Designing transitions from civil war: Demobilization, democratization, and commitments to peace

International Security

Volumn 24, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 127-153

  Walter, Barbara F ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

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EID: 0033459172     PISSN: 01622889     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/016228899560077     Document Type: Article

References (89)

1. I coded civil wars as having had "negotiations" if factions held face-to-face talks and issues relevant to resolving the war were discussed. These qualifications eliminated scheduled talks that never took place, meetings where no substantive issues were deliberated, and talks that excluded key participants. I also attempted to apply a "good faith" proviso and exclude those meetings where one or both participants were obviously unwilling to yield on important issues. Although sometimes difficult to determine, certain actions did signal whether or not faction leaders honestly wished to cooperate. Their readiness to accept supervision, make public announcements of important concessions, discuss the details of a transfer of power, and participate in lengthy negotiations all generated costs to the groups involved and indicated more than a tactical interest in appearing to be cooperative. To say that a civil war experienced "negotiations," however, does not imply that groups would not willingly defect if they could benefit from cheating. "Negotiations" simply indicate that they were willing to consider an alternative to war.
2. Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), p. 564. See also Stephen John Stedman, "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes," International Security, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Fall 1997), pp. 5-53.
3. Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), p. 564. See also Stephen John Stedman, "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes," International Security, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Fall 1997), pp. 5-53.
4. Quoted in Goswin Baumhoegger, The Struggle for Independence: Documents on the Recent Development of Zimbabwe (1975-1980) (Hamburg: Institute of African Studies, Africa Documentation Center, 1984), vol. 2, p. 7.
5. Much exciting research is being done in the area of strategic barriers to successful negotiation in international relations. See especially James D. Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 3 (Summer 1995), pp. 379-414; and David A. Lake, Entangling Relations: American Foreign Policy in Its Century (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998).
6. Much exciting research is being done in the area of strategic barriers to successful negotiation in international relations. See especially James D. Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 3 (Summer 1995), pp. 379-414; and David A. Lake, Entangling Relations: American Foreign Policy in Its Century (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998).
7. Paul Pillar, Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1983), p. 24. For similar arguments, see Fred Ikle, Every War Must End (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), p. 95; George Modelski, "International Settlement of Internal War," in James Rosenau, ed., International Aspects of Civil Strife (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1964); and R. Harrison Wagner, "The Causes of Peace," in Roy Licklider, ed., Stopping the Killing: How Civil Wars End (New York: New York University Press, 1993).
8. Paul Pillar, Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1983), p. 24. For similar arguments, see Fred Ikle, Every War Must End (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), p. 95; George Modelski, "International Settlement of Internal War," in James Rosenau, ed., International Aspects of Civil Strife (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1964); and R. Harrison Wagner, "The Causes of Peace," in Roy Licklider, ed., Stopping the Killing: How Civil Wars End (New York: New York University Press, 1993).
9. Paul Pillar, Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1983), p. 24. For similar arguments, see Fred Ikle, Every War Must End (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), p. 95; George Modelski, "International Settlement of Internal War," in James Rosenau, ed., International Aspects of Civil Strife (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1964); and R. Harrison Wagner, "The Causes of Peace," in Roy Licklider, ed., Stopping the Killing: How Civil Wars End (New York: New York University Press, 1993).
10. Paul Pillar, Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1983), p. 24. For similar arguments, see Fred Ikle, Every War Must End (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), p. 95; George Modelski, "International Settlement of Internal War," in James Rosenau, ed., International Aspects of Civil Strife (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1964); and R. Harrison Wagner, "The Causes of Peace," in Roy Licklider, ed., Stopping the Killing: How Civil Wars End (New York: New York University Press, 1993).
11. See James D. Fearon, "Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation," International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 2 (Spring 1998), pp. 269-305.
12. See Roger B. Myerson and Mark A. Satterthwaite, "Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading," Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 29, No. 2 (April 1983), pp. 265-281; James D. Morrow, "Signalling Difficulties with Linkage in Crisis Bargaining," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 2 (June 1992), pp. 153-172; and Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War."
13. See Roger B. Myerson and Mark A. Satterthwaite, "Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading," Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 29, No. 2 (April 1983), pp. 265-281; James D. Morrow, "Signalling Difficulties with Linkage in Crisis Bargaining," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 2 (June 1992), pp. 153-172; and Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War."
14. See Roger B. Myerson and Mark A. Satterthwaite, "Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading," Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 29, No. 2 (April 1983), pp. 265-281; James D. Morrow, "Signalling Difficulties with Linkage in Crisis Bargaining," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 2 (June 1992), pp. 153-172; and Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War."
15. Ironically, even if groups were willing to divulge this information, their incentive to misrepresent these facts (which is understood by both sides) would make even accurate information suspect.
16. This is similar to the bargaining strategies that Thomas C. Schelling discusses in Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966), chap. 2. See also Vince Crawford, "A Theory of Disagreement in Bargaining," Econometrica, Vol. 50, No. 3 (May 1982), pp. 607-637. My thanks to John McMillan for pointing this out.
17. This is similar to the bargaining strategies that Thomas C. Schelling discusses in Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966), chap. 2. See also Vince Crawford, "A Theory of Disagreement in Bargaining," Econometrica, Vol. 50, No. 3 (May 1982), pp. 607-637. My thanks to John McMillan for pointing this out.
18. One could argue that empty promises are easy to make because they will never be fulfilled. But public promises are not costless. Ignoring or violating an agreement could easily negate many of the benefits a party had hoped to gain by appearing to cooperate.
19. Civil war adversaries could choose to partition their country into two or more independent states and thus circumvent this problem of consolidation. Chaim Kaufmann argues, for example, that ethnic civil wars "cannot end until the populations are separated into defensible, mostly homogeneous regions." Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Spring 1996), pp. 136-175; and Kaufmann, "When All Else Fails: Ethnic Population Transfers and Partitions in the Twentieth Century," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Fall 1998), pp. 120-156. As I discuss later, however, governments rarely agree to negotiate a separation of territory, leaving powersharing as the only negotiable alternative.
20. Civil war adversaries could choose to partition their country into two or more independent states and thus circumvent this problem of consolidation. Chaim Kaufmann argues, for example, that ethnic civil wars "cannot end until the populations are separated into defensible, mostly homogeneous regions." Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Spring 1996), pp. 136-175; and Kaufmann, "When All Else Fails: Ethnic Population Transfers and Partitions in the Twentieth Century," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Fall 1998), pp. 120-156. As I discuss later, however, governments rarely agree to negotiate a separation of territory, leaving powersharing as the only negotiable alternative.
21. For pathbreaking discussions on the security dilemma, see Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Winter 1978), pp. 167-214; and Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," in Michael E. Brown, ed., Ethnic Conflict and International Security (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993).
22. For pathbreaking discussions on the security dilemma, see Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Winter 1978), pp. 167-214; and Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," in Michael E. Brown, ed., Ethnic Conflict and International Security (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993).
23. For a well-developed discussion on the use of costly signals, see Andrew Kydd, "Game Theory and the Spiral Model," World Politics, Vol. 49, No. 3 (April 1997), pp. 371-400.
24. Quoted in Mike O'Connor, "Bosnia's Military Threat: Rival Police," New York Times, January 12, 1997, p. A6.
25. I presented and tested this hypothesis and found that outside security guarantees in the form of active peacekeeping forces were a necessary condition for the successful implementation of peace treaties. See Barbara F. Walter, "The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 3 (Summer 1997), pp. 335-364.
26. I use Timothy D. Sisk's definition of powersharing to mean any political system that "fosters governing coalitions inclusive of most, if not all, major mobilized ethnic groups in society." See Sisk, Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflict (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1996), p. 4.
27. See Robert Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1971), p. 15.
28. For a cross section of these debates, see Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, The Global Resurgence of Democracy (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993).
29. An extensive literature supports this view. See James Madison, "Federalist No. 10," The Federalist Papers (New York: Penguin, 1961); Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1977); Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict; David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, "Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Fall 1996), pp. 41-75; and Alicia Levine, "Political Accommodation and the Prevention of Secessionist Violence," in Michael E. Brown, ed., The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996), pp. 311-340.
30. An extensive literature supports this view. See James Madison, "Federalist No. 10," The Federalist Papers (New York: Penguin, 1961); Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1977); Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict; David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, "Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Fall 1996), pp. 41-75; and Alicia Levine, "Political Accommodation and the Prevention of Secessionist Violence," in Michael E. Brown, ed., The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996), pp. 311-340.
31. An extensive literature supports this view. See James Madison, "Federalist No. 10," The Federalist Papers (New York: Penguin, 1961); Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1977); Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict; David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, "Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Fall 1996), pp. 41-75; and Alicia Levine, "Political Accommodation and the Prevention of Secessionist Violence," in Michael E. Brown, ed., The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996), pp. 311-340.
32. An extensive literature supports this view. See James Madison, "Federalist No. 10," The Federalist Papers (New York: Penguin, 1961); Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1977); Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict; David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, "Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Fall 1996), pp. 41-75; and Alicia Levine, "Political Accommodation and the Prevention of Secessionist Violence," in Michael E. Brown, ed., The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996), pp. 311-340.
33. An extensive literature supports this view. See James Madison, "Federalist No. 10," The Federalist Papers (New York: Penguin, 1961); Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1977); Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict; David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, "Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Fall 1996), pp. 41-75; and Alicia Levine, "Political Accommodation and the Prevention of Secessionist Violence," in Michael E. Brown, ed., The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996), pp. 311-340.
34. See especially Juan Linz, "The Perils of Presidentialism" and "The Virtues of Parliamentarianism," in Diamond and Plattner, The Global Resurgence of Democracy; and Sisk, Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflict, pp. 53-54. For a dissenting view, see Donald Horowitz, "Comparing Democratic Systems," in ibid.
35. See especially Juan Linz, "The Perils of Presidentialism" and "The Virtues of Parliamentarianism," in Diamond and Plattner, The Global Resurgence of Democracy; and Sisk, Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflict, pp. 53-54. For a dissenting view, see Donald Horowitz, "Comparing Democratic Systems," in ibid.
36. For criticisms of majoritarianism, see Sisk, Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflict, p. ix; Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, pp. 25-28, 114-118;
37. For criticisms of majoritarianism, see Sisk, Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflict, p. ix; Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, pp. 25-28, 114-118;
38. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, pp. 629-630;
39. and Levine, "Political Accommodation and the Prevention of Secessionist Violence," pp. 333-334.
40. See Dahl, Polyarchy, p. 115.
41. Quoted in John Darnton, "Africa Tries Democracy, Finding Hope and Peril," New York Times, June 21, 1994, p. A6.
42. Larry Diamond, "Three Paradoxes of Democracy," in Diamond and Plattner, The Global Resurgence of Democracy, p. 104.
43. Quoted in Darnton, "Africa Tries Democracy, Finding Hope and Peril," p. A1.
44. This of course assumes that the ruling party does not enact oppressive policies. If one-party rule becomes too tyrannical, war might once again become the more attractive alternative.
45. According to Adam Przeworski, these are the conditions that make elections so attractive to competing groups as they transition from authoritarian rule. See Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
46. For a more comprehensive discussion of the destabilizing effects of political liberalization in war-shattered states, see Roland Paris, "Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism," International Security, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Fall 1997), p. 56.
47. For an excellent discussion of the importance of an integrated security force, see Sisk, Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflict, p. 57.
48. Baumhoegger, The Struggle for Independence, vol. 6, p. 1129.
49. For criticisms, see Sisk, Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflict, pp. 38-39; Brian Barry, "Review Article: Political Accommodation and Consociational Democracy," British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 5 (October 1975), pp. 477-505; and Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, p. 586.
50. For criticisms, see Sisk, Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflict, pp. 38-39; Brian Barry, "Review Article: Political Accommodation and Consociational Democracy," British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 5 (October 1975), pp. 477-505; and Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, p. 586.
51. For criticisms, see Sisk, Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflict, pp. 38-39; Brian Barry, "Review Article: Political Accommodation and Consociational Democracy," British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 5 (October 1975), pp. 477-505; and Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, p. 586.
52. William Finnegan, A Complicated War: The Harrowing of Mozambique (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), p. 4.
53. U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Africa Roy Stacy speaking at a donors' conference in Maputo, quoted in Thomas Ohlson, "Strategic Confrontation versus Economic Survival in Southern Africa," in Francis M. Deng and I. William Zartman, eds., Conflict Resolution in Africa (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1991).
54. Robert B. Lloyd, "Mozambique: The Terror of War, the Tensions of Peace," Current History, Vol. 94 (April 1995), p. 153. For the theoretical underpinnings of this argument, see I. William Zartman, Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985).
55. Robert B. Lloyd, "Mozambique: The Terror of War, the Tensions of Peace," Current History, Vol. 94 (April 1995), p. 153. For the theoretical underpinnings of this argument, see I. William Zartman, Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985).
56. Eric Berman, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Mozambique (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 1996), pp. 19-20.
57. See Thomas Ohlson and Stephen John Stedman with Robert Davies, The New Is Not Yet Born: Conflict Resolution in Southern Africa (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1994), pp. 113-116. See also Chris Alden and Mark Simpson, "Mozambique: A Delicate Peace," Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 31, No. 1 (March 1993), p. 126.
58. See Thomas Ohlson and Stephen John Stedman with Robert Davies, The New Is Not Yet Born: Conflict Resolution in Southern Africa (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1994), pp. 113-116. See also Chris Alden and Mark Simpson, "Mozambique: A Delicate Peace," Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 31, No. 1 (March 1993), p. 126.
59. Foreword in Berman, Managing Arms in Peace Processes, pp. xi-xii.
60. Ibrahim Msabaha, "Negotiating an End to Mozambique's Murderous Rebellion," in I. William Zartman, ed., Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1995), p. 210.
61. Berman, Managing Arms in Peace Processes, p. 21.
62. Cameron Hume, Ending Mozambique's War: The Role of Mediation and Good Offices (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1994), p. 10.
63. Allen Isaacman, "Mozambique: Tugging at the Chains of Dependency," in Gerald J. Bender, James S. Coleman, and Richard Sklar, eds., African Crisis Areas and U.S. Foreign Policy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985); Helen Kitchen, Angola, Mozambique, and the West (New York: Praeger, 1987); and Msabaha, "Negotiating an End to Mozambique's Murderous Rebellion."
64. Allen Isaacman, "Mozambique: Tugging at the Chains of Dependency," in Gerald J. Bender, James S. Coleman, and Richard Sklar, eds., African Crisis Areas and U.S. Foreign Policy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985); Helen Kitchen, Angola, Mozambique, and the West (New York: Praeger, 1987); and Msabaha, "Negotiating an End to Mozambique's Murderous Rebellion."
65. Allen Isaacman, "Mozambique: Tugging at the Chains of Dependency," in Gerald J. Bender, James S. Coleman, and Richard Sklar, eds., African Crisis Areas and U.S. Foreign Policy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985); Helen Kitchen, Angola, Mozambique, and the West (New York: Praeger, 1987); and Msabaha, "Negotiating an End to Mozambique's Murderous Rebellion."
66. See Finnegan, A Complicated War, pp. 246-247.
67. Hume, Ending Mozambique's War, p. 34.
68. Ibid., p. 59.
69. Ibid., p. 86.
70. Ibid., p. 60.
71. Ibid., p. 59.
72. Voice of RENAMO, "Dhlakama Says FRELIMO Army Launching Attacks to Stop Him Leaving for Summit," August 4, 1992, Lexis/Nexis, Section: Part 4, The Middle East, Africa, and Latin America, Mozambique Peace Talks, ME/1450/B/1.
73. Hume, Ending Mozambique's War, p. 62.
74. Ibid., p. 66.
75. Ibid., p. 67.
76. Donald Rothchild has argued that one reason why Dhlakama was willing to agree to the plan was because he was receiving side payments from British business interests. For an interesting analysis of this issue, see Rothchild, Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa: Pressures and Incentives for Cooperation (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1997).
77. Hume, Ending Mozambique's War, p. 133.
78. Maria Cremilda Massingue, "Mozambique Opposition RENAMO Is Two-Edged Sword, Scholar Says," March 9, 1996. Lexis/Nexis, Section: International News.
79. John Fleming, "Mozambique Rebel Now Works inside the System," Christian Science Monitor, November 19, 1996, p. 6.
80. For a more rigorous empirical examination of these cases as well as an analysis of the full set of civil wars between 1940 and 1990, see Walter, "The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement."
81. Only two civil wars reached successful settlement without an outside guarantee (Colombia in 1958 and Yemen in 1970), yet these were also the only two cases where the opposing parties could not launch surprise attacks on each other. Both wars were fought by relatively uncommitted armies whose loyalties could be procured by the highest bidder and thus did not represent an immediate threat to either opponent. It appears, therefore, as if Colombia and Yemen were exceptions that prove the rule.
82. See Dunstan M. Wai, The African-Arab Conflict in the Sudan (New York: Africana Publishing, 1981), p. 171.
83. The settlements in both Chad and Uganda included specific political guarantees. In neither case, however, was an outside state willing to enforce the final agreement.
84. From the Varkiza agreement as outlined in Keesing's Contemporary Archives, October 13-20, 1945, p. 7486.
85. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, February 1980, p. 30067.
86. Kenya and Tanzania never sent troops.
87. See especially John J. Mearsheimer, "The Only Exit from Bosnia," New York Times, October 7, 1997, p. A21; Mearsheimer and Robert A. Pape, "The Answer: A Three-way Partition Plan for Bosnia and How the U.S. Can Enforce It," New Republic, June 14, 1993; and Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Conflict," pp. 136-175.
88. See especially John J. Mearsheimer, "The Only Exit from Bosnia," New York Times, October 7, 1997, p. A21; Mearsheimer and Robert A. Pape, "The Answer: A Three-way Partition Plan for Bosnia and How the U.S. Can Enforce It," New Republic, June 14, 1993; and Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Conflict," pp. 136-175.
89. See especially John J. Mearsheimer, "The Only Exit from Bosnia," New York Times, October 7, 1997, p. A21; Mearsheimer and Robert A. Pape, "The Answer: A Three-way Partition Plan for Bosnia and How the U.S. Can Enforce It," New Republic, June 14, 1993; and Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Conflict," pp. 136-175.