Partition as a solution to ethnic war: An empirical critique of the theoretical literature

World Politics

Volumn 52, Issue 4, 2000, Pages 437-483

  Sambanis, Nicholas ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CONFLICT MANAGEMENT; ETHNIC CONFLICT; PARTITIONING; THEORETICAL STUDY; WAR;

EID: 0033875207     PISSN: 00438871     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0043887100020074     Document Type: Article

References (111)

1. Chaim Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," International Security 20 (Spring 1996); idem, "When All Else Fails," International Security 23 (Fall 1998); John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen Van Evera, "When Peace Means War," New Republic (December 1995).
2. Chaim Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," International Security 20 (Spring 1996); idem, "When All Else Fails," International Security 23 (Fall 1998); John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen Van Evera, "When Peace Means War," New Republic (December 1995).
3. Chaim Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," International Security 20 (Spring 1996); idem, "When All Else Fails," International Security 23 (Fall 1998); John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen Van Evera, "When Peace Means War," New Republic (December 1995).
4. Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 588. See also Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), 44-47; Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), 121; and Samuel P. Huntington, "Civil Violence and the Process of Development," Adelphi Paper no. 83 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1971), 14. Horowitz also discusses dangers of partition (pp. 588-91).
5. Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 588. See also Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), 44-47; Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), 121; and Samuel P. Huntington, "Civil Violence and the Process of Development," Adelphi Paper no. 83 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1971), 14. Horowitz also discusses dangers of partition (pp. 588-91).
6. Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 588. See also Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), 44-47; Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), 121; and Samuel P. Huntington, "Civil Violence and the Process of Development," Adelphi Paper no. 83 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1971), 14. Horowitz also discusses dangers of partition (pp. 588-91).
7. Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 588. See also Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), 44-47; Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), 121; and Samuel P. Huntington, "Civil Violence and the Process of Development," Adelphi Paper no. 83 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1971), 14. Horowitz also discusses dangers of partition (pp. 588-91).
8. Kaufmann (fn. 1, 1996), 137, 139.
9. See Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," World Politics 30 (January 1978). Such suspicion and fear would be supported by actual or perceived state collapse, which transforms the domestic political environment into a near anarchic environment.
10. Barry Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," Survival 35 (Spring 1993).
11. Kaufmann (fn. 1, 1996), 139-47.
12. Ibid., 150.
13. On ethnic diffusion cooperation, see Daniel L. Byman, "Divided They Stand: Lessons about Partition from Iraq and Lebanon," Security Studies 7 (Autumn 1997). On security guarantees and ethnic war termination, see Barbara F. Walter, "The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement," International Organization 51 (Summer 1997). Neither Byman nor Walter is a critic of partition theory (Byman in fact supports partition under certain conditions). Some of their arguments, however, can be read as indirect critiques of the theory.
14. On ethnic diffusion cooperation, see Daniel L. Byman, "Divided They Stand: Lessons about Partition from Iraq and Lebanon," Security Studies 7 (Autumn 1997). On security guarantees and ethnic war termination, see Barbara F. Walter, "The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement," International Organization 51 (Summer 1997). Neither Byman nor Walter is a critic of partition theory (Byman in fact supports partition under certain conditions). Some of their arguments, however, can be read as indirect critiques of the theory.
15. Radha Kumar, "The Troubled History of Partition," Foreign Affairs 76 (January-February 1997).
16. Ibid.; see also Amitai Etzioni, "The Evils of Self-Determination," Foreign Policy 89 (Winter 1992-93); and Robert Schaeffer, Warpaths: The Politics of Partition (New York: Hill and Wang, 1990).
17. Ibid.; see also Amitai Etzioni, "The Evils of Self-Determination," Foreign Policy 89 (Winter 1992-93); and Robert Schaeffer, Warpaths: The Politics of Partition (New York: Hill and Wang, 1990).
18. Ibid.; see also Amitai Etzioni, "The Evils of Self-Determination," Foreign Policy 89 (Winter 1992-93); and Robert Schaeffer, Warpaths: The Politics of Partition (New York: Hill and Wang, 1990).
19. Byman (fn. 9).
20. Ibid.; and Schaeffer (fn. 11).
21. Etzioni (fn. 11);Allen Buchanan "Self-Determination and the Right to Secede," Journal of International Affairs 45 (Winter 1992).
22. Kaufman (fn. 1, 1998).
23. David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, eds., The International Spread of Ethnic Conflicts (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998). More research is needed to fully appreciate the impact of historical examples and of precedential reasoning in ethnic conflict.
24. See Horowitz (fn. 2), 588-91 and chaps. 2, 6.
25. Ibid., 589, emphasis added.
26. See, among others, David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, "Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict," International Security 21 (Fall 1996); V. P. Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia," International Security 19 (Winter 1995); Rui J. P. de Figueiredo and Barry R. Weingast, "The Rationality ot Fear: Political Opportunism and Ethnic Conflict," in Barbara Walter and Jack Snyder, eds., Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999).
27. See, among others, David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, "Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict," International Security 21 (Fall 1996); V. P. Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia," International Security 19 (Winter 1995); Rui J. P. de Figueiredo and Barry R. Weingast, "The Rationality ot Fear: Political Opportunism and Ethnic Conflict," in Barbara Walter and Jack Snyder, eds., Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999).
28. See, among others, David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, "Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict," International Security 21 (Fall 1996); V. P. Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia," International Security 19 (Winter 1995); Rui J. P. de Figueiredo and Barry R. Weingast, "The Rationality ot Fear: Political Opportunism and Ethnic Conflict," in Barbara Walter and Jack Snyder, eds., Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999).
29. David Laitin, "Somalia: Civil War and International Intervention," in Walter and Snyder (fn. 19); and Jack Snyder and Robert Jervis "Civil War and the Security Dilemma," in Walter and Snyder (fn. 19), 19-24.
30. David Laitin, "Somalia: Civil War and International Intervention," in Walter and Snyder (fn. 19); and Jack Snyder and Robert Jervis "Civil War and the Security Dilemma," in Walter and Snyder (fn. 19), 19-24.
31. I do not develop a theory of ethnic cooperation in this paper. I only summarize relevant theoretical arguments to frame my empirical analysis. Thus, this section is not designed to resolve all doubt about the possibility of ethnic cooperation after civil war.
32. Snyder and Jervis (fn. 20), 18. On power sharing, see Timothy Sisk, Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts (Washington, D.C: United States Institute of Peace, 1996).
33. Lake and Rothschild (fn. 19).
34. Snyder and Jervis (fn. 20).
35. In Walter's (fn. 9) argument, the security dilemma depends on an asymmetry of power between the government and rebels. Walter notes that credible external security guarantees are effective, though difficult. The difficulty in proving the credibility of the third party's commitment amounts to indirect support for the partition thesis, though only if partition is proven to be more credible and less difficult to implement than a brokered settlement.
36. De Figuereido and Weingast (fn. 19).
37. The rationalist school is well represented by Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War (New York: Free Press, 1973); and James Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," International Organization 49 (Summer 1995). War should reveal any private information about relative power and resolve, making it less rational for parties to resort to war again rather than to strike a more efficient bargain short of war. That said, we should also consider other explanations of war and weigh them against this argument.
38. The rationalist school is well represented by Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War (New York: Free Press, 1973); and James Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," International Organization 49 (Summer 1995). War should reveal any private information about relative power and resolve, making it less rational for parties to resort to war again rather than to strike a more efficient bargain short of war. That said, we should also consider other explanations of war and weigh them against this argument.
39. Snyder and Jervis (fn. 20); and Laitin (fn. 20).
40. Byman (fn. 9). This argument can backfire. Ethnic balancing can also paralyze the state. For such an argument, see Harrison Wagner, "The Causes of Peace," in Roy Licklider, ed., Stopping the Killing (New York: New York University Press, 1993). Wagner argues that because military victory results in unitary political systems, it will be more stable than any peace agreement based on ethnic balancing. Indeed, the occurrence of an ethnic war suggests a precedent of failed ethnic balancing. In this paper, I present empirical results about the relationship of ethnicity to postwar violence, but that relationship also demands better theorizing.
41. See, e.g., Paul Collier, Ibrahim Elbadawi, and Nicholas Sambanis, "How Much War Will We See? Estimating the Probability of Civil War in 161 Countries" (Manuscript, World Bank, February 2000)
42. Dropping those cases did not affect any of the results presented in later sections.
43. This definition is nearly identical to the definition of a civil war in J. David Singer and Melvin Small, Correlates of War Project: International and Civil War Data, 1816-1992 (Ann Arbor, Mich.: ICPSR, 1994); idem, Resort to Arms (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1982); and Roy Licklider, "The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993," American Political Science Review 89 (September 1995). Unlike them, my coding of wars does not presume one thousand deaths per year, but rather uses the one thousand deaths as the threshold for the entire war. In fact, however, most of my cases have caused one thousand deaths annually. My coding decision was based on the arbitrariness of setting one thousand as the annual death criterion and on the lack of available data on annual deaths in the Correlates of War project. Indeed, the codebook of the ICPSR study, which includes the international and civil war data files for the Correlates of War Project, does not mention an annual death threshold and no annual death data are made available by the authors.
44. This definition is nearly identical to the definition of a civil war in J. David Singer and Melvin Small, Correlates of War Project: International and Civil War Data, 1816-1992 (Ann Arbor, Mich.: ICPSR, 1994); idem, Resort to Arms (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1982); and Roy Licklider, "The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993," American Political Science Review 89 (September 1995). Unlike them, my coding of wars does not presume one thousand deaths per year, but rather uses the one thousand deaths as the threshold for the entire war. In fact, however, most of my cases have caused one thousand deaths annually. My coding decision was based on the arbitrariness of setting one thousand as the annual death criterion and on the lack of available data on annual deaths in the Correlates of War project. Indeed, the codebook of the ICPSR study, which includes the international and civil war data files for the Correlates of War Project, does not mention an annual death threshold and no annual death data are made available by the authors.
45. This definition is nearly identical to the definition of a civil war in J. David Singer and Melvin Small, Correlates of War Project: International and Civil War Data, 1816-1992 (Ann Arbor, Mich.: ICPSR, 1994); idem, Resort to Arms (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1982); and Roy Licklider, "The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993," American Political Science Review 89 (September 1995). Unlike them, my coding of wars does not presume one thousand deaths per year, but rather uses the one thousand deaths as the threshold for the entire war. In fact, however, most of my cases have caused one thousand deaths annually. My coding decision was based on the arbitrariness of setting one thousand as the annual death criterion and on the lack of available data on annual deaths in the Correlates of War project. Indeed, the codebook of the ICPSR study, which includes the international and civil war data files for the Correlates of War Project, does not mention an annual death threshold and no annual death data are made available by the authors.
46. My sources for coding wars include Singer and Small (fn. 32, 1994); Licklider (fn. 32); idem (fn. 29); Peter Wallensteen and Margareta Sollenberg, "Armed Conflicts, Conflict Termination, and Peace Agreements, 1989-1996," Journal of Peace Research 34, no. 3 (1997); Daniel C. Esty et al., "The State Failure Project: Early Warning Research for US Foreign Policy Planning," in John L. Davies and Ted Robert Gurr, eds., Preventive Measures: Building Risk Assessment and Crisis Early Warning Systems (Boulder, Colo., and Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998); David Mason and Patrick Fett, "How Civil Wars End: A Rational Choice Approach," Journal of Conflict Resolution 40 (December 1996); Patrick Regan, "Conditions for Successful Third Party Interventions, "Journal of Conflict Resolution 40, no. 1 (1996); Walter (fn. 9); SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook (http://editors.sipri.se/pubs/yearb.html); Human Rights Watch, World Report (New York and Washington, D.C.: Human Rights Watch, various years). Secondary texts consulted include Robert I. Rotberg, ed., Burma: Prospects for a Democratic Future (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1998); Martin Stuart-Fox, A History of Laos (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); David Callahan, Unwinnable Wars (New York: Hill and Wang, 1997); John O. Iatrides, "The Doomed Revolution: Communist Insurgency in Postwar Greece," in Licklider (fn. 29); Michael W. Doyle, Robert Orr, and Ian Johnstone, eds., Keeping the Peace (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Francis M. Deng, War of Visions: Conflict of Identities in the Sudan (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1999); David McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996); and Nicholas Sambanis, "United Nations Peacekeeping in Theory and in Cyprus: New Conceptual Approaches and Interpretations" (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1999). The most important difference between my coding and that of others concerns the periodization of wars. I have broken what is a single observation of war in other data
47. My sources for coding wars include Singer and Small (fn. 32, 1994); Licklider (fn. 32); idem (fn. 29); Peter Wallensteen and Margareta Sollenberg, "Armed Conflicts, Conflict Termination, and Peace Agreements, 1989-1996," Journal of Peace Research 34, no. 3 (1997); Daniel C. Esty et al., "The State Failure Project: Early Warning Research for US Foreign Policy Planning," in John L. Davies and Ted Robert Gurr, eds., Preventive Measures: Building Risk Assessment and Crisis Early Warning Systems (Boulder, Colo., and Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998); David Mason and Patrick Fett, "How Civil Wars End: A Rational Choice Approach," Journal of Conflict Resolution 40 (December 1996); Patrick Regan, "Conditions for Successful Third Party Interventions, "Journal of Conflict Resolution 40, no. 1 (1996); Walter (fn. 9); SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook (http://editors.sipri.se/pubs/yearb.html); Human Rights Watch, World Report (New York and Washington, D.C.: Human Rights Watch, various years). Secondary texts consulted include Robert I. Rotberg, ed., Burma: Prospects for a Democratic Future (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1998); Martin Stuart-Fox, A History of Laos (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); David Callahan, Unwinnable Wars (New York: Hill and Wang, 1997); John O. Iatrides, "The Doomed Revolution: Communist Insurgency in Postwar Greece," in Licklider (fn. 29); Michael W. Doyle, Robert Orr, and Ian Johnstone, eds., Keeping the Peace (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Francis M. Deng, War of Visions: Conflict of Identities in the Sudan (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1999); David McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996); and Nicholas Sambanis, "United Nations Peacekeeping in Theory and in Cyprus: New Conceptual Approaches and Interpretations" (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1999). The most important difference between my coding and that of others concerns the periodization of wars. I have broken what is a single observation of war in other data
48. My sources for coding wars include Singer and Small (fn. 32, 1994); Licklider (fn. 32); idem (fn. 29); Peter Wallensteen and Margareta Sollenberg, "Armed Conflicts, Conflict Termination, and Peace Agreements, 1989-1996," Journal of Peace Research 34, no. 3 (1997); Daniel C. Esty et al., "The State Failure Project: Early Warning Research for US Foreign Policy Planning," in John L. Davies and Ted Robert Gurr, eds., Preventive Measures: Building Risk Assessment and Crisis Early Warning Systems (Boulder, Colo., and Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998); David Mason and Patrick Fett, "How Civil Wars End: A Rational Choice Approach," Journal of Conflict Resolution 40 (December 1996); Patrick Regan, "Conditions for Successful Third Party Interventions, "Journal of Conflict Resolution 40, no. 1 (1996); Walter (fn. 9); SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook (http://editors.sipri.se/pubs/yearb.html); Human Rights Watch, World Report (New York and Washington, D.C.: Human Rights Watch, various years). Secondary texts consulted include Robert I. Rotberg, ed., Burma: Prospects for a Democratic Future (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1998); Martin Stuart-Fox, A History of Laos (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); David Callahan, Unwinnable Wars (New York: Hill and Wang, 1997); John O. Iatrides, "The Doomed Revolution: Communist Insurgency in Postwar Greece," in Licklider (fn. 29); Michael W. Doyle, Robert Orr, and Ian Johnstone, eds., Keeping the Peace (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Francis M. Deng, War of Visions: Conflict of Identities in the Sudan (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1999); David McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996); and Nicholas Sambanis, "United Nations Peacekeeping in Theory and in Cyprus: New Conceptual Approaches and Interpretations" (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1999). The most important difference between my coding and that of others concerns the periodization of wars. I have broken what is a single observation of war in other data
49. My sources for coding wars include Singer and Small (fn. 32, 1994); Licklider (fn. 32); idem (fn. 29); Peter Wallensteen and Margareta Sollenberg, "Armed Conflicts, Conflict Termination, and Peace Agreements, 1989-1996," Journal of Peace Research 34, no. 3 (1997); Daniel C. Esty et al., "The State Failure Project: Early Warning Research for US Foreign Policy Planning," in John L. Davies and Ted Robert Gurr, eds., Preventive Measures: Building Risk Assessment and Crisis Early Warning Systems (Boulder, Colo., and Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998); David Mason and Patrick Fett, "How Civil Wars End: A Rational Choice Approach," Journal of Conflict Resolution 40 (December 1996); Patrick Regan, "Conditions for Successful Third Party Interventions, "Journal of Conflict Resolution 40, no. 1 (1996); Walter (fn. 9); SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook (http://editors.sipri.se/pubs/yearb.html); Human Rights Watch, World Report (New York and Washington, D.C.: Human Rights Watch, various years). Secondary texts consulted include Robert I. Rotberg, ed., Burma: Prospects for a Democratic Future (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1998); Martin Stuart-Fox, A History of Laos (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); David Callahan, Unwinnable Wars (New York: Hill and Wang, 1997); John O. Iatrides, "The Doomed Revolution: Communist Insurgency in Postwar Greece," in Licklider (fn. 29); Michael W. Doyle, Robert Orr, and Ian Johnstone, eds., Keeping the Peace (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Francis M. Deng, War of Visions: Conflict of Identities in the Sudan (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1999); David McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996); and Nicholas Sambanis, "United Nations Peacekeeping in Theory and in Cyprus: New Conceptual Approaches and Interpretations" (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1999). The most important difference between my coding and that of others concerns the periodization of wars. I have broken what is a single observation of war in other data
50. My sources for coding wars include Singer and Small (fn. 32, 1994); Licklider (fn. 32); idem (fn. 29); Peter Wallensteen and Margareta Sollenberg, "Armed Conflicts, Conflict Termination, and Peace Agreements, 1989-1996," Journal of Peace Research 34, no. 3 (1997); Daniel C. Esty et al., "The State Failure Project: Early Warning Research for US Foreign Policy Planning," in John L. Davies and Ted Robert Gurr, eds., Preventive Measures: Building Risk Assessment and Crisis Early Warning Systems (Boulder, Colo., and Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998); David Mason and Patrick Fett, "How Civil Wars End: A Rational Choice Approach," Journal of Conflict Resolution 40 (December 1996); Patrick Regan, "Conditions for Successful Third Party Interventions, "Journal of Conflict Resolution 40, no. 1 (1996); Walter (fn. 9); SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook (http://editors.sipri.se/pubs/yearb.html); Human Rights Watch, World Report (New York and Washington, D.C.: Human Rights Watch, various years). Secondary texts consulted include Robert I. Rotberg, ed., Burma: Prospects for a Democratic Future (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1998); Martin Stuart-Fox, A History of Laos (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); David Callahan, Unwinnable Wars (New York: Hill and Wang, 1997); John O. Iatrides, "The Doomed Revolution: Communist Insurgency in Postwar Greece," in Licklider (fn. 29); Michael W. Doyle, Robert Orr, and Ian Johnstone, eds., Keeping the Peace (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Francis M. Deng, War of Visions: Conflict of Identities in the Sudan (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1999); David McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996); and Nicholas Sambanis, "United Nations Peacekeeping in Theory and in Cyprus: New Conceptual Approaches and Interpretations" (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1999). The most important difference between my coding and that of others concerns the periodization of wars. I have broken what is a single observation of war in other data
51. My sources for coding wars include Singer and Small (fn. 32, 1994); Licklider (fn. 32); idem (fn. 29); Peter Wallensteen and Margareta Sollenberg, "Armed Conflicts, Conflict Termination, and Peace Agreements, 1989-1996," Journal of Peace Research 34, no. 3 (1997); Daniel C. Esty et al., "The State Failure Project: Early Warning Research for US Foreign Policy Planning," in John L. Davies and Ted Robert Gurr, eds., Preventive Measures: Building Risk Assessment and Crisis Early Warning Systems (Boulder, Colo., and Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998); David Mason and Patrick Fett, "How Civil Wars End: A Rational Choice Approach," Journal of Conflict Resolution 40 (December 1996); Patrick Regan, "Conditions for Successful Third Party Interventions, "Journal of Conflict Resolution 40, no. 1 (1996); Walter (fn. 9); SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook (http://editors.sipri.se/pubs/yearb.html); Human Rights Watch, World Report (New York and Washington, D.C.: Human Rights Watch, various years). Secondary texts consulted include Robert I. Rotberg, ed., Burma: Prospects for a Democratic Future (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1998); Martin Stuart-Fox, A History of Laos (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); David Callahan, Unwinnable Wars (New York: Hill and Wang, 1997); John O. Iatrides, "The Doomed Revolution: Communist Insurgency in Postwar Greece," in Licklider (fn. 29); Michael W. Doyle, Robert Orr, and Ian Johnstone, eds., Keeping the Peace (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Francis M. Deng, War of Visions: Conflict of Identities in the Sudan (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1999); David McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996); and Nicholas Sambanis, "United Nations Peacekeeping in Theory and in Cyprus: New Conceptual Approaches and Interpretations" (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1999). The most important difference between my coding and that of others concerns the periodization of wars. I have broken what is a single observation of war in other data
52. My sources for coding wars include Singer and Small (fn. 32, 1994); Licklider (fn. 32); idem (fn. 29); Peter Wallensteen and Margareta Sollenberg, "Armed Conflicts, Conflict Termination, and Peace Agreements, 1989-1996," Journal of Peace Research 34, no. 3 (1997); Daniel C. Esty et al., "The State Failure Project: Early Warning Research for US Foreign Policy Planning," in John L. Davies and Ted Robert Gurr, eds., Preventive Measures: Building Risk Assessment and Crisis Early Warning Systems (Boulder, Colo., and Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998); David Mason and Patrick Fett, "How Civil Wars End: A Rational Choice Approach," Journal of Conflict Resolution 40 (December 1996); Patrick Regan, "Conditions for Successful Third Party Interventions, "Journal of Conflict Resolution 40, no. 1 (1996); Walter (fn. 9); SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook (http://editors.sipri.se/pubs/yearb.html); Human Rights Watch, World Report (New York and Washington, D.C.: Human Rights Watch, various years). Secondary texts consulted include Robert I. Rotberg, ed., Burma: Prospects for a Democratic Future (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1998); Martin Stuart-Fox, A History of Laos (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); David Callahan, Unwinnable Wars (New York: Hill and Wang, 1997); John O. Iatrides, "The Doomed Revolution: Communist Insurgency in Postwar Greece," in Licklider (fn. 29); Michael W. Doyle, Robert Orr, and Ian Johnstone, eds., Keeping the Peace (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Francis M. Deng, War of Visions: Conflict of Identities in the Sudan (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1999); David McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996); and Nicholas Sambanis, "United Nations Peacekeeping in Theory and in Cyprus: New Conceptual Approaches and Interpretations" (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1999). The most important difference between my coding and that of others concerns the periodization of wars. I have broken what is a single observation of war in other data
53. My sources for coding wars include Singer and Small (fn. 32, 1994); Licklider (fn. 32); idem (fn. 29); Peter Wallensteen and Margareta Sollenberg, "Armed Conflicts, Conflict Termination, and Peace Agreements, 1989-1996," Journal of Peace Research 34, no. 3 (1997); Daniel C. Esty et al., "The State Failure Project: Early Warning Research for US Foreign Policy Planning," in John L. Davies and Ted Robert Gurr, eds., Preventive Measures: Building Risk Assessment and Crisis Early Warning Systems (Boulder, Colo., and Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998); David Mason and Patrick Fett, "How Civil Wars End: A Rational Choice Approach," Journal of Conflict Resolution 40 (December 1996); Patrick Regan, "Conditions for Successful Third Party Interventions, "Journal of Conflict Resolution 40, no. 1 (1996); Walter (fn. 9); SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook (http://editors.sipri.se/pubs/yearb.html); Human Rights Watch, World Report (New York and Washington, D.C.: Human Rights Watch, various years). Secondary texts consulted include Robert I. Rotberg, ed., Burma: Prospects for a Democratic Future (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1998); Martin Stuart-Fox, A History of Laos (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); David Callahan, Unwinnable Wars (New York: Hill and Wang, 1997); John O. Iatrides, "The Doomed Revolution: Communist Insurgency in Postwar Greece," in Licklider (fn. 29); Michael W. Doyle, Robert Orr, and Ian Johnstone, eds., Keeping the Peace (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Francis M. Deng, War of Visions: Conflict of Identities in the Sudan (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1999); David McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996); and Nicholas Sambanis, "United Nations Peacekeeping in Theory and in Cyprus: New Conceptual Approaches and Interpretations" (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1999). The most important difference between my coding and that of others concerns the periodization of wars. I have broken what is a single observation of war in other data
54. My sources for coding wars include Singer and Small (fn. 32, 1994); Licklider (fn. 32); idem (fn. 29); Peter Wallensteen and Margareta Sollenberg, "Armed Conflicts, Conflict Termination, and Peace Agreements, 1989-1996," Journal of Peace Research 34, no. 3 (1997); Daniel C. Esty et al., "The State Failure Project: Early Warning Research for US Foreign Policy Planning," in John L. Davies and Ted Robert Gurr, eds., Preventive Measures: Building Risk Assessment and Crisis Early Warning Systems (Boulder, Colo., and Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998); David Mason and Patrick Fett, "How Civil Wars End: A Rational Choice Approach," Journal of Conflict Resolution 40 (December 1996); Patrick Regan, "Conditions for Successful Third Party Interventions, "Journal of Conflict Resolution 40, no. 1 (1996); Walter (fn. 9); SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook (http://editors.sipri.se/pubs/yearb.html); Human Rights Watch, World Report (New York and Washington, D.C.: Human Rights Watch, various years). Secondary texts consulted include Robert I. Rotberg, ed., Burma: Prospects for a Democratic Future (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1998); Martin Stuart-Fox, A History of Laos (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); David Callahan, Unwinnable Wars (New York: Hill and Wang, 1997); John O. Iatrides, "The Doomed Revolution: Communist Insurgency in Postwar Greece," in Licklider (fn. 29); Michael W. Doyle, Robert Orr, and Ian Johnstone, eds., Keeping the Peace (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Francis M. Deng, War of Visions: Conflict of Identities in the Sudan (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1999); David McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996); and Nicholas Sambanis, "United Nations Peacekeeping in Theory and in Cyprus: New Conceptual Approaches and Interpretations" (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1999). The most important difference between my coding and that of others concerns the periodization of wars. I have broken what is a single observation of war in other data
55. My sources for coding wars include Singer and Small (fn. 32, 1994); Licklider (fn. 32); idem (fn. 29); Peter Wallensteen and Margareta Sollenberg, "Armed Conflicts, Conflict Termination, and Peace Agreements, 1989-1996," Journal of Peace Research 34, no. 3 (1997); Daniel C. Esty et al., "The State Failure Project: Early Warning Research for US Foreign Policy Planning," in John L. Davies and Ted Robert Gurr, eds., Preventive Measures: Building Risk Assessment and Crisis Early Warning Systems (Boulder, Colo., and Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998); David Mason and Patrick Fett, "How Civil Wars End: A Rational Choice Approach," Journal of Conflict Resolution 40 (December 1996); Patrick Regan, "Conditions for Successful Third Party Interventions, "Journal of Conflict Resolution 40, no. 1 (1996); Walter (fn. 9); SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook (http://editors.sipri.se/pubs/yearb.html); Human Rights Watch, World Report (New York and Washington, D.C.: Human Rights Watch, various years). Secondary texts consulted include Robert I. Rotberg, ed., Burma: Prospects for a Democratic Future (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1998); Martin Stuart-Fox, A History of Laos (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); David Callahan, Unwinnable Wars (New York: Hill and Wang, 1997); John O. Iatrides, "The Doomed Revolution: Communist Insurgency in Postwar Greece," in Licklider (fn. 29); Michael W. Doyle, Robert Orr, and Ian Johnstone, eds., Keeping the Peace (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Francis M. Deng, War of Visions: Conflict of Identities in the Sudan (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1999); David McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996); and Nicholas Sambanis, "United Nations Peacekeeping in Theory and in Cyprus: New Conceptual Approaches and Interpretations" (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1999). The most important difference between my coding and that of others concerns the periodization of wars. I have broken what is a single observation of war in other data
56. My sources for coding wars include Singer and Small (fn. 32, 1994); Licklider (fn. 32); idem (fn. 29); Peter Wallensteen and Margareta Sollenberg, "Armed Conflicts, Conflict Termination, and Peace Agreements, 1989-1996," Journal of Peace Research 34, no. 3 (1997); Daniel C. Esty et al., "The State Failure Project: Early Warning Research for US Foreign Policy Planning," in John L. Davies and Ted Robert Gurr, eds., Preventive Measures: Building Risk Assessment and Crisis Early Warning Systems (Boulder, Colo., and Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998); David Mason and Patrick Fett, "How Civil Wars End: A Rational Choice Approach," Journal of Conflict Resolution 40 (December 1996); Patrick Regan, "Conditions for Successful Third Party Interventions, "Journal of Conflict Resolution 40, no. 1 (1996); Walter (fn. 9); SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook (http://editors.sipri.se/pubs/yearb.html); Human Rights Watch, World Report (New York and Washington, D.C.: Human Rights Watch, various years). Secondary texts consulted include Robert I. Rotberg, ed., Burma: Prospects for a Democratic Future (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1998); Martin Stuart-Fox, A History of Laos (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); David Callahan, Unwinnable Wars (New York: Hill and Wang, 1997); John O. Iatrides, "The Doomed Revolution: Communist Insurgency in Postwar Greece," in Licklider (fn. 29); Michael W. Doyle, Robert Orr, and Ian Johnstone, eds., Keeping the Peace (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Francis M. Deng, War of Visions: Conflict of Identities in the Sudan (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1999); David McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996); and Nicholas Sambanis, "United Nations Peacekeeping in Theory and in Cyprus: New Conceptual Approaches and Interpretations" (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1999). The most important difference between my coding and that of others concerns the periodization of wars. I have broken what is a single observation of war in other data
57. My sources for coding wars include Singer and Small (fn. 32, 1994); Licklider (fn. 32); idem (fn. 29); Peter Wallensteen and Margareta Sollenberg, "Armed Conflicts, Conflict Termination, and Peace Agreements, 1989-1996," Journal of Peace Research 34, no. 3 (1997); Daniel C. Esty et al., "The State Failure Project: Early Warning Research for US Foreign Policy Planning," in John L. Davies and Ted Robert Gurr, eds., Preventive Measures: Building Risk Assessment and Crisis Early Warning Systems (Boulder, Colo., and Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998); David Mason and Patrick Fett, "How Civil Wars End: A Rational Choice Approach," Journal of Conflict Resolution 40 (December 1996); Patrick Regan, "Conditions for Successful Third Party Interventions, "Journal of Conflict Resolution 40, no. 1 (1996); Walter (fn. 9); SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook (http://editors.sipri.se/pubs/yearb.html); Human Rights Watch, World Report (New York and Washington, D.C.: Human Rights Watch, various years). Secondary texts consulted include Robert I. Rotberg, ed., Burma: Prospects for a Democratic Future (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1998); Martin Stuart-Fox, A History of Laos (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); David Callahan, Unwinnable Wars (New York: Hill and Wang, 1997); John O. Iatrides, "The Doomed Revolution: Communist Insurgency in Postwar Greece," in Licklider (fn. 29); Michael W. Doyle, Robert Orr, and Ian Johnstone, eds., Keeping the Peace (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Francis M. Deng, War of Visions: Conflict of Identities in the Sudan (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1999); David McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996); and Nicholas Sambanis, "United Nations Peacekeeping in Theory and in Cyprus: New Conceptual Approaches and Interpretations" (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1999). The most important difference between my coding and that of others concerns the periodization of wars. I have broken what is a single observation of war in other data
58. My sources for coding wars include Singer and Small (fn. 32, 1994); Licklider (fn. 32); idem (fn. 29); Peter Wallensteen and Margareta Sollenberg, "Armed Conflicts, Conflict Termination, and Peace Agreements, 1989-1996," Journal of Peace Research 34, no. 3 (1997); Daniel C. Esty et al., "The State Failure Project: Early Warning Research for US Foreign Policy Planning," in John L. Davies and Ted Robert Gurr, eds., Preventive Measures: Building Risk Assessment and Crisis Early Warning Systems (Boulder, Colo., and Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998); David Mason and Patrick Fett, "How Civil Wars End: A Rational Choice Approach," Journal of Conflict Resolution 40 (December 1996); Patrick Regan, "Conditions for Successful Third Party Interventions, "Journal of Conflict Resolution 40, no. 1 (1996); Walter (fn. 9); SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook (http://editors.sipri.se/pubs/yearb.html); Human Rights Watch, World Report (New York and Washington, D.C.: Human Rights Watch, various years). Secondary texts consulted include Robert I. Rotberg, ed., Burma: Prospects for a Democratic Future (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1998); Martin Stuart-Fox, A History of Laos (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); David Callahan, Unwinnable Wars (New York: Hill and Wang, 1997); John O. Iatrides, "The Doomed Revolution: Communist Insurgency in Postwar Greece," in Licklider (fn. 29); Michael W. Doyle, Robert Orr, and Ian Johnstone, eds., Keeping the Peace (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Francis M. Deng, War of Visions: Conflict of Identities in the Sudan (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1999); David McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996); and Nicholas Sambanis, "United Nations Peacekeeping in Theory and in Cyprus: New Conceptual Approaches and Interpretations" (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1999). The most important difference between my coding and that of others concerns the periodization of wars. I have broken what is a single observation of war in other data
59. My sources for coding wars include Singer and Small (fn. 32, 1994); Licklider (fn. 32); idem (fn. 29); Peter Wallensteen and Margareta Sollenberg, "Armed Conflicts, Conflict Termination, and Peace Agreements, 1989-1996," Journal of Peace Research 34, no. 3 (1997); Daniel C. Esty et al., "The State Failure Project: Early Warning Research for US Foreign Policy Planning," in John L. Davies and Ted Robert Gurr, eds., Preventive Measures: Building Risk Assessment and Crisis Early Warning Systems (Boulder, Colo., and Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998); David Mason and Patrick Fett, "How Civil Wars End: A Rational Choice Approach," Journal of Conflict Resolution 40 (December 1996); Patrick Regan, "Conditions for Successful Third Party Interventions, "Journal of Conflict Resolution 40, no. 1 (1996); Walter (fn. 9); SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook (http://editors.sipri.se/pubs/yearb.html); Human Rights Watch, World Report (New York and Washington, D.C.: Human Rights Watch, various years). Secondary texts consulted include Robert I. Rotberg, ed., Burma: Prospects for a Democratic Future (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1998); Martin Stuart-Fox, A History of Laos (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); David Callahan, Unwinnable Wars (New York: Hill and Wang, 1997); John O. Iatrides, "The Doomed Revolution: Communist Insurgency in Postwar Greece," in Licklider (fn. 29); Michael W. Doyle, Robert Orr, and Ian Johnstone, eds., Keeping the Peace (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Francis M. Deng, War of Visions: Conflict of Identities in the Sudan (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1999); David McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996); and Nicholas Sambanis, "United Nations Peacekeeping in Theory and in Cyprus: New Conceptual Approaches and Interpretations" (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1999). The most important difference between my coding and that of others concerns the periodization of wars. I have broken what is a single observation of war in other data
60. Kaufmann (fn.1, 1996 and 1998). Other studies also use the broad definition, given that the distinction between secession and partition seems artificial. See, among others, Horowitz (in. 2); and Alexis Heraelides, The Self-Determination of Minorities in International Politics (Portland: Frank Cass, 1991); both use the terms partition and secession interchangeably.
61. I consider only post-World War II cases because of the paucity of economic data from before 1945. Thus, I exclude the partition of Ireland. Cases of peaceful partition are also excluded, for example, Macedonia (1992), Czechoslovakia (1993), and Singapore (1965). I exclude one case (Iraq) that I believe was erroneously classified as a partition in Kaufmann (fn. 1, 1998). I exclude Iraq (1991) because there is no recognized, functional, or even autonomous Iraqi Kurdistan and the territory and its population would have been within reach of the Iraqi military had it not been for the U.S.-enforced no-fly zone.
62. My coding of cases of partition incorporated suggestions made by anonymous referees.
63. One might argue that the "real" number of partitions is smaller, since several of them occurred in either the former Yugoslavia or the former USSR. This would imply that these partitions may not be independent of one another. Thus, I cluster all same-country observations in my statistical analysis, relaxing the assumption of independence for those observations and allowing for nonconstant variance within clusters.
64. See, for example, Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "Justice-Seeking and Loot-Seeking in Civil War" (Manuscript, World Bank, February 1999); Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, "International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis" (Manuscript, Princeton University and the World Bank, February 2000); Paul Collier, "On the Economic Consequences of Civil War," Oxford Economic Papers 51 (1998); and Mason and Fett (fn. 33).
65. See, for example, Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "Justice-Seeking and Loot-Seeking in Civil War" (Manuscript, World Bank, February 1999); Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, "International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis" (Manuscript, Princeton University and the World Bank, February 2000); Paul Collier, "On the Economic Consequences of Civil War," Oxford Economic Papers 51 (1998); and Mason and Fett (fn. 33).
66. See, for example, Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "Justice-Seeking and Loot-Seeking in Civil War" (Manuscript, World Bank, February 1999); Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, "International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis" (Manuscript, Princeton University and the World Bank, February 2000); Paul Collier, "On the Economic Consequences of Civil War," Oxford Economic Papers 51 (1998); and Mason and Fett (fn. 33).
67. The coding of the WARTYPE variable was not easy. There are substantial differences in the various sources and data sets I consulted. I used two main sources for this variable: Licklider (fn. 32); and Esty et al. (fn. 33). I coded the variables TYPELICK (Licklider's war-issue variable) and TYPESTF (the State-Failure Project's war-type variable) to facilitate comparisons across cases. Where those two sources differed, I coded WARTYPE based on majority opinion in other data sets, including Rcgan (fn. 33); and Mason and Fett (fn. 33).
68. This hypothesis (with an emphasis on the proportion of young men) has been posited with reference to the causes of civil war by Collier and Hoeffler (fn. 45); and Robert H. Bates, "Ethnicity, Capital Formation, and Conflict," CID Working Paper no. 27 (Harvard University, October 1999).
69. For example, Collier and Hoeffler (fn. 45).
70. Given such problems, quantitative analysts of civil wars must be highly transparent in their coding of these variables. Moreover, it is necessary for those building data sets of civil war to coordinate their
71. Kaufmann (fn. 1, 1998), 124.
72. The original data on democracy were compiled by Keith Jaggers and Ted Robert Gurr, Polity 98 Project (http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/polity/). I added their democracy and autocracy scores as follows: GURR = [DEMOCRACY+ (10-AUTOCRACY)]. The resulting variable ranges from 0 to 20. The Polity3 data end in 1994, so I imputed thirty-five missing values using the political rights index of the Freedom House project after I established that there was a very close correlation between Gurr's democracy index and Freedom House's political rights index. See Freedom House, Freedom in the World (London: Freedom House, 1999).
73. The original data on democracy were compiled by Keith Jaggers and Ted Robert Gurr, Polity 98 Project (http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/polity/). I added their democracy and autocracy scores as follows: GURR = [DEMOCRACY+ (10-AUTOCRACY)]. The resulting variable ranges from 0 to 20. The Polity3 data end in 1994, so I imputed thirty-five missing values using the political rights index of the Freedom House project after I established that there was a very close correlation between Gurr's democracy index and Freedom House's political rights index. See Freedom House, Freedom in the World (London: Freedom House, 1999).
74. This list includes not only ethnic partitions but also all other cases of partition in my data set. Subsequent analysis focuses directly on partitions that resulted from ethnic wars and therefore excludes a number of partitions (for example, the Koreas, Vietnam, and Taiwan). However, I test the robustness of my results by including all wars and partitions.
75. I selected these variables based on theoretical arguments regarding the determinants of the level of democratization after civil war, drawing on Doyle and Sambanis (fn. 45), among others. Also the relationship between economic variables and democracy has been the focus of numerous studies in the economics and political science literatures; see, e.g., Ross E. Burkhart and Michael S. Lewis-Beck, "Comparative Democracy: The Economic Development Thesis," American Political Science Review 88 (December 1994).
76. These regression results are robust for a large number of specifications.
77. B are their respective covariance matrices.
78. B are their respective covariance matrices.
79. B are their respective covariance matrices.
80. Given the paucity of data to answer this important question, a worthwhile project would be to conduct a comparative case study of the political institutions of all these successor states.
81. This is not a well-known case. In 1963 a "green line" was established in the capital city of Nicosia, partitioning the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot sectors. After 1964 the partition was expanded, and more than 30 percent of the Turkish Cypriot population moved to defensible, self-administered enclaves. These enclaves forcibly excluded the Greek Cypriot population and their demilitarization and defortification was part of the mandate given to a UN peacekeeping force - UNFICYP (see UN doc. S/5764, 15 June 1964, para. 61). The UN secretary-general often noted in his report that the enclaves gave the Turkish Cypriots "complete military and administrative control" of several areas (S/6228, para. 50). In 1965 the secretary-general noted that the enclave fortifications "contribute to maintaining tension at high pitch" and UNFICYP "insists on their removal" (S/6228, para. 51). Within six months in 1967, 52 new positions were built by the Greek Cypriot National Guard and 130 by the Turkish Cypriots (S/8286, December 8, 1967, para. 50). The secretary-general noted that "this ceaseless building of fortifications . . . [would] result in the Island being criss-crossed and honeycombed with defences [sic]" (S/8286, para. 49). Thus, the island was effectively partitioned between 1963 and 1967. On the Cyprus conflict during the critical years between 1963 and 1974, see Richard Patrick, Political Geography and the Cyprus Conflict, 1963-1971 (Waterloo, Canada: Department of Geography, University of Waterloo, 1976); the work includes maps of the pre-1974 enclaves. See also Joseph Joseph, Cyprus: Ethnic Conflict and International Solution (New York: St. Martin's, 1997); and Sambanis (fn. 33).
82. This is not a well-known case. In 1963 a "green line" was established in the capital city of Nicosia, partitioning the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot sectors. After 1964 the partition was expanded, and more than 30 percent of the Turkish Cypriot population moved to defensible, self-administered enclaves. These enclaves forcibly excluded the Greek Cypriot population and their demilitarization and defortification was part of the mandate given to a UN peacekeeping force - UNFICYP (see UN doc. S/5764, 15 June 1964, para. 61). The UN secretary-general often noted in his report that the enclaves gave the Turkish Cypriots "complete military and administrative control" of several areas (S/6228, para. 50). In 1965 the secretary-general noted that the enclave fortifications "contribute to maintaining tension at high pitch" and UNFICYP "insists on their removal" (S/6228, para. 51). Within six months in 1967, 52 new positions were built by the Greek Cypriot National Guard and 130 by the Turkish Cypriots (S/8286, December 8, 1967, para. 50). The secretary-general noted that "this ceaseless building of fortifications . . . [would] result in the Island being criss-crossed and honeycombed with defences [sic]" (S/8286, para. 49). Thus, the island was effectively partitioned between 1963 and 1967. On the Cyprus conflict during the critical years between 1963 and 1974, see Richard Patrick, Political Geography and the Cyprus Conflict, 1963-1971 (Waterloo, Canada: Department of Geography, University of Waterloo, 1976); the work includes maps of the pre-1974 enclaves. See also Joseph Joseph, Cyprus: Ethnic Conflict and International Solution (New York: St. Martin's, 1997); and Sambanis (fn. 33).
83. Following are the explanatory variables and the researchers who identified their importance: war duration, Mason and Fett (fn. 33); size of the government's military, Mason and Fett (fn. 33); war outcomes, Licklider (fn. 32) and Walter (fn. 39); ethnic heterogeneity and population size, Collier and Hoeffler (fn. 45); deaths and displacements, Licklider (fn. 32) and Doyle and Sambanis (fn. 45); income per capita, Collier (fn. 45); major power involvement, Singer and Small (fn. 32); foreign intervention, Regan (fh. 33); third-party and UN peace operations, Doyle and Sambanis (fn. 45); democracy, Collier, Elbadawi, and Sambanis (fn. 30) and Håvard Hegre et al., "Towards a Democratic Civil Peace? Opportunity, Grievance, and Civil War, 1816-1992" (Paper presented at the World Bank Conference on the Economics of Political and Criminal Violence, Washington, D.C., February 16-22, 1999). I also controlled for the number of land borders, the decade the war started, and the cold war. I could not include too many of these variables together, given my small data set and the collinearity of these variables.
84. The Russia-Chechnya case causes the negative sign, and partition is positively correlated with WAREND if I drop that observation. The nonsignificance of partition, however, does not change by deleting that observation. I also sequentially deleted several other cases (e.g., Cyprus 1963/67, Somalia, Tajikistan, India), and the substantive results did not change. The results are also robust to using TYPELICK and TYPESTF instead of WARTYPE to identify ethnic wars.
85. The opposite argument (without much empirical support) is made in Chaim Kaufmann, "Intervention in Ethnic and Ideological Civil Wars: Why One Can Be Done and the Other Can't," Security Studies 6 (Autumn 1997).
86. The sign of LOGCOST in models 1 and 2 is negative, indicating that the higher the human cost, the greater the probability of war recurrence. This may seem counterintuitive: why would more costly wars lead to new wars? Would not great human cost discourage war recurrence? That reasoning is correct and it is reflected in my findings on war duration (see below), which verify the war-weariness hypothesis. However, controlling for this finding, the probability of war recurrence should be expected to be greater as the human costs of the war increase. These costs measure war-generated hostility and create grievances that may manifest themselves in future conflict. Further, the greater the human and economic cost of the war, the lower should be a country's human capital and the lower the state's capacity to resume normal operations.
87. OUTCOME2 is a categorical variable denoting whether the war ended in a truce, rebel victory, government victory, or peace settlement. It is highly
88. Mason and Fett (fn. 33). I thank Russ Leng for pointing this out to me.
89. By contrast, Mason and Fett (fn. 33) find a significant negative correlation.
90. This finding may be due to selection effects, as I mentioned earlier, but it may also confirm the revenue-seeking economic model of civil war in Collier (fn. 45); and Collier and Hoeffler (fn. 45); the model looks at GDP per capita as a proxy for "lootable" resources, which would increase the risk of war.
91. James Fearon and David Laitin, "Explaining Interethnic Cooperation," American Political Science Review 90 (December 1996).
92. See, e.g., Collier, Elbadawi, and Sambanis (fn. 30).
93. 2 = 0.3199.
94. G. S. Maddala, Limited Dependent and Qualitative Variables in Econometrics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); D. Rivers and Q. Vuong, "Limited Information Estimators and Exogeneity Tests for Simultaneous Probit Models," Journal of Econometrics 39 (1988). This method is almost identical to Kenneth A. Bollen, D. K. Guilkey, and T. A. Mroz, "Binary Outcomes and Endogenous Explanatory Variables: Tests and Solutions with an Application to the Demand for Contraceptive Use in Tunisia," Demography 32 (February 1995). The two-stage probit model produces inefficient standard errors, though the efficiency loss is small. Rivers and Vuong derive the formula that gives the correct variance-covariance matrix, but their procedure is designed tor continuous endogenous right-hand-side variables. A methodological discussion and Monte Carlo simulation results reporting the properties of this estimator in small samples are found in Michael Alvarez and Jennifer Glascow, "Two-Stage Estimation of Non-Recursive Choice Models," Political Analysis (forthcoming). For a political science application of this method, see Michael Alvarez and L. Butterfield, "The Resurgence of Nativism in California? The Case of Proposition 187 and Illegal Immigration," Social Science Quarterly (forthcoming). A discussion of the two binary variable case can be found in Madalla (p. 246).
95. G. S. Maddala, Limited Dependent and Qualitative Variables in Econometrics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); D. Rivers and Q. Vuong, "Limited Information Estimators and Exogeneity Tests for Simultaneous Probit Models," Journal of Econometrics 39 (1988). This method is almost identical to Kenneth A. Bollen, D. K. Guilkey, and T. A. Mroz, "Binary Outcomes and Endogenous Explanatory Variables: Tests and Solutions with an Application to the Demand for Contraceptive Use in Tunisia," Demography 32 (February 1995). The two-stage probit model produces inefficient standard errors, though the efficiency loss is small. Rivers and Vuong derive the formula that gives the correct variance-covariance matrix, but their procedure is designed tor continuous endogenous right-hand-side variables. A methodological discussion and Monte Carlo simulation results reporting the properties of this estimator in small samples are found in Michael Alvarez and Jennifer Glascow, "Two-Stage Estimation of Non-Recursive Choice Models," Political Analysis (forthcoming). For a political science application of this method, see Michael Alvarez and L. Butterfield, "The Resurgence of Nativism in California? The Case of Proposition 187 and Illegal Immigration," Social Science Quarterly (forthcoming). A discussion of the two binary variable case can be found in Madalla (p. 246).
96. G. S. Maddala, Limited Dependent and Qualitative Variables in Econometrics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); D. Rivers and Q. Vuong, "Limited Information Estimators and Exogeneity Tests for Simultaneous Probit Models," Journal of Econometrics 39 (1988). This method is almost identical to Kenneth A. Bollen, D. K. Guilkey, and T. A. Mroz, "Binary Outcomes and Endogenous Explanatory Variables: Tests and Solutions with an Application to the Demand for Contraceptive Use in Tunisia," Demography 32 (February 1995). The two-stage probit model produces inefficient standard errors, though the efficiency loss is small. Rivers and Vuong derive the formula that gives the correct variance-covariance matrix, but their procedure is designed tor continuous endogenous right-hand-side variables. A methodological discussion and Monte Carlo simulation results reporting the properties of this estimator in small samples are found in Michael Alvarez and Jennifer Glascow, "Two-Stage Estimation of Non-Recursive Choice Models," Political Analysis (forthcoming). For a political science application of this method, see Michael Alvarez and L. Butterfield, "The Resurgence of Nativism in California? The Case of Proposition 187 and Illegal Immigration," Social Science Quarterly (forthcoming). A discussion of the two binary variable case can be found in Madalla (p. 246).
97. G. S. Maddala, Limited Dependent and Qualitative Variables in Econometrics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); D. Rivers and Q. Vuong, "Limited Information Estimators and Exogeneity Tests for Simultaneous Probit Models," Journal of Econometrics 39 (1988). This method is almost identical to Kenneth A. Bollen, D. K. Guilkey, and T. A. Mroz, "Binary Outcomes and Endogenous Explanatory Variables: Tests and Solutions with an Application to the Demand for Contraceptive Use in Tunisia," Demography 32 (February 1995). The two-stage probit model produces inefficient standard errors, though the efficiency loss is small. Rivers and Vuong derive the formula that gives the correct variance-covariance matrix, but their procedure is designed tor continuous endogenous right-hand-side variables. A methodological discussion and Monte Carlo simulation results reporting the properties of this estimator in small samples are found in Michael Alvarez and Jennifer Glascow, "Two-Stage Estimation of Non-Recursive Choice Models," Political Analysis (forthcoming). For a political science application of this method, see Michael Alvarez and L. Butterfield, "The Resurgence of Nativism in California? The Case of Proposition 187 and Illegal Immigration," Social Science Quarterly (forthcoming). A discussion of the two binary variable case can be found in Madalla (p. 246).
98. G. S. Maddala, Limited Dependent and Qualitative Variables in Econometrics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); D. Rivers and Q. Vuong, "Limited Information Estimators and Exogeneity Tests for Simultaneous Probit Models," Journal of Econometrics 39 (1988). This method is almost identical to Kenneth A. Bollen, D. K. Guilkey, and T. A. Mroz, "Binary Outcomes and Endogenous Explanatory Variables: Tests and Solutions with an Application to the Demand for Contraceptive Use in Tunisia," Demography 32 (February 1995). The two-stage probit model produces inefficient standard errors, though the efficiency loss is small. Rivers and Vuong derive the formula that gives the correct variance-covariance matrix, but their procedure is designed tor continuous endogenous right-hand-side variables. A methodological discussion and Monte Carlo simulation results reporting the properties of this estimator in small samples are found in Michael Alvarez and Jennifer Glascow, "Two-Stage Estimation of Non-Recursive Choice Models," Political Analysis (forthcoming). For a political science application of this method, see Michael Alvarez and L. Butterfield, "The Resurgence of Nativism in California? The Case of Proposition 187 and Illegal Immigration," Social Science Quarterly (forthcoming). A discussion of the two binary variable case can be found in Madalla (p. 246).
99. For the case of two binary variables, this can be estimated as a seemingly unrelated bivariate probit model with a selection effect. The exogeneity test in this model consists of a Wald test of rho, the estimated coefficient of the correlation of the error terms in the structural and reduced-form ("first-stage") equations.
100. Michael Tomz, Jason Wittenberg, and Gary King, "Clarify: Software for Interpreting and Presenting Statistical Results," version 1.2.1 (June 1, 1999). See also idem, "Making the Most of Statistical Analyses: Improving Interpretations and Presentation" (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, 1999).
101. Michael Tomz, Jason Wittenberg, and Gary King, "Clarify: Software for Interpreting and Presenting Statistical Results," version 1.2.1 (June 1, 1999). See also idem, "Making the Most of Statistical Analyses: Improving Interpretations and Presentation" (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, 1999).
102. Note that these estimates may differ slightly in replications since I did not fix the number seed used to randomly select samples for the simulations. initially increases, but then falls" (p. 25). In Bates's analysis, it is extreme polarization that is most associated with violence. My finding that greater heterogeneity and more sizable ethnic groups reduce violence in postwar states is therefore compatible with Bates's result and complements it. I should note however, that Bates's results may not be generally applicable to non-African countries, given that African countries have a generally higher mean level of ethnic heterogeneity and this implies a selection effect if the results are to be applied widely to non-African countries. In my data set, for example, the mean and standard deviation of the ethnic heterogeneity index for African countries is 68.82 and 34.58, respectively, whereas for non-African countries it is 50.5 and 31.73. The ethnic heterogeneity index used was created by Tatu Vanhanen, "Domestic Ethnic Conflict and Ethnic Nepotism: A Comparative Analysis," Journal of Peace Research 36, no. 1 (1999).
103. Ten years after the end of the war partition has a negative correlation with an end to low-grade violence, but this result may be an artifact of missing (right-censored) observations (only fifty-five observations are available for the ten-year period).
104. Thus, development levels and military strength are more relevant with respect to war recurrence than with respect to low-level violence.
105. To cite Horowitz (fn. 2), 135: "Is there any reason to believe that the more pronounced the cultural differences that exist between groups, the greater the ethnic conflict? There has been no shortage of offhanded assertions that cultural differences engender ethnic conflict. But . . . systematic statements of the relationship are more difficult to find."
106. See, e.g., Jeffrey Herbst, "Responding to State Failure in Africa," International Security 21 (Winter 1996-97).
107. The choice of estimator depends on the number of observations, the degree of identification of the model, the number of potentially endogenous variables, and the goodness of fit of the first-stage equation. See Bollen, Guilkey, and Mroz (fn. 76).
108. 2 was higher than 30 percent. Further, Bollen, Guilkey and Mroz (fn. 76) discuss evidence from Monte Carlo simulations that suggest that the models' identification must be less than 75 percent for the two-step probit estimator to be preferable to the simple probit (i.e., the overlapping variables in the two equations must be fewer than three-fourths of the total number of right-handside variables in the structural equation).
109. T. Amemiya, "The Maximum Likelihood and the Nonlinear Three-Stage Least Squares Estimator in the General Nonlinear Simultaneous Equation Model," Econometrica 45 (1978).
110. See Bollen, Guilkey, and Mroz (fn. 76); and G. Tauchen, "Diagnostic Testing and Evaluation of Maximum Likelihood Models," Journal of Econometrics 30 (1985). Formulas to compute efficient standard errors can be found in Maddala (fn. 76), and a method to estimate the asymptotically efficient covariance matrix when the model is overidentified has been developed by Amemiya (fn. 95). Alvarez and Butterfield (fn. 76) use bootstrapping to obtain estimates of the correct standard errors.
111. Bollen, Guilkey and Mroz (fn. 76) find this to be the best-performing exogeneity test.