The elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina: The end of an illusion

Problems of Post-Communism

Volumn 44, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 3-15

  Shoup, Paul ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0030637964     PISSN: 10758216     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/10758216.1997.11655710     Document Type: Article

References (63)

1. In the New York Times (June 14, 1996), Secretary of State Warren Christopher justified the holding of elections as vital for the creation of new institutions in Bosnia, without which there would be no Bosnian state. Christopher argued that by setting a firm date the international community could better compel the participants to live up to their responsibilities.
2. The agreement was signed March 1, 1994, and laid out principles for the creation of a Bosnian Federation and a preliminary agreement on a confederation between the federation and Croatia. Negotiations in Vienna held at the U.S. embassy produced a draft constitution, which was then agreed to by the Muslims and Croats on March 18 in Washington.
3. "Dayton Agreement on Implementing the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina of 9 November 1995." By December 10, 1995, the RBiH assembly was to have adopted legislation dealing with the powers and functions of the federation, and one month later the federal government was to assume exclusive governmental authority over the federation.
4. "General Framework Agreement," Annex 4. Proximity Peace Talks, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Dayton, OH, November 1-21, 1995.
5. The rules and regulations of the PEC can be found in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in English, nos. 22 and 25, 1996.
6. Annex 3 provided that the elections had to meet the standards set out in the OSCE Copenhagen document, the provisions of which were appended as an annex to Annex 3.
7. At an international experts' meeting on elections held in Stockholm in January 1996, it was recommended that the responsibility for monitoring the elections be separated from the PEC and given to an independent body. Following the meeting's recommendation, van Thijn became coordinator and took over responsibility for deploying some 25 long-term observers and some 850 short-term observers. See International Crisis Group, "Elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina," Part I (September 22, 1996), p. 8.
8. The vote was to be by party lists. In the case of the vote for the Muslim and Croat members of the presidency of the government of BiH, voters were to chose either a Muslim or Croat candidate. The Muslim and the Croat who received the highest number of votes were elected.
9. International Crisis Group, "Elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina," Part II (September 22, 1996), p. 11. As the report noted, many of the OSCE staff were secunded from member states, who were slow to cooperate and to provide funds to enable the OSCE to carry out its tasks. This problem has plagued the international reconstruction effort in Bosnia from the start.
10. Internal OSCE memos were passed on to the New York Times (June 2, 1996). These memos reported that representatives of the international organization were the target of death threats and that elections, especially at the local level, could not be held before the deadlines set out at Dayton. One U.S. official said, "We are way over our heads" (Washington Post [May 15,1996]).
11. Internal OSCE memos were passed on to the New York Times (June 2, 1996). These memos reported that representatives of the international organization were the target of death threats and that elections, especially at the local level, could not be held before the deadlines set out at Dayton. One U.S. official said, "We are way over our heads" (Washington Post [May 15,1996]).
12. New York Times (June 3, 1996).
13. Several days after refusing to issue a statement supporting the U.S. stand, Cotti stated, "If minimal conditions are not met, then I believe it will be better to delay the elections. If these elections degenerate into a farce and a drama, then it will be a negative exercise for all the parties involved" (New York Times [June 8, 1996]). On June 25, Cotti gave the go-ahead, but made clear that he did so reluctantly, warning that the elections could end up consolidating the position of the nationalist parties (New York Times [June 26, 1996]).
14. Several days after refusing to issue a statement supporting the U.S. stand, Cotti stated, "If minimal conditions are not met, then I believe it will be better to delay the elections. If these elections degenerate into a farce and a drama, then it will be a negative exercise for all the parties involved" (New York Times [June 8, 1996]). On June 25, Cotti gave the go-ahead, but made clear that he did so reluctantly, warning that the elections could end up consolidating the position of the nationalist parties (New York Times [June 26, 1996]).
15. In Cotti's words, "If no actions are undertaken right now against the indicted war criminals, it can be taken for granted that the elections will very quickly give way to developments diametrically opposed to those which they are expected to yield. There exists the most serious danger that they then degenerate into a pseudo-democratic legitimization of extreme nationalist power structures and ethnic cleansing. Instead of peaceful evolution in keeping with the peace agreement, the elections would lead to further dramatic tensions" (New York Times [June 26, 1996]).
16. See the Guardian (August 28, 1996), and Oslobodjenje (European ed.) (September 23, 1996).
17. See the Guardian (August 28, 1996), and Oslobodjenje (European ed.) (September 23, 1996).
18. Absentee voting in the Mostar elections was arranged in Europe by the EU. Displaced Mostar residents were allowed to vote only if they came to Mostar. The provision affected the 17,000 former Serb residents of the city. Only 150 Serbs - sent by the Belgrade Association of Refugees -showed up to vote. The number of Muslims and Croats who turned up (some 18,000) almost equaled the number of those who crossed the entity boundaries in the September elections.
19. For the Mostar elections, see the International Crisis Group report 12a and 12b "Bosnia: Mostar Elections" (July 13, 1996); available at: www.intl-crisis-group.org/projects/bosnia/report/bh12arep.htm.
20. According to the voting register compiled by the EU, 4,085 refugees from Mostar voted in Germany. When the ballots were counted, twenty-six more ballots were cast than voters registered. The election law required that under these circumstances a new vote take place. On these grounds, the Mostar City Elections Committee annulled the German results. This decision was then annulled by the European Union Administration of Mostar ombudsman, providing the pretext for the HDZ challenge to the election results.
21. Guardian (August 5, 1996).
22. Under the compromise, the council would meet to choose a Croat mayor and a Muslim deputy mayor and would meet regularly only after a court (not specified) had ruled on the Croats' voting complaint (Guardian [August 7, 1996] and New York Times [August 8, 1996]).
23. Under the compromise, the council would meet to choose a Croat mayor and a Muslim deputy mayor and would meet regularly only after a court (not specified) had ruled on the Croats' voting complaint (Guardian [August 7, 1996] and New York Times [August 8, 1996]).
24. The SPiM included the Socialist Party of the Republic of Serbia (SPRS), an offshoot of the Serbian Socialists; the Yugoslav Left (JUL); and other splinter parties of the Left. For a description of the parties contesting the election in the RS, see International Crisis Group, "Electioneering in Republika Srpska" (August 1996); available at: www.intl-crisis-group.org/ projects/bosnia/report/bh06rep.htm.
25. This was possible because funds were made available to parties by the OSCE for campaigning in proportion to the number of candidates the party was able to field. Thanks to Arkan's financial support the SSJ was able to run candidates throughout the RS and thus received generous OSCE financial assistance.
26. The parties within the ZL included the Union of Bosnian Social Democrats (UBSD) from Tuzla, lead by the mayor of Tuzla, Selim Beslagić; the Social Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina (SDPRiH), the formerly the League of Communists; the Croatian Peasant Party (HSS), lead by Ivo Komšić, who was the ZL candidate for the presidency of BH; the Muslim Bosnian Organization (MBO) of Adil Zulfikarpašić; and the Republicans of Stjepan Kljujić.
27. See Zija Dizdarević in her excellent analysis of the SDA in Oslobodjenje (European ed.) (September 23, 1996) and the remarks of Sefudin Tokić in War Report (September 1996), p. 7.
28. See Zija Dizdarević in her excellent analysis of the SDA in Oslobodjenje (European ed.) (September 23, 1996) and the remarks of Sefudin Tokić in War Report (September 1996), p. 7.
29. The figure was quoted in Oslobodjenje (European ed.) (February 5, 1996). Included in this total were 227,478 in Tuzla canton, 121,556 in Zenica, 57,254 in Travnik, 144,513 in Sarajevo, 49,911 in Mostar, 68,400 in Goražde, and 30,000 in the Bihać canton.
30. For the struggle to set up an independent television network, see the International Crisis Group report of May 6, 1996, "Bosnia: Conditions for Democratic Elections," p. 3; available at: www.intl-crisis-group.org/ projects/bosnia/report/bh06rep.htm. It should be added that Bosnians were not entirely deprived of different points of view on television. Fikret Abdić's supporters were allowed to appear on Croatian television, which could be seen in Cazinska Krajina. Belgrade television could be viewed in the eastern part of the RS, and a transmitter was finally put in operation in the Banja Luka area as well. There were also a number of local independent radio stations in the FBiH, and Radio Krajina in Banja Luka, funded and protected by the Serb military, which was critical of conditions in the RS but did not touch on the national question. The Swiss funded Radio FERN (Free Election Radio Network), but its transmissions were jammed in the RS by Radio Sonja. Bosnians could also tune in BBC and the Voice of America, but the impact of these stations was apparently small. For these and other aspects of the effort to bring free television and radio to Bosnia, see Guardian (September 10, 1996) and New York Times (September 12, 1996).
31. For the struggle to set up an independent television network, see the International Crisis Group report of May 6, 1996, "Bosnia: Conditions for Democratic Elections," p. 3; available at: www.intl-crisis-group.org/ projects/bosnia/report/bh06rep.htm. It should be added that Bosnians were not entirely deprived of different points of view on television. Fikret Abdić's supporters were allowed to appear on Croatian television, which could be seen in Cazinska Krajina. Belgrade television could be viewed in the eastern part of the RS, and a transmitter was finally put in operation in the Banja Luka area as well. There were also a number of local independent radio stations in the FBiH, and Radio Krajina in Banja Luka, funded and protected by the Serb military, which was critical of conditions in the RS but did not touch on the national question. The Swiss funded Radio FERN (Free Election Radio Network), but its transmissions were jammed in the RS by Radio Sonja. Bosnians could also tune in BBC and the Voice of America, but the impact of these stations was apparently small. For these and other aspects of the effort to bring free television and radio to Bosnia, see Guardian (September 10, 1996) and New York Times (September 12, 1996).
32. For the struggle to set up an independent television network, see the International Crisis Group report of May 6, 1996, "Bosnia: Conditions for Democratic Elections," p. 3; available at: www.intl-crisis-group.org/ projects/bosnia/report/bh06rep.htm. It should be added that Bosnians were not entirely deprived of different points of view on television. Fikret Abdić's supporters were allowed to appear on Croatian television, which could be seen in Cazinska Krajina. Belgrade television could be viewed in the eastern part of the RS, and a transmitter was finally put in operation in the Banja Luka area as well. There were also a number of local independent radio stations in the FBiH, and Radio Krajina in Banja Luka, funded and protected by the Serb military, which was critical of conditions in the RS but did not touch on the national question. The Swiss funded Radio FERN (Free Election Radio Network), but its transmissions were jammed in the RS by Radio Sonja. Bosnians could also tune in BBC and the Voice of America, but the impact of these stations was apparently small. For these and other aspects of the effort to bring free television and radio to Bosnia, see Guardian (September 10, 1996) and New York Times (September 12, 1996).
33. Oslobodjenje (European ed.) (August 19, 1996).
34. New York Times (August 5, 1996).
35. Guardian (August 12, 1996) gave the example of Spolak, where 6,000 Croat refugees registered to vote - three times the number that left during the war (in 1991 the town had a Muslim majority).
36. The controversy over Karadžić's resignation was heightened by the manner in which the High Representative, Carl Bildt, dealt with the problem. In late June, Bildt said he had received a letter of resignation from Karadžić and that his duties had been taken over by Biljana Plavšić, only to have Plavšić insist that Karadžić would continue to hold office until the elections were held (New York Times [July 1, 1996]). As this episode unfolded, a devastating report in the Guardian (July 2, 1996) revealed that Karadžić remained in control of the SDS and of the committee responsible for choosing candidates for the elections, using this opportunity to remove his opponents from Banja Luka from the party electoral lists.
37. The controversy over Karadžić's resignation was heightened by the manner in which the High Representative, Carl Bildt, dealt with the problem. In late June, Bildt said he had received a letter of resignation from Karadžić and that his duties had been taken over by Biljana Plavšić, only to have Plavšić insist that Karadžić would continue to hold office until the elections were held (New York Times [July 1, 1996]). As this episode unfolded, a devastating report in the Guardian (July 2, 1996) revealed that Karadžić remained in control of the SDS and of the committee responsible for choosing candidates for the elections, using this opportunity to remove his opponents from Banja Luka from the party electoral lists.
38. Under pressure from Western human rights groups, the OSCE appeals board finally fined the SDS $50,000 for engaging in secessionist propaganda (Washington Post [September 11, 1996]).
39. The removal of Karadžić was exploited by the SDS for its own political ends during the campaign, and Serb intellectuals sympathetic to the efforts of the international community to indict war criminals reminded the OSCE and related organizations that arresting Karadžić and bringing him to The Hague, as many in the West advocated, would only make him a martyr in the RS and strengthen the position of the SDS. See the International Crisis Group report "Electioneering in Republika Srpska," p. 8.
40. Frowick estimated that no more than 20,000 Muslims and Croats crossed into Serb territory; Bosnian officials predicted as many as 110,000 would cross (Washington Post [September 15, 1996]).
41. These deficiencies were covered in the OSCE parliamentary report on the elections, "Report on the Elections in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina held on September 14, 1996," and the reports of the International Crisis Group and the CSCE/Helsinki Commission, cited in notes 7,20, 25, and 42.
42. International Crisis Group, "The Elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina," Part III (September 22, 1996), pp. 10-12.
43. The original OSCE/UN estimate of the potential voter pool was 2.9 million. When the ICG aired its charges, Frowick, according to media reports, ordered his staff to use the figure of 3.2 million. The Election Appeals Subcommission of the OSCE, upon re-examination of the data, concluded that Frowick's figure was probably inflated and urged a recount. This finding was in turn overruled by the PEC, which suggested that the matter be resolved by a "retabulation" of the votes, rather than a recount (Washington Post [September 28, 1996] and Guardian [September 25 and 28, 1996]). For a defense of the PEC estimate concerning the number of potential voters and the number who actually voted (in the case in question for the presidency of the BiH), see the explanation of Jeff Fischer, a member of the PEC, in Oslobodjenje (European ed.) (October 24, 1996). Fischer asserted that 76 percent voted, not 103 percent, as claimed by the ICG.
44. The original OSCE/UN estimate of the potential voter pool was 2.9 million. When the ICG aired its charges, Frowick, according to media reports, ordered his staff to use the figure of 3.2 million. The Election Appeals Subcommission of the OSCE, upon re-examination of the data, concluded that Frowick's figure was probably inflated and urged a recount. This finding was in turn overruled by the PEC, which suggested that the matter be resolved by a "retabulation" of the votes, rather than a recount (Washington Post [September 28, 1996] and Guardian [September 25 and 28, 1996]). For a defense of the PEC estimate concerning the number of potential voters and the number who actually voted (in the case in question for the presidency of the BiH), see the explanation of Jeff Fischer, a member of the PEC, in Oslobodjenje (European ed.) (October 24, 1996). Fischer asserted that 76 percent voted, not 103 percent, as claimed by the ICG.
45. The original OSCE/UN estimate of the potential voter pool was 2.9 million. When the ICG aired its charges, Frowick, according to media reports, ordered his staff to use the figure of 3.2 million. The Election Appeals Subcommission of the OSCE, upon re-examination of the data, concluded that Frowick's figure was probably inflated and urged a recount. This finding was in turn overruled by the PEC, which suggested that the matter be resolved by a "retabulation" of the votes, rather than a recount (Washington Post [September 28, 1996] and Guardian [September 25 and 28, 1996]). For a defense of the PEC estimate concerning the number of potential voters and the number who actually voted (in the case in question for the presidency of the BiH), see the explanation of Jeff Fischer, a member of the PEC, in Oslobodjenje (European ed.) (October 24, 1996). Fischer asserted that 76 percent voted, not 103 percent, as claimed by the ICG.
46. Guardian (September 30, 1996). At an earlier point, according to media accounts, the right to certify the elections had been taken out of the hands of Flavio Cotti and turned over to Frowick. Guardian (September 25, 1996).
47. Guardian (September 30, 1996). At an earlier point, according to media accounts, the right to certify the elections had been taken out of the hands of Flavio Cotti and turned over to Frowick. Guardian (September 25, 1996).
48. Oslobodjenje (European ed.) (September 23, 1996).
49. For an analysis of the SDA victory in Muslim areas, see Zija Dizdarević in Oslobodjenje (European ed.) (October 7, 1996).
50. Some, although not all, of the voting by municipality has been reported in the Bosnian press. The data for Tuzla and Sarajevo appeared in Oslobodjenje (European ed.) (September 21-22, 1996), before the final count was in.
51. Washington Post (September 15, 1996).
52. See the analysis of the NATO role in the Bosnian reconstruction effort by John Pomfret in the Washington Post (October 27, 1996).
53. CSCE/Helsinki Commission, "The September 1996 Elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina," p. 15; available at: http://www.house.gov/csce/bobsbosn.htm.
54. There were threats to boycott the elections. The SDA, three weeks before the elections, threatened a boycott if the P-2 forms were not abolished, all voters abroad registered, and local elections postponed (Oslobodjenje [European ed.] [August 24-25, 1996]). The SDS also demanded that the voting in the RS be declared invalid, and Izetbegović threatened to boycott the elections if Herzeg Bosna was not dissolved at least three days before the elections (Oslobodjenje [September 9, 1996]). The SDS reacted furiously to the postponement of local elections, claiming the Dayton peace process had been "seriously distorted" (Guardian [August 28, 1996]).
55. There were threats to boycott the elections. The SDA, three weeks before the elections, threatened a boycott if the P-2 forms were not abolished, all voters abroad registered, and local elections postponed (Oslobodjenje [European ed.] [August 24-25, 1996]). The SDS also demanded that the voting in the RS be declared invalid, and Izetbegović threatened to boycott the elections if Herzeg Bosna was not dissolved at least three days before the elections (Oslobodjenje [September 9, 1996]). The SDS reacted furiously to the postponement of local elections, claiming the Dayton peace process had been "seriously distorted" (Guardian [August 28, 1996]).
56. There were threats to boycott the elections. The SDA, three weeks before the elections, threatened a boycott if the P-2 forms were not abolished, all voters abroad registered, and local elections postponed (Oslobodjenje [European ed.] [August 24-25, 1996]). The SDS also demanded that the voting in the RS be declared invalid, and Izetbegović threatened to boycott the elections if Herzeg Bosna was not dissolved at least three days before the elections (Oslobodjenje [September 9, 1996]). The SDS reacted furiously to the postponement of local elections, claiming the Dayton peace process had been "seriously distorted" (Guardian [August 28, 1996]).
57. Oslobodjenje (European ed.) (September 9, 1996).
58. CSCE/Helsinki Commission, "The September 1996 Elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina," p. 5.
59. A new organization chief has been brought in, Patrick Bradley of Ireland. See Oslobodjenje (European ed.) (October 7, 1996).
60. See Jan Urban's excellent account of the elections in Oslobodjenje (European ed.) (August 12, 1996).
61. On July 9 the FBiH parliament passed a law creating a joint defense ministry. The law was not implemented; on October 2, under heavy American pressure, it was announced that the two forces had merged, yet the Croatian deputy commander, General Zivko Budimir, has continued to insist that the degree of integration of the two armies will be that stipulated in the Dayton accords, which provide for the autonomous existence of the two armies. See Washington Post (October 3, 1996) and Oslobodjenje (European ed.) (October 5-6, 1996).
62. On July 9 the FBiH parliament passed a law creating a joint defense ministry. The law was not implemented; on October 2, under heavy American pressure, it was announced that the two forces had merged, yet the Croatian deputy commander, General Zivko Budimir, has continued to insist that the degree of integration of the two armies will be that stipulated in the Dayton accords, which provide for the autonomous existence of the two armies. See Washington Post (October 3, 1996) and Oslobodjenje (European ed.) (October 5-6, 1996).
63. It has been observed in the literature on ethnic conflict that the desire to end a foreign intervention can unite conflicting ethnic groups. See Robert Cooper and Mats Berdal, "Outside Intervention in Ethnic Conflict," Survival (spring 1993): 118-42.