do when unconstrained by a third party provides a rational reason for continuing to identify with ethnic kin.
83. The term is Zartman's; see, for example, I. William Zartman, "The Unfinished Agenda: Negotiating Internal Conflicts," in Licklider, Stopping the Killing, 24.
84. Robert Harrison Wagner, "The Causes of Peace," in ibid., 261.
85. For an explanation of ethnic competition along similar lines, see Robert H. Bates, "Modernization, Ethnic Competition, and the Rationality of Politics in Contemporary Africa," in State Versus Ethnic Claims: African Policy Dilemmas, ed. Donald Rothchild and Victor A. Olorunsola (Boulder: Westview Press, 1983), 152-71.
86. Lijphart, "Consociational Democracy," and Lijphart, "The Power-Sharing Approach," in Montville, Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies, 491-509.
87. See also Sisk, Power Sharing and International Mediation.
88. Svante E. Cornell, "Autonomy as a Source of Conflict: Caucasian Conflicts in Theoretical Perspective," World Politics 54, no. 2 (January 2002): 247.
89. See also Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild, "Stabilizing the Peace After Civil War," 191. In an autonomous or federal solution, an ethnic group gains control of governmental structures that have both symbolic and practical power, fulfilling group aspirations for greater independence and providing members with tangible benefits, such as the ability to conduct business and education in the native tongue, keep more tax revenue at home, and access to expanded job opportunities in the regional bureaucracy that were previously unavailable. The difference between the two is that regional autonomy grants these powers only to the particular region in question whereas the rest of the state remains unitary, while in a federal solution all regions of the state are given substantial powers of self-government, a bicameral legislature is created at the center having an upper house in which the regions are represented equally regardless of population, and a judiciary is established to adjudicate disputes between the federal and regional authorities.
90. Sudanese president Jaafar al-Nimeiri frequently violated the details of the autonomy agreement that ended his government's civil war with the country's Christian South in 1972, finally provoking a new war by re-dividing the region into three provinces in 1983. See Kasfir, "Peacemaking and Social Cleavages in Sudan." Other examples of autocracies revoking autonomy agreements include Pakistan (Baluchistan, 1973) and Yugoslavia (Kosovo and Vojvodina, 1989).
91. India provides an example, as central authorities have repeatedly dissolved regional governments and instituted presidential rule to crack down on ethnic unrest. Thus, regional governments in India ultimately serve at the pleasure of New Delhi.
92. Stedman has coined the term spoilers to describe such actors: Stephen John Stedman, "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes," International Security 22, no. 2 (fall 1997): 5-53.
93. See Alicia Levine, "Political Accommodation and the Prevention of Secessionist Violence," in Brown, International Dimensions of Internal Conflict, 332. Gurr ("Ethnic Warfare on the Wane," 56) argues that autonomy rarely leads groups to make greater demands, and is thus not a slippery slope toward independence.
94. Toft, Geography of Ethnic Violence, 26-29.
95. For statistical support for this finding, see R. William Ayres and Stephen Saideman, "Is Separatism as Contagious as the Common Cold or as Cancer?" Nationalism & Ethnic Politics 6, no. 3 (autumn 2000): 91-113. State leaders thus usually prefer to oppose rebel groups militarily to discourage other secession-minded groups that might view the government's cutting a deal as a sign of weakness. Offers of autonomy to groups in traditionally unitary states can also provoke conflict within the government over the appropriateness of autonomy as a solution.
96. See Keith B. Richburg, "France Split on Self-Rule for Corsica," Washington Post, 1 October 2000, a23.
97. As one scholar puts it, "The institution of autonomous regions is conducive to secessionism because institutionalizing and promoting the separate identity of a titular group increases that group's cohesion and willingness to act, and establishing political institutions increases the capacity of that group to act" (Cornell, "Autonomy as a Source of Conflict," 252, emphasis in original). Following the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, for example, the only states to undergo partition were federal ones: Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union. See Valerie Bunce, "Subversive Institutions: The End of the Soviet State in Comparative Perspective," Post-Soviet Affairs 14, no. 4 (October-December 1998): 323-54;
98. Bunce, "Peaceful versus Violent State Dismemberment: A Comparison of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia," Politics & Society 27, no. 2 (June 1999): 217-37;
99. and Philip G. Roeder, "Soviet Federalism and Ethnic Mobilization," World Politics 43, no. 2 (January 1991): 196-232.
100. This is because federal structures in those countries "provid[ed] an excellent organizational base for political leaders to exploit with nationalist appeals once the center began to weaken" (Robert H. Dorff, "Federalism in Eastern Europe: Part of the Solution or Part of the Problem?" Publius 24, no. 2 [spring 1994]: 104). Within the former Soviet republics in the Caucasus, moreover, regional autonomy was an excellent predictor of ethnic rebellion as those states became independent in the late 1980s/early 1990s (Cornell, "Autonomy as a Source of Conflict"). Regional autonomy also supplies the group with the experience of self government, which by itself can be significant, and opens up "multiple, competing political arenas rather than a common political space" when states democratize.
101. On the former, see Gail W. Lapidus and Edward W. Walker, "Nationalism, Regionalism, and Federalism: Center-Periphery Relations in Post-Communist Russia," in The New Russia: Troubled Transformation, ed. Gail W. Lapidus (Boulder: Westview, 1995), 87.
102. For the latter, see Carol Skalnik Leff "Democratization and Disintegration in Multinational States: The Breakup of the Communist Federations," World Politics 51, no. 2 (January 1999): 207.
103. These dynamics were documented in the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia and Soviet Union. In Yugoslavia, Slovenia and Croatia were the more advanced republics, while the Baltic and Caucasian republics were relatively advanced in the Soviet Union. For details on Yugoslavia, see Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1995);
104. for the USSR, see Roeder, "Soviet Federalism and Ethnic Mobilization."
105. As Charles King puts it, "such attempts run against the tide of history" (King, Ending Civil Wars, 25).
106. Twenty-two percent remain unresolved. When these conflicts are included, decisive victories account for 60 percent and negotiated settlements 18 percent, (Committing to Peace, 169-70).
107. Walter's full dataset may be found at http://www-irps.ucsd.edu/irps/ faculty/bfwalter/data.html. I coded a war as having resumed if fighting broke out again between the same combatants over the same issues, whether within the five year limit generally used to define successful settlements or after. These codings were based on Licklider, "Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars," and Sambanis, "Partition as a Solution to Ethnic War." Monica Toft's work produces similar results: 60 percent of civil wars end in victory, 18 percent in negotiated agreements, and 9 percent in cease-fires or stalemates. Of these types of termination, 12 percent of the victories experienced renewed warfare whereas 29 percent of negotiated settlements broke down into war (as did 33 percent of cease-fires; Toft, "Peace Through Victory?" 9, 11).
108. The three failures are Lebanon (1958), Sudan (1972), Croatia (1992), while the three successes are Zimbabwe (1979), Mozambique (1992), and Bosnia (1995). Zimbabwe experienced a war (1982-87) after its negotiated settlement, but it was between former allies who turned against each other after settling with their common enemy. For more on such cases, see Pierre M. Atlas and Roy Licklider, "Conflict Among Former Allies After Civil War Settlement: Sudan, Zimbabwe, Chad, and Lebanon," Journal of Peace Research 36, no. 1 (January 1999): 35-54.
109. The failures in Licklider's dataset are Cyprus (1964), India (1948, 1965), Lebanon (1958, 1976), and Sudan (1972); the successes are Chad (1987), Cyprus (1974), and Zimbabwe (1984). No ideological civil wars re-started no matter how they were settled (Licklider, "Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars," 688-89, 686). The failure rates for negotiated settlements in ethnic wars in Walter's and Licklider's data roughly coincide with the 58 percent rate I found in a previous work (Downes, "Holy Land Divided," 90). Although the codings of each particular analyst are somewhat different, the fact that they tend to converge in the same range gives us greater confidence in the finding (for a similar conclusion, see King, Ending Civil Wars, 25).
110. Walter (Committing to Peace, 94-95) found that unless accompanied by a third-party guarantee, power sharing failed to end civil wars in eight of ten cases.
111. Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions," 160. Cases with violence continuing after autonomy are the Nagas and Tripuras vs. India, Basques vs. Spain, Palestinians vs. Israel, Moros vs. Philippines, Chittagong vs. Bangladesh, and Abkhazians vs. Georgia. The sole success is the Miskito Indians vs. Nicaragua.
112. Gurr, Peoples versus States, 198-202.
113. The four successes are Mizos vs. India, Miskitos vs. Nicaragua, Gagauz vs. Moldova, and Tuaregs vs. Mali. Chittagong vs. Bangladesh (1997, different from the 1989 agreement cited in note 52) was originally counted as a success, but I recoded it as a failure owing to the fact that the government has failed to implement the autonomy provisions of the peace agreement, which has sparked renewed violence.
114. See Sharier Khan, "Hill Violence Threatens Bangladesh Peace Treaty," OneWorld.net at http://www.oneworld.net/arficle/view/76728/1. Of the 20 non-successes, low-level conflict continued in three; serious conflict erupted after autonomy was granted in two; serious conflict resumed after a period of inactivity in six; and serious conflict continued with no cessation in seven. Two others were suppressed by third party occupation, hence no judgment is possible (Downes, "Holy Land Divided," 94-96). Several studies, however, have found that the inclusion of autonomy in a negotiated settlement reduces the likelihood of the country experiencing another conflict (Hartzell, "Explaining the Stability of Negotiated Settlements," 15-18, Rothchild and Hartzell, "Security in Deeply Divided Societies," 266-67, and Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild, "Stabilizing the Peace After Civil War," 196-201). These datasets, however, are flawed for two reasons. First, they include far more negotiated settlements than previous studies because they code any war that ended after a process of negotiations as a negotiated settlement no matter what the battlefield outcome. This problem leads the authors to code several stalemates or military victories as negotiated settlements, which in turn causes a number of false positives for autonomy as these victories or deadlocks have proven stable (examples include Azerbaijan 1994 [Nagorno-Karabakh], Croatia 1995, and Georgia 1992 and 1994 [South Ossetia and Abkhazia]). Second, the coding rules are biased in favor of agreement success: negotiated settlements that broke down into war after more than five years are excluded, as are settlements in which the parties did not fully implement the agreement (the 1993 Arusha Accords in Rwanda are excluded, for example).
115. Frank S. Cohen, "Proportional Versus Majoritarian Ethnic Conflict Management in Democracies," Comparative Political Studies 30, no. 5 (October 1997): 625;
116. and Stephen M. Saideman et al., "Democratization, Political Institutions, and Ethnic Conflict: A Pooled Time-Series Analysis," Comparative Political Studies 35, no. 1 (February 2002): 118-20. The first of these studies examined only democracies and did not control for wealth. The second study controlled for income but found that federalism in democracies had no significant effect on rebellion, contradicting the earlier analysis. Moreover, the authors of the second study note that federalism was sensitive to changes in other variables in the model (ibid., 120n34).
117. Alexander B. Downes, "Federalism and Ethnic Rebellion: A Quantitative Analysis" (unpub. ms., University of Chicago, May 2000);
118. and James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and War," (unpub. ms., Stanford University, 30 March 2000), 30.
119. The unit of analysis in the MAR dataset is the ethnic group, but not all ethnic groups are included, and the sample that is included is not random. Groups must have suffered or bedefited from discrimination in the past or present, or be politiocally mobilized to make it into the study (Gurr, Minorities at Risk, 6-7). These criteria probably bias the sample toward higher levels of conflict.
120. I defend this controversial recommendation further in the article's conclusion.
121. Wagner, "Causes of Peace," in Licklider, ed., Stopping the Killing, 260-63;
122. Toft, "Peace Through Victory?" 31-32.
123. Edward N. Luttwak, "Give War a Chance," Foreign Affairs 78, no. 4 (July/August 1999): 36.
124. While Kaufmann agrees that formal partition will often accompany demographic separation in practice, he does not prefer independent states, arguing instead that autonomy is sufficient once separation is achieved (Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions," 162; and "When All Else Fails," 123n7). Kaufmann offers no theoretical basis for this assertion, however; his argument is grounded solely in demography, not institutions.
125. For a more detailed exposition of the argument for partition, see Downes, "Holy Land Divided," 74-77.
126. Technically, Kosovo would be part of the "Union of Serbia and Montenegro," as of February 2003 the successor to Yugoslavia.
127. It should be noted, however, that the length and intensity of the Bosnian war, and the long history of Albanian dissent and Serb repression in Kosovo, makes these cases relatively strong ones for my argument as well.
128. See, for example, Ivo H. Daalder, "Bosnia After SFOR: Options for Continued US Engagement," Survival 39, no. 4 (winter 1997 /98): 5-18;
129. Jane M.O. Sharp, "Dayton Report Card," International Security 22, no. 3 (winter 1997/98): 101-37;
130. Charles G. Boyd, "Making Bosnia Work," Foreign Affairs 77, no. 1 (January/February 1998):42-55;
131. Gideon Rose, "The Exit Strategy Delusion," Foreign Affairs 77, no. 1 (January/February 1998): 56-67;
132. Warren Bass, "The Triage of Dayton," Foreign Affairs 77, no. 5 (September/October, 1998): 95-108;
133. Michael O'Hanlon, "Turning the Bosnia Cease-Fire into Peace," Brookings Review 16, no. 1 (winter 1998): 41-44;
134. Gary Dempsey, Rethinking the Dayton Agreement: Bosnia Three Years Later (Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute, 1998);
135. Ivo H. Daalder and Michael B.G. Froman, "Dayton's Incomplete Peace," Foreign Affairs 78, no. 6 (November/December 1999): 106-13;
136. Elizabeth M. Cousens and Charles K. Cater, Toward Peace in Bosnia: Implementing the Dayton Accords (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001);
137. and Sumantra Bose, Bosnia After Dayton: Nationalist Partition and International Intervention (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).
138. The Croat share of Bosnia's population, approximately 17 percent before the war, was estimated in 1999 at 8 percent and falling. See International Crisis Group (ICG), Preventing Minority Return in Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Anatomy of Hate and Fear (Sarajevo: August 1999), 3. All of the ICG reports referenced in this article are available at ICG's website, http://www.crisisweb.org.
139. A survey of Serb university students in 2000 found that 74 percent preferred either independence for the Serb region of Bosnia or union with Serbia. See ICG, Bosnia's November Elections: Dayton Stumbles (Sarajevo: December 2000),19. Similarly, in a referendum in November 2000, 99 percent of the Bosnian Croats who voted (turnout was 71 percent) supported the creation of a "third entity" that would be dominated by Bosnian Croats and which eventually might join Croatia proper
140. (Bose, Bosnia After Dayton, 29).
141. David Chandler, Bosnia: Faking Democracy After Dayton, 2nd ed. (London: Pluto, 2000), 197.
142. ICG, Bosnia's November Elections, ii.
143. The best work on the war's origins, conduct, and endgame is Steven L. Burg and Paul S. Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention (Armonk, N.Y: M. E. Sharpe, 1999).
144. See http://www.euforbih.org.
145. The Dayton Peace Accords: General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Annex 10, Article V, available at OHR'S website, http://www.ohr.int.
146. The PIC is the international body, composed of representatives of the major Western countries, that oversees implementation of the DPA.
147. Sgt. Peter Fitzgerald, "The Armed Forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina," SFOR Informer Online no. 127, 28 November 2001 http://www.nato.int.sfor/indexinf/127/content.htm.
148. The VF and VRS are in the process of reducing their numbers to 8,000 and 4,000, respectively (SFOR, Main News Summary, 4 February 2004, at http://www.nato.int/sfor/media/2004/ms040204.htm).
149. Peace Implementation Council, "Part VIII: Military and Security Issues," Annex to the Madrid Declaration of the Peace Implementation Council (Madrid, Spain: 16 December 1998), at http:// www.ohr.int/pic/default.asp?content_id=5191.
150. "The Delicate Balkan Balance," The Economist, 19 August 2000, 42.
151. Nicholas Wood, "Bosnian Serb Premier Quits, Criticizing West," New York Times, 18 December 2004, A5.
152. OHR Press Release, "High Representative Maps Out Process to Tackle War Criminal Networks and to Reform BiH's Security Institutions," at http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/pressr/default.asp? content_id=33742.
153. Nick Thorpe, "Croatian Soldiers Mutiny in Bosnia," The Guardian (London), 29 March 2001, 17.
154. Bose, Bosnia After Dayton, 77-78.
155. Chandler, Bosnia, 160.
156. Ibid., 195.
157. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) was designated to organize and oversee the balloting, but it was "overwhelmed" by and "unprepared" for the task. Moreover, conditions in the country were far from ideal: refugee return had not yet begun, intimidation and fraud were rampant, and nationalist propaganda dominated the airwaves. See Paul Shoup, "The Elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina: The End of an Illusion," Problems of Post-Communism 44, no. 1 (January-February 1997), 7, 10.
158. OSCE chair Flavio Cotti initially refused to certify that free and fair elections were possible. Under heavy pressure from the US, though, Cotti reversed himself and the elections went forward (Cousens and Cater, Toward Peace in Bosnia, 113-14).
159. Chandler, Bosnia, 70.
160. Between them, the SDA and HDZ garnered 80.7 percent of the votes for the FBiH Parliament, while the SDA, SDS, and SRS (Serb Radical Party, an ultra-nationatist party led by Vojislav Šešelj), took 78.3 percent of the votes for the RS Assembly (ibid., 72, 75).
161. ICG, Is Dayton Failing?: Bosnia Four Years After the Peace Agreement (Sarajevo: 28 October 1999), 13.
162. Cousens and Cater, Toward Peace in Bosnia, 115.
163. ICG Is Dayton Failing?, 14;
164. and Michael Pugh and Margaret Cobble, "Non-Nationalist Voting in the Bosnian Municipal Elections: Implications for Democracy and
165. ICG, Is Dayton Failing?, 13-14.
166. Pugh and Cobble, "Non-Nationalist Voting in the Bosnian Municipal Elections," 31, 39.
167. A special election took place in the RS in November 1997 after president Biljana Plavšić dissolved the RS Assembly. Owing to the split in the SDS caused by Plavšić's defection and subsequent formation of the Serb People's Alliance (SNS), the SDS lost its parliamentary majority. In the ensuing struggle to form a government, Plavšić - with the connivance of the IC - succeeded in excluding the SDS and SRS. Plavšić proposed Milorad Dodik for prime minister, head of the Independent Social Democrats (SNSD), which had garnered only two seats. When the nationalist parties adjourned the session for the night on 17 January 1998 and walked out, those remaining reconvened the session, and SFOR intercepted a legislator who had headed home but who was needed to provide a majority for Dodik.
168. ICG, Is Dayton Failing?, 15. Although she was embraced by the West and trumpeted as a moderate, Plavšić was later indicted and convicted of war crimes by ICTY and is currently serving an eleven-year sentence. Poplasen, who defeated her in the 1998 balloting, was removed from office by High Representative Carlos Westendorp for obstructing the DPA's implementation in March 1999.
169. United States Information Agency, Public Opinion in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Vol. V (Washington, D.C.: Office of Research and Media Reaction, 1998), 35-37.
170. ICG, Bosnia's Municipal Elections 2000: Winners and Losers (Sarajevo: April 2000), 14. This strong nationalist showing is even more notable given that the OSCE barred the SRS from participating.
171. The SDA won alone in twenty-four municipalities, and in coalition with SBiH in fifteen others.
172. It should be noted that the SDP's appeal is limited to the Bosniak area of the federation; the party did not obtain a significant percentage of votes in any municipality where Bosnian Croats or Serbs constituted a majority.
173. The SDA and SDP finished neck-and-neck in both the Bosnian and Federation Assemblies with the SBiH trailing about ten points behind.
174. This coalition, which included ten moderate parties, fell apart in June 2002 and did not contest the October election as a group.
175. IGC, Bosnia's November Elections, ii.
176. US Secretary of State Colin Powell, for example, warned on the eve of the election that Bosnians could vote for reform and integration into Europe, or "elect to go back down the dark and dangerous road to ethnic division, economic stagnation and international isolation." Quoted in Nicholas Wood, "Nationalists Take Lead in Bosnian Elections," Washington Post, 8 October 2002, A17. The US then refused to work with the nationalist government.
177. Election results for 2002 may be accessed at http://www.izbori.ba.
178. The SDP candidate for the state presidency, for example, came in a distant third behind the SDA's Tihić and Silajdžić of the SBiH with about 17.5 percent of the vote, and the SDP now ranks third among parties which draw their primary support from the Bosniak population.
179. The HDZ's Dragan Čović won the presidency slot with 61.5 percent of the vote, while the party formed the second largest bloc in both the state and entity House of Representatives with five and sixteen seats, respectively.
180. Dragan Cavić became the RS president, and Mirko Sarović won the Serb spot on the country's presidency, although he was forced to resign in 2003 after a scandal over selling weapons to Iraq. Overall, the nationalist parties combined obtained about 45 percent of the vote. See OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Bosnia and Herzegovina: General Elections, 5 October 2002, Final Report (Warsaw: 9 January 2003), 20, at http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/2003/01/ 1188_en.pdf. Former RS prime minister Milorad Dodik's more moderate party, the SNSD, did make a comeback, however, and is now the second largest party after the SDS among Serbs after polling about 22 percent in the various races.
181. See the European Forum for Democracy and Solidarity web page on Bosnia, at http://www.europeanforum.net/country_updates/ bosnia_herzegovina_update.
182. Bose, Bosnia After Dayton, 209.
183. See ibid., 220-38, for an excellent analysis of this issue.
184. For a full description of Bosnia's institutional structure, see ibid., 60-89.
185. See "A Survey of the Balkans," The Economist, 7,
186. Chandler, Bosnia, 64;
187. and the OHR web page on the decisions of the High Representative in the area of state symbols and state-level matters, http://www.ohr.int/ decisions/statemattersdec/archive.asp.
188. Speech by the High Representative, Wolfgang Petritsch, to the United Nations Security Council, New York, 9 May 2000 (http://www.ohr.int/ ohr-dept/presso/presssp/default.asp?content_id=3236).
189. See http://www.ohr.int/decisions/archive.asp.
190. Paddy Ashdown, 26th Report of the High Representative for Implementation of the Peace Agreement to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, 18 November 2004, at http://www.ohr.int/other-doc/ hr-reports/default.asp?content_id=33537.
191. Wood, "Bosnian Serb Premier Quits, Criticizing West."
192. Chandler, Bosnia, 204.
193. Petritsch basically conceded this point in 1999: "But our presence here has inadvertantly absolved them [Bosnian politicians] of their responsibilities as democratically elected leaders. We enable the local politicians to fight their tribalistic battles, and then to place the blame for potentially unpopular compromises squarely on the shoulders of foreigners. I call this the 'dependency syndrome'." Wolfgang Petritsch, "The Future of Bosnia Lies with its People," Wall Street Journal Europe, 17 September 1999, at http:// www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/pressa/default.asp?content_id=3188.
194. Ashdown, 26th Report of the High Representative.
195. Spear, "Disarmament and Demobilization of Warring Factions," 12.
196. The percentage of Serbs in the territory that now comprises the RS, for example, rose from 54 percent in 1991 to 97 percent in 1997, while the proportion of Serbs in the FBiH dropped from 18 to 2 percent. Robert M. Hayden, "Bosnia Ten Years After 'Independence': The Dictatorship of the Protectariate Under Civicist Self-Management," EES Special Report, May 2002, 4.
197. ICG, Is Dayton Failing?, 32.
198. See Catherine Phuong, "Freely to Return: Reversing Ethnic Cleansing in Bosnia-Herzegovina," Journal of Refugee Studies 13, no. 2 (June 2000): 165-83.
199. For a skeptical view of the priority placed on minority returns, see Richard Black, "Return and Reconstruction in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Missing Link or Mistaken Priority?" SAIS Review 21, no. 2 (summer-fall 2001): 177-99.
200. These figures can be found in ICG, Is Dayton Failing?, 32-33.
201. Most minority returns (64.7 percent, or 65,159 people) took place in Bosniak-dominated municipalities (ibid., 33). OHR's Reconstruction and Return Task Force characterized the pattern of returns as follows in March 1998: "Few people have returned to areas where they would be ethnic minorities, and such 'minority returns' are often localized in the Zone of Separation, and correspond to elderly individuals or large groups with strong international back up" (OHR Reconstruction and Return Task Force, Report [March 1998], "Executive Summary," at http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/rrtf/key-docs/reports/ default.asp?content_id=5612).
202. ICG, Is Dayton Failing?, 34. Inadequate housing made increasing the rate of returns extremely difficult, since many homes were damaged or destroyed during the war, or are now occupied by members of another ethnic group driven from elsewhere in Bosnia. ICG estimated that "up to 50% of the entire housing stock was destroyed during the war" (ibid., 37). Moreover, the war accelerated the process of urbanization already underway in Bosnia, and made residents of remote villages dependent on agriculture for a living reluctant to go back.
203. See OHR Reconstruction and Return Task Force, Report (March 1998), "Current Situation."
204. All of these figures are updated through the end of October 2004, and may be found at UNHCR's Bosnia website, http://www.unhcr.ba, under the heading "statistics."
205. See, for example, Speech by the High Representative, Wolfgang Petritsch, to the United Nations Security Council, New York, 9 May 2000 http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/pressa/default.asp? content_id=3236;
206. Wolfgang Petritsch, "Don't Abandon the Balkans," New York Times, 25 March 2001, section 4, 15;
207. Petritsch, "We Must Stay the Course in BiH," Wall Street Journal Europe, 12 June 2001 http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/ pressa/default.asp?content_id=3153;
208. Petritsch, "Islam is Part of the West, Too," New York Times, 20 November 2001, A19;
209. Joseph Biden, "Nation Building? Yes," New York Times, 25 January 2001, A23;
210. Lord Robertson, "The Work Ahead in Bosnia," New York Times, 25 November 2000, A19.
211. ICG, Is Dayton Failing?, 36.
212. Bose, Bosnia After Dayton, 35-36.
213. ICG, Bosnia's Refugee Logjam Breaks: Is the International Community Ready? (Sarajevo: May 2000), 3. Some younger people have returned to urban areas, taking advantage of new property laws instituted by OHR in 1998 that allow authorities to evict current residents and let homeowners reclaim their property.
214. Figures are from ICG, The Wages of Sin: Confronting Bosnia's Republika Srpska (Sarajevo: October 2001), 38. In Banja Luka, one man was killed, a minimum of 34 were injured, and hundreds of international officials and Bosniaks visiting for the ceremony were trapped inside the local Islamic Community Center (ibid., 33-36).
215. UNHCR, "Update on Donditions for Return to Bosnia and Herzegovina," January 2005, at http://www.unhcr.ba/publications/ B&HRET0105.pdf.
216. ICG, The Continuing Challenge of Refugee Return in Bosnia & Herzegovina (Sarajevo: December 2002), 18.
217. UNHCR, "Update on Conditions for Return to Bosnia and Herzegovina."
218. Ibid. More than half of all Bosnians reported in mid-2002 that they did not earn enough money to meet their own needs or those of their families (ICG. Continuing Challenge of Refugee Return, 15).
219. Ibid., 15 (emphasis in orginal).
220. For details on this problem. see ICG. Bosnia's Refugee Logjam Breaks, 7-11.
221. ICG, Continuing Challenge of Refugee Return, 7.
222. Ibid., 11.
223. Ibid., 20.
224. In addition, the political-territorial structure set up by the DPA, combined with refugee return, raises the danger that the majority populations of each entity may perceive their dominant status to be under threat by minority returns. As outlined earlier, this is one of two mechanisms that can lead to majority-group violence in a federal state. The dangers of this process argue strongly for limiting minority returns to a small percentage of each entity's population, such that the majority group will not feel its power under siege.
225. Five hundred thousand of Bosnia's 1.3 million refugees had found "durable solutions" outside the country by 1998, and 62 percent of young people surveyed in 2000 "expressed the desire to leave the country if they could" (Bose, Bosnia After Dayton, 37).
226. Ibid., 36.
227. A similar plan advocated by Robert Pape would displace about 200,000 Serbs and some tens of thousands of Bosniaks. See Robert A. Pape, "Partition: An Exit Strategy for Bosnia," Survival 39, no. 4 (winter 1997/98): 25-28.
228. An alternative plan - to amputate the western half of the RS - would drastically shorten the Serb-Bosniak border, but would force the Serbs to abandon their capital city and require two-thirds of the RS population to leave. See Daalder, "Bosnia After SFOR."
229. Besides warnings from the various High Representatives, see Carl Bildt, "There is no Alternative to Dayton," Survival 39, no. 4 (winter 1997): 19-21.
230. For these numbers, see Ivo H. Daalder and Michael O'Hanlon, Winningg Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2000), 151.
231. On the origins and conduct of the war, see Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2000),
232. Kelly M. Greenhill, "The Use of Refugees as Political and Military Weapons in the kosovo Conflict" in Yugoslavia Unraveled: Sovereignty, Self Determination, Intervention, ed. Raju G.C. Thomas (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2003), 205-42;
233. and Wesley K. Clark, Waging Modern War (New York: Public Affairs, 2001).
234. UNMIK reported that 211,000 people, "mostly Serbs," fled Kosovo after the war ended. See UNMIK, "UNMIK 1st Anniversary Backgrounder - Returns - 5 June 2000," at http://www. unmikonline.org/1styear/returnees.htm. The Yugoslav Red Cross registered 247,391 people who had fled or been expelled from Kosovo by November 1999 (Judah, Kosovo, 287).
235. Ibid., 294.
236. UNHCR Breifing Notes, "Kosovo Minorities Still need International Protection says UNHCR," 24 August 2004, at http://www.unhcr.ch/ cgi-bin/texis/vtx/country?iso=yug&expand=news.
237. HCK, The Follow Up, 6.
238. ICG, A Kosovo Roadmap (1): Addressing Final Status (Pristina: March 2002), 6.
239. ICG, Return to Uncertainty: Kosovo's Internally Displaced and the Return Process (Pristina: December 2002), 1.
240. These drives have largely failed, the last one in fall 2003 collecting a paltry 155 guns. See "Geneva-Based Organization Says Kosovo Weapons Collection Drive Has Failed," BBC Monitoring Europe, 6 December 2003.
241. Quoted in Arie Farnam, "Gun Culture Stymies the UN in Kosovo," Christian Science Monitor, 26 September 2003, 8.
242. Judah, Kosovo, 299.
243. KFOR troops seized weapons stockpiles in March, May, and June of 2000, the last of these yielding a haul of some 70 tons. See Philip Shenon, "U.S. Troops Seize Weapons from Albanians in Kosovo," New, York Times, 16 March 2000, A1;
244. Shennon, "U.S. Soldiers Seize Weapons in Kosovo," ibid., 20 May 2000, A8;
245. and Steven Erlanger, "Aide Takes Stock of U.N. in Kosovo," ibid., 17 July 2000, A1.
246. Arms seizures continued in 2001, primarily of weapons moving from Kosovo to Albanian rebels in Macedonia, but did not end with the dampening of that conflict. See "KFOR Discovers Large Arms Cache in Southern Kosovo," BBC Monitoring Europe, 28 August 2002;
247. and "KFOR Seizes 'Large' Arms Cache in Areas Populated 'Solely' by Kosovo Albanians," Global News Wire, 9 April 2003.
248. Daalder and O'Hanlon, Winning Ugly, 178. "To all intents and purposes;" comments Judah, "the KPC is the KLA in mothballs" (Judah, Kosovo, 300).
249. See Tim Judah, "Greater Albania?" and Alexander Yannis, "Kosovo Under International Administration," Survival 43, no. 2 (summer 2001): 11 and 39, respectively, as well as Steven Erlanger, "Adrift in the Balkans," New York Times, 12 March 2001, A1.
250. See Steven Erlanger, "Torn Mitrovica Reflects West's Trials in K'osovo," New York Times, 27 February 2000, 16.
251. It is widely believed among Serbs that Kosovo's international administrators are biased in favor of the majority Albanians. See, for example, Daniel Simpson, "A Restive Kosovo, Officially Still Serbian, Squirms Under the Status Quo," New York Times, 29 December 2002, 14.
252. OSCE/UNHCR, Tenth Assessment of the Situation of Ethnic Minorities in Kosovo (March 2003), 12, at http://www.unmikonline.org/press/reports/ MinorityAssessmentReport10ENG.pdf.
253. For examples from the last quarter of 2002, see ibid., 14-26.
254. Notable violent incidents in 2003 included the shooting of two young Serb men while swimming in the Bistrica River and an incident in which local Serbs threw stones at the Kosovar prime minister. See "New Violence Feared in Kosovo After Death of 2 Serbian Youths," New York Times, 15 August 2003, A4;
255. and "Rocks Thrown at Kosovan PM," The Gazette (Montreal), 7 December 2003, A12.
256. Irena Guzelova, "Mitrovica Arms Hunt Sparks Attack on KFOR," Financial Times, 21 February 2000, 6.
257. Julie A. Mertus, Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 319. The same survey reported that 65 percent of Albanians did not believe the two populations could live together in one state, while the same percentage believed that Serbs wanted all Albanians to leave Kosovo (ibid., 319-20).
258. Daalder and O'Hanlon, Winning Ugly, 186-87.
259. HCK, The Kosovo Report, 264-65.
260. Jacques Rupnik, "Yugoslavia After Milosevic," Survival 43, no. 2 (summer 2001): 25.
261. Carlotta Gall, "As Albanians Flock to Polls, Serbs Lie Low," New York Times, 29 October 2000, A1.
262. Melinda Henneberger, "Serb Turnout in Kosovo Vote Seen as an Encouraging Step," New York Times, 20 November 2001, A8. Ten of these seats were guaranteed by the electoral laws. I thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out. The OSCE's Kosovo division has the election results on its website at http://www.osce.org/kosovo/ elections.
263. Melinda Henneberger, "Albanian Moderate's Party Wins Peaceful Kosovo Election," New, York Times, 18 November 2001, A14.
264. Rupnik, "Yugoslavia After Milosevic," 22-23.
265. Henneberger, "Serb Turnout in Kosovo Vote Seen as an Encouraging Step."
266. Quoted in Roger Cohen, "In Balkans Again, Promises, Promises," New, York Times, 14 October 1998, A1. Prominent international officials also expressed support for autonomy after the war. As Carlos Westendorp, High Representative in Bosnia at the time, put it, "The only possible solution for Kosovo, once those ethnically-cleansed have been returned to their homes, is the eventual establishment of an autonomous state within Serbia (or Yugoslavia). Autonomy is a necessary condition for a lasting peace, though it cannot bring peace on its own."
267. Carlos Westendorp, "Lessons Bosnia Taught Us," Wall Street Journal, 19 May 1999 http://www.ohr.int/ohrdept/presso/pressa/ default.asp?content_id=3182.
268. Daalder and O'Hanlon, Winning Ugly, 25.
269. The other three factors would be the opinions of "relevant authorities," the efforts of the parties to implement Rambouillet, and the Helsinki Final Act (which guarantees the territorial integrity of states; ibid., 82;
270. and Judah, Kosovo, 213-14).
271. Michael Mandelbaum, "A Perfect Failure: NATO's War Against Yugoslavia," Foreign Affairs 78, no. 5 (September/October 1999): 5.
272. Michael Ignatieff, "The Reluctant Imperialist," New York Times Magazine, 6 August 2000, 47.
273. Christian Jennings, "War-Ravaged Kosovo Caught in Catch 1244 Situation," Scotland on Sunday, 9 February 2003 24.
274. HCK, The Follow-Up, 7.
275. Quoted in Helena Smith, "Angry Kosovars Call on 'Colonial' UN Occupying Force to Leave," The Observer, 19 October 2003, 21.
276. Yannis, "Kosovo Under International Administration," 37.
277. Quoted in Melinda Henneberger, "Dose of Tolerance in a Kosovo Town," New York Times, 2 December 2001, A12. Daalder and O'Hanlon are quick to point out the "silver lining" in this emigration and segregation: it "has reduced the likelihood of interethnic violence by physically separating those who would commit it from their potential victims"
278. (Daalder and O'Hanlon, Winning Ugly, 177).
279. Kouchner adds that he opposes a permanent division of Mitrovica. See Steven Erlanger, "Fears Grow Over the De Facto Partition of Kosovo," New York Times, 14 November 1999, 1. A Serb teacher, Zoran Virijevic, commented in the same article, Only a suicidal Serb would go to the other side [of Mitrovica]."
280. The Associated Press reported that the September violence in Mitrovica resulted in 184 wounded and 1 dead (an ethnic Albanian). See "K.L.A. Calms Ethnic Riots in Tense Town in Kosovo," New York Times, 12 September 1999, 6.
281. Violence also occurred in October as Albanians clashed with French peacekeepers who barred them from crossing the Ibar. See "French Clash With Albanians in Kosovo Town," New York Times, 16 October 1999, A5.
282. Carlotta Gall, "7 Killed and 9 Hurt in Kosovo Rampage, Worst Since War," New York Times, 5 February 2000, A3;
283. and Gall, "In Riot-Torn Kosovo City, Serbs Force Albanians From Homes," ibid., 12 February 2000, A6.
284. 1,700 Albanians, Turks, and Bosniaks fled the northern section of Mitrovica between 2 and 20 February due to renewed violence. See UNHCR/ OSCE, Update on the Situation of Ethnic Minorities in Kosovo (February-May 2000), 6, at http://www.osce.org/kosovo/documents/reports/ minorities).
285. Irena Guzelova, "Kosovo's Albanians Grow Impatient for Self-Rule," Financial Times, 8 February 2001, 3. This episode set off further unrest throughout Kosovo, peaking with the Albanian attack on the "Nis Express" bus convoy that killed 10 Serbs on 16 February.
286. ICG, UNMIK's Kosovo Albatross: Tackling Division in Mitrovica (Pristina: June 2002), 4-5.
287. ICG, Collapse in Kosovo (Pristina: April 2004), 1.
288. See, for example, the comments of the Under-Secretary of UN for Peacekeeping Operations Jean-Marie Guéhenno to the Security Council at http://www.unmikonline.org/news.htm#1304.
289. Oliver Ivanović, quoted in Adam LeBor, "Troops Pourin as Serbs Flee Kosovo Homes," The Times (London), 20 March 2004, 14.
290. I reject two other options - continued protectorate and autonomy within Yugoslavia - as undesirable and unworkable.
291. For further details on this and other plans for Kosovo's future status, see HCK, The Kosovo Report, chap. 9, Rupnik, "Yugoslavia After Milosevic," and ICG, A Kosovo Roadmap.
292. These territories were taken from Kosovo and added to Serbia shortly after the Second World War, and Serb-majority districts added to northern Kosovo in compensation.
293. It should be noted that in simulated negotiations conducted under the auspices of the United States Institute for Peace, local Serb and Albanian officials also repeatedly chose partition (Simpson, "A Restive Kosovo").
294. Moreover, combining the partition of Bosnia and Kosovo into a single deal, in which the RS acceded to Yugoslavia, would perhaps gain Belgrade's acquiescence in the loss of Kosovo.
295. In the words of the HCK: "It is better, in our view, that the international community develop procedures to accord self-government to these groups under appropriate and justifiable conditions than to maintain an obsolete regime of unalterable state sovereignty ... In such cases ... the international community must not shrink from its responsibility to devise rules for secession and independence which allow persecuted groups to find a constitutional order which grants them security and self government" (HCK, The Kosovo Report, 277-78).
296. Luttwak, "Give War a Chance," 37.
297. Prominent critiques include Robert Schaeffer, Warpaths: The Politics of Partition (New York: Hill and Wang, 1990);
298. Radha Kumar, "The Troubled History of Partition," Foreign Affairs 76, no. 1 (January/February 1997): 22-34;
299. and Sambanis, "Partition as a Solution to Ethnic War."
300. For others see Downes, "Holy Land Divided," 59-60 nn5-8; and 78-89 passim.
301. For a more complete response, see ibid., 77-89.
302. Daniel Byman, "Forever Enemies? The Manipulation of Ethnic Identities to Ethnic Wars," Security Studies 9, no. 3 (spring 2000): 149-90.
303. Sambanis, "Partition as a Solution to Ethnic War," 459-64.
304. Moreover, this argument ignores the existence and prosperity of many micro-states, and is an argument against all small states, whether ethnically homogeneous or multiethnic. See Michael Lind, "In Defense of Liberal Nationalism," Foreign Affairs 73, no. 3 (May/June 1994): 94.
305. As the HCK has commented, "Far from Kosovar independence acting as a domino ... the uncertainty about the future means that there is still everything to play for and that southern Serbia and parts of Macedonia could still enter the equation through changing the facts on the ground. In other words, the recent conflicts could be treated as a consequence of uncertainty, which provides an incentive to try to change the facts on the ground before a final settlement is reached" (HCK, The Follow-Up, 8).
306. Kaufmann, "When All Else Fails."
307. Licklider, "Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars," 686-87;
308. Stedman, "Negotiation and Mediation," 375-76;
309. and King, Ending Civil Wars, 12-13.
310. Wagner, "Causes of Peace," in Licklider, Stopping the Killing, 260;
311. and Walter, "Critical Barrier," 362.
312. Toft, "Peace Through Victory?" 23;
313. and Sambanis, "Partition as a Solution to Ethnic War," 459-64.
314. Nineteen percent of victories in identity wars were followed by genocide, 7 percent of victories in ideological wars had such an outcome, but no genocides occurred after negotiated settlements (Licklider, "Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars," 686-87). Neither of the first two relationships was statistically significant.
315. Matthew Krain, "State-Sponsored Mass Murder: The Onset and Severity of Genocides and Politicides," Journal of Conflict Resolution 41, no. 3 (June 1997): 331-60.