Transparency, reputation, and credibility under floating and pegged exchange rates

Journal of International Economics

Volumn 49, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 31-50

  Herrendorf, Berthold ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK   (United Kingdom)

^b CEPR   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Credibility; Exchange rate regime choice; Private information; Reputation; Transparency

Indexed keywords

EXCHANGE RATE; FINANCIAL MARKET;

EID: 0032703849     PISSN: 00221996     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0022-1996(98)00060-9     Document Type: Article

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